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Sunday, 3 March 2024

Phillipians2:6-8 demystified

   Philippians 2:6-8 [pt 1] 


ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, 7 ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος· καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος....
                                   
"Who, being [huparchon] in the form [morphe] of God [theou], thought it not robbery [harpagmos] to be equal [ison] with God.  But ... took upon him the form [morphe] of a servant, and was made in the likeness [homoiomati] of men:  And being found in fashion [schemati] as a man...." - Phil. 2:6-8, KJV.

"Who, although He existed [huparchon] in the form [morphe] of God [theou], did not regard equality [ison] with God a thing to be grasped [harpagmos], but emptied Himself, taking the form [morphe] of a bond-servant and being made in the likeness [homoiomati] of men.  And being found in appearance [schemati] as a man...." - Phil. 2:6-8, NASB.

Some trinitarians insist that this scripture proves that Jesus was (and is) "equal with God."  But all the real evidence proves just the opposite!  Phil. 2:6 is, in reality, proof that Jesus has never been equally God with the Father! 


To begin with, as the Watchtower Society has pointed out, the context of Phil. 2:3-8 indicates how Phil. 2:6 should be understood.  The context stresses the concept of humility and obedience, and Phil. 2:6 itself is clearly meant as the prime example of this for all Christians.  The extremely trinitarian The Amplified Bible, for example, translates Phil. 2:3, 5 this way: 


"Instead, in the true spirit of humility (lowliness of mind) let each regard the others as better than and superior to himself.... Let this same attitude and purpose and [humble] mind be in you which was in Christ Jesus. - Let Him be your example in humility."

Then that very example of Jesus (Phil. 2:6-8) is given. - Cf. The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, vol. 1, p. 547.

Most trinitarian interpretations of Phil. 2:6, however, as above, do not show Jesus as regard-ing God as "better than and superior to himself" in the beginning (as the context demands for this example)!  Most of them, instead, twist that proper example of humility into just the opposite: an example of a person who regards himself already as equal to the Most High, Almighty God ("thought it not robbery to be equal to God").  Such an interpretation destroys the very purpose (Phil. 2:3) of Jesus' "example in humility" here! 

Paul is not telling us to regard ourselves as equal to others.  (Whether we obey them or not is very important but is not the main point here.)  He is clearly using Jesus as his example to teach that each Christian must, as the very trinitarian Amplified Bible above puts it, "regard others as better than and superior to himself"!  And yet most trinitarian translations show Jesus doing the very opposite in this "example in humility" for all Christians!

Something, then, is very wrong with the translation of Phil. 2:6 in most trinitarian Bibles!

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                                                          Harpagmos

Now notice how these two very trinitarian Bibles have rendered it:


1.  "He did not think to snatch at [harpagmos, ἁρπαγμὸς ]  equality with God"[1]  -  NEB. 

  
2.  "He did not think that by force [harpagmos] he should try to become  equal with God" - TEV (and GNB).

We believe that the translations by the trinitarian NEB and TEV Bibles of this part of Phil. 2:6 must be the intended meaning of the original writer of this scripture because (in part, at least) of the obvious meaning of the New Testament (NT) Greek word harpagmos. 
 There could be some doubt about the meaning of the word harpagmos if we looked only at the NT Greek Scriptures (since harpagmos occurs only at Phil. 2:6 in the entire New Testament).  We would then only have the meaning of the source words for harpagmos to determine its intended meaning.

Even so, Strong's Exhaustive Concordance (by trinitarian writer and trinitarian publisher) tells us that harpagmos means "plunder" and that it comes from the source word harpazo which means: "to seize ... catch away, pluck, take (by force)." - #725 & 726, Abingdon Press, 1974 printing. 

And the New American Standard Concordance of the Bible (also by trinitarians) tells us:  "harpagmos; from [harpazo]; the act of seizing or the thing seized."  And, "harpazo ... to seize, catch up, snatch away."  Notice that all have to do with taking something away by force. - # 725 and #726, Holman Bible Publ., 1981.

In fact, the trinitarian The Expositor's Greek Testament, 1967, pp. 436, 437, vol. III, tells us:

"We cannot find any passage where [harpazo] or any of its derivatives [which include harpagmos] has the sense of `holding in possession,' `retaining' [as preferred in many trinitarian translations of Phil. 2:6].  It seems invariably to mean `seize', `snatch violently'.  Thus it is not permissible to glide from the true sense [`snatch violently'] into one which is totally different, `hold fast.' " 

Even the very trinitarian NT Greek expert, W. E. Vine, had to admit that harpagmos is "akin to harpazo, to seize, carry off by force." - p. 887, An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words. 

And the trinitarian The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology tells us that the majority of Bible scholars (mostly trinitarian, of course) 

"have taken harpagmos to mean a thing plundered or seized..., and so spoil, booty or a prize of war." - p. 604, vol. 3, Zondervan, 1986. 

The key to both these words (harpagmos and its source word, harpazo) is: taking something away from someone by force and against his will.  And if we should find a euphemism such as "prize" used in a trinitarian Bible for harpagmos, it has to be understood only in the same sense as a pirate ship forcibly seizing another ship as its "prize"! 

We can easily see this "taken by force" meaning in all the uses of harpazo (the source word for harpagmos) in the New Testament.  But since harpagmos itself is used only at Phil. 2:6 in the NT, Bible scholars must go to the ancient Greek translation of the Old Testament (which is frequently quoted in the NT), the Septuagint. 

In the Septuagint harpagmos (in its forms of harpagma[2,3]  and harpagmata) is used 16 times according to trinitarian Zondervan's A Concordance of the Septuagint, p. 32, 1979 printing.  And in every case its meaning is the taking of something away from someone by force.  Here they are in the Bagster Septuagint as published by Zondervan:  Lev. 6:4 "plunder;" Job 29:17 "spoil" (a "prize" taken by force); Ps. 61:10 (Ps. 62:10 in most modern Bibles) "robberies;" Is. 42:22 "prey;" Is. 61:8 "robberies;" Ezek. 18:7 "plunder;" Ezek. 18:12 "robbery;" Ezek. 18:16 "robbery;" Ezek. 18:18 "plunder;" Ezek. 19:3 "prey;" Ezek. 19:6 "take prey;" Ezek. 22:25 "seizing prey;" Ezek. 22:27 "get dishonest gain" (through the use of "harpazo" or "force"); Ezek. 22:29 "robbery;" Ezek. 33:15 "has robbed;" and Malachi 1:13 "torn victims" (compare ASV). 

So, in spite of some trinitarians' reasonings and euphemistic renderings, it is clear from the way it was always used in scripture that harpagmos means either taking something away by force (a verb), or something which has been taken by force (a noun). 

Many trinitarian translators, however, either make nonsense out of the meaning of Phil. 2:6 by  actually using the proper meaning of "robbery" or "taken by force" without showing God's clear superiority over Jesus which the context demands, or, instead, making sense of it by choosing a word that doesn't have the proper meaning of "taking by force." 

For example, the King James Version (KJV) does use "robbery" (a nearly-accurate meaning for harpagmos) but obviously mangles the meaning of the rest of the statement so that it doesn't even make proper sense: "thought it not robbery to be equal with God."  This is a nonsensical statement even by itself.  In context it is even more inappropriate! 

Yes, as we have seen above, even in the KJV it is apparent from context that the purpose of this example is to emphasize lowliness of mind, humility: to regard others as better than yourself (vv. 3-5).  Paul certainly wouldn't destroy this example of humility for fellow Christians by saying that Jesus is thinking that it isn't robbery for him to be equal with the Most High!  Besides being a nonsensical statement, it is just the opposite of humility!  Instead, to be in harmony with the purpose of Paul's example, we must find a Jesus who regards God as superior to himself and won't give even a moment's thought about attempting to take that most high position himself, but, instead, humbles himself even further.  

Trinitarian scholar R. P. Martin, for example, feels the context (especially the obvious contrast of verses 6 and 7) clearly proves that harpagmos in verse 6 means Christ refused to seize equality with God.  Emphasizing the fact that this is a contrast with verse 6, verse 7 begins with "but [alla]."  In accord with this, he tells us, 

"V[erse] 6b states what Christ might have done [or could have attempted to do], i.e. seized equality with God; v. 7 states what he chose to do, i.e.  give himself." - The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, vol. 3, p. 604. 

The Phil. 2:6 footnote for ‘grasped’ (harpagmos) in the NAB (2002, by United States Conference of Catholic Bishops) : 

[6] "Either a reference to Christ's preexistence and those aspects of divinity that he was willing to give up in order to serve in human form, or to what the man Jesus refused to grasp at to attain divinity.  Many see an allusion to the Genesis story: unlike Adam, Jesus, though . . . in the form of God (Genesis 1:26-27), did not reach out for equality with God, in contrast with the first Adam in Genesis 3:5-6."  

The NASB, on the other hand, chooses an English word for harpagmos that doesn't clearly bring out its full intended meaning: "[Jesus] did not regard equality with God a thing to be grasped [harpagmos]," when, of course, it should be: "did not regard equality with God a thing to be taken by force [harpagmos]."  (Review the quote from the Expositor's Greek Testament above.)[4] 

An excellent illustration of the trinitarian's dilemma concerning an honest translation of Phil. 2:6 can be shown by the 1971 "Palm Sunday Controversy" in France (see  June 15, 1971 WT):

At every Palm Sunday Mass, Phil. 2:5-11 is read.  The 1959 lectionary for France's Catholic Church read:  "Being of divine status, Christ did not greedily hold on to [harpagmos] the rank that made him equal to God." 


In 1969 the Roman Catholic bishops of France authorized a new lectionary for their country.  The Holy See in Rome approved it on September 16, 1969.  In this new lectionary Phil. 2:6 was translated:  "Christ Jesus is God's image [morphe, `form']; but he did not choose to seize by force [harpagmos] equality with God."

This new translation, needless to say, started a great controversy and demonstrations by many Catholics throughout France.  As one French Catholic magazine explained:  "If he [Jesus] refused to seize it [equality with God], it must be that he did not already possess it." 

So much pressure was brought to bear upon the Church in France that the trinitarian Catholic bishops who had insisted upon the new honest translation were forced to change it.  So, in an attempt to compromise, they rendered it:  "He [Jesus] did not choose to claim to be the same as God."


This newest version was also thoroughly condemned by the same trinity-defending French Catholic magazine.  It noted that if Christ "did not choose to claim to be the same as God," this implied that he was not "the same as God," and "the practical effect of this substitution amounts to heresy and blasphemy."


But, in spite of threats and demonstrations, the French episcopate refused to compromise any further.  Le Monde reported, 


"this translation ... was accepted by the entire body of French-speaking bishops.  The Permanent Council of the French Episcopate, that has just met in Paris, has ratified it; so it will stand."

Why did these trinitarian Catholic scholars and Church officials insist on a translation of Phil. 2:6 that so obviously denies the "central doctrine" of the Catholic Church?    
                                                
This question was answered by an article in Le Monde (6 April 1971): 


 "The scholars responsible for this change - a change ratified by the majority of French bishops - consider the new translation more faithful to the Greek text than the former [1959] one was." 


So the French Catholic cardinals, archbishops, and bishops found themselves in a dilemma.  They could either give up their new, more honest, translation of Phil. 2:6 which would show they are more loyal to their trinitarian traditions than to the truth of the inspired scriptures (Matt. 15:6-9; 1 Cor. 4:6; Gal. 1:8, 9; 2 Tim. 4:3, 4; John 8:31-32), or they could keep their new official translation and thereby admit that many other French trinitarian Bibles (as well as many translations in other languages) have mistranslated Phil. 2:6.  In order to take the latter course required not only a strong stand against tradition but the strength and courage to stand against the desires (and demonstrations, politics, economic pressures, etc.) of a large number of their countrymen.  Courage of such a magnitude is rare in the ranks of tradition-bound Christendom! 


When even a number of the best trinitarian scholars are willing to admit the actual meaning (or even an equivalent compromise) of harpagmos at Phil. 2:6, it becomes necessary for honest-hearted, truth-seeking individuals to admit that Phil. 2:6 not only does not identify Jesus as God, but that it clearly shows Jesus is not God!


The highly regarded (and trinitarian) The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, 1986, Zondervan, says: 


"Although the Son of God in his pre-existent being was in the form of God, he resisted the temptation to be equal with God (Phil. 2:6).  In his earthly existence he was obedient to God, even unto death on the cross (Phil. 2:8) .... After the completion of his work on earth he has indeed been raised to the right hand of God (Eph. 1:20; 1 Pet. 3:22) .... But he is still not made equal to God.  Although completely co-ordinated with God, he remains subordinate to him (cf. 1 Cor. 15:28)." - p. 80, vol. 2. [Emphasis found in quotations is nearly always added by me, as it also is here.]
  Ison: "Equal" 


Of course most trinitarians ignore the proper translation of harpagmos.  Among such "scholars" was the influential Dr. Walter Martin, the anti-"cult" Trinity defender.  He tells us, in fact, that the word "equal" here further proves Jesus' absolute equation with God [but only if you mistranslate harpagmos first, of course]. 



(Please consider:  Being "equal to someone or something" [like being "the image of someone"] is really a statement that you are not really that person or thing at all!  When we intend to identify someone or something, we come right out and say it.  We do not say, "David is equal to the king of Israel;" "Jesus is equal to the Christ;" "Jehovah is equal to God;" etc.!  No, we clearly say, "David is King over Israel" - 2 Sam. 5:17; "Jesus is the Christ" - 1 Jn 5:1; "Jehovah is God" - 1 Ki 18:39, Living Bible, ASV, Young's, and The Interlinear Bible; Ps 100:3, ASV, Young's, and The Interlinear Bible.  - - - Remember, "LORD" in most Bibles is a mistranslation of "Jehovah.")


 "The term `equal' here," Martin writes, "is another form of ison [see MINOR 7-10], namely isa, which again denotes absolute sameness of nature, thus confirming Christ's true Deity." - p. 68, KOTC.  


So Martin tries to tell us that Phil. 2:6 is asserting that Jesus "thought it not something to be retained [harpagmos] to be of the absolute same nature with God."  But, as we have seen (MINOR 7-11), isos does not mean "absolute equality of nature" - cf. Matt. 20:12; Luke 20:36 (esp. LB).  


Even the highly acclaimed trinitarian authority The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology admits that ison (and its related forms) 


"indicates more strongly an external, objectively measurable and established likeness and correspondence"  - p. 497, vol. 2.  

A careful study of the NT uses of this word not only shows that it means an external likeness but that it may even be limited to a likeness of only one aspect of the original [MINOR 8 - "John 5:18 (`Equal': Ison)"].

Isos (isa, neut.) "ἴσος ... prob. from 1492 [eido] (through the idea of seeming); similar (in amount or kind)" - Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible.

  So when one thing is described as isa [ison] with another thing, they are still two separate different things.  One is merely like or similar to another in a certain aspect.

The very trinitarian The International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia, vol. 2, p. 968, discussing isos, reveals: 


"In Mt 20:12, `made them equal' means `put them upon the same footing,' i.e. regarded their brief service as though it were the very same as our long hours of toil.  In Lk 20:36 the context restricts the equality to a particular relation." - Eerdmans Publ., 1984 reprint.


In other words, ison at Matt. 20:12 makes the workers measurably "equal" to one another in only one external aspect: the amount of money they were to receive.  They were really very unequal otherwise.  Also in Luke 20:36, as the trinitarian reference quoted above tells us, those resurrected humans and God's angels are not necessarily considered equal in essence in this scripture but in only one particular relation: they will not die again.  (See Living Bible.) 


And we see the same thing in the OT Septuagint:


"so thy quarrel and enmity shall not depart, but shall be to thee like [isos] death." - Prov. 25:10, Septuagint Version, Zondervan Publ., 1970, p. 813.  


"Quarrel" and "enmity" certainly are not absolutely equal to death (in spite of the fact that some could render this "shall be equal [isos] to death")!   The similarity of the single quality of permanence is the only thing being equated here.  The "quarreling" and "enmity" are a never-ending condition, like death itself.


Furthermore, the fact that isa is neuter in this verse in Philippians means that Paul is not saying that Jesus is perfectly equal to God himself.  You see, the word `God' here is the masculine form of the word, and for the word `equal' (whatever its intended meaning) to be applied wholly to the word `God' itself it must be of the same gender (masculine in this case - isos). - see the similar use of the neuter `one' used for the masculine `God' in the ONE study.  


Therefore, even if isa could mean absolute equality, only some thing (or things)  about God are being considered - not God as a whole.[5]  So Jesus is refusing to seize some thing or things (authority, power, immortality, ...?) that are similar to God's.


That is why 4th century trinitarians were forced to use a non-Biblical word instead of isos in an attempt to provide just such a meaning for their trinitarian creeds (see MINOR 8-9). 

So if we translated this passage with the actual, full meaning of the word ison, the literal NT Greek - ("not taking by force [harpagmos] considered [hegeomai] the to be `equal' [isa] with god [theo]") - would be rendered: "did not even consider forcefully trying to become like God (even in any single aspect)."

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                                          Theos: "God"/"a god"



Another thing we should know about Phil. 2:6, 7 concerns the phrase "of God" (θεοῦ or theou).  A perfectly honest alternate translation of this verse can be: "though he was existing in the form of a god [i.e., `a mighty individual' in a similar sense that the Bible calls angels and Israelite judges `gods' - see the DEF and BOWGOD studies]."  The NWT does not translate it that way, but grammatically and doctrinally it is a perfectly honest rendering and probably accounts for the 1959 French translation of Phil. 2:6, "being of divine status" and the NEB's "divine nature" and the renderings in Moffatt and the JB.  (See the first part of the DEF study which discusses "god/divine.") 

This scripture contrasts Jesus as, first, being in "form of god" (morphe theou) and, then, (2:7) being in "form of slave" (morphen doulou).  Both of these phrases use the word "form" followed by an anarthrous genitive noun.  This means that we are being given a contrast of two grammatical parallels.

 If we should decide to translate the second half of this parallel as "form of a slave," then there can be no honest objection on grammatical grounds for translating the first part of this parallel as "form of a  god."  In fact it would seem more appropriate to translate it this way instead of "form of [the] God."


That means it would certainly not be improper to interpret Phil. 2:6, 7 as "although he was existing in the form of one in a high position of mightiness and/or authority (as, in a lower sense, the position of angels, and even certain Israelite judges and kings, qualified them to be called `gods' occasionally in the inspired scriptures), he never even gave a thought about an attempt to seize equality with God, but instead, he gave up that exalted position he already had and took on the form of one in a lowly position."


To show further that the anarthrous genitive theou ("God" or "a god") as found at Phil. 2:6 may be honestly translated "of a god," compare Acts 12:22 in any NT Greek-English interlinear Bible  - "the voice of a god." 


The Watchtower Society, however, interprets Phil. 2:6 to mean that Jesus  was in the form of God.  That is, he was a spirit person as are all heavenly persons - see WORSHIP-1.  The Father is a spirit person (John 4:23, 24 KJV, ASV); the angels are spirit persons (Heb. 1:7 KJV - also see Aid book, p. 1542 - and pp. 39 and 593 in the trinitarian Today's Dictionary of the Bible); men resurrected to heaven become spirit persons (Phil. 3:20, 21; 1 Cor. 15:44-53); and Jesus is (and was in the beginning also) a spirit person (1 Pet. 3:18, 1 Cor. 15:45).


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                                                                Morphe



Although it has been rejected by even many trinitarian Bible scholars, some others attempt to force an interpretation of morphe (μορφῇ) that includes the idea of "essence" or "nature." They do this only at Phil. 2:6 (Jesus "was in the form [morphe] of God") because the true meaning of morphe will not allow for the trinitarian interpretation that Jesus is God.  But with their forced interpretation of morphe at Phil. 2:6 they can say that Jesus had the "absolute essence" and "full nature" of God!
 However, as even many trinitarian Bible scholars admit: 


"Morphe is instanced from Homer onwards and means form in the sense of outward appearance."  -  The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, 1986, Zondervan, p. 705, vol. 1.  


Thayer agrees that morphe is 


"the form by which a person or thing strikes the vision; the external appearance" - Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, p. 418, Baker Book House.  [Also see Young's Analytical Concordance (also compare the closely-related morphosis) and Liddell and Scott's An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, p. 519, Oxford University Press, 1994 printing.] 


It's easy to see why even many trinitarian scholars disagree with the forced "nature" interpretation of morphe when you look at all the scriptural uses of morphe (according to Young's Analytical Concordance, Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1978 printing and  A Concordance of the Septuagint, Zondervan Publishing House, 1979 printing): Mark 16:12; Phil. 2:6, 7 in the New Testament and in the Old Testament Greek Septuagint of Job 4:16 "there was no form [morphe] before my eyes;" Is. 44:13 "makes it as the form [morphe] of a man;" Dan. 4:33 "my natural form [morphe] returned to me;" 5:6, 9, 10 "the king's countenance [morphe] changed;" 7:28 "[Daniel's] countenance [morphe] was changed." - The Septuagint Version, Greek and English, Zondervan, 1976 printing.  


Morphe is found at Mark 16:12 which is part of the "Long Ending" for the Gospel of Mark.  Many scholars do not consider this as inspired scripture, but, instead, a later addition by someone to Mark's original inspired writing.  However, even if this is the case, it is still an example of how morphe was used in those times since copies of the "Long Ending" were in existence at least as early as 165 A.D. (Justin Martyr).


So notice especially how the New American Bible (1970), the Living Bible, The New English Bible, the Douay version, the New Life Version, and the Easy-to-Read Version translate morphe at Mark 16:12:


"he was revealed to them completely changed in appearance [morphe]" - NAB.


"they didn't recognize him at first because he had changed his appearance [morphe]." - LB.


"he appeared in a different guise [morphe]" - NEB.


"he appeared in another shape [morphe]" - Douay.


"he did not look like he had looked [morphe] before to these two people" - NLV.


"Jesus did not look the same" - ETRV.


Mark 16:12 - "He appeared in another form. Luke explains this by saying that their eyes were held. If their eyes were influenced, of course, optically speaking, Jesus would appear in another form." - People's New Testament Notes.

These trinitarian translations show the meaning of morphe to be that of "external appearance" not "essence" or "nature"![6]  


The hyper-trinitarian Living Bible even renders morphe at Phil. 2:7 as "disguise"!  And the 1969 French lectionary (see section on harpagmos above) rendered morphe at Phil. 2:6 as image!


The further uses of morphe, the very same form as used at Phil 2:6, by those first Christian writers to write after the NT itself was written (the Apostolic Fathers - about 90 A.D. to 150 A.D.) make a trinitarian rendering at Philippians 2:6 even more incredible:


      "There was no form [μορφῇ] before my eyes, but I heard a breeze and a voice." 1 Clem. 39:3, The Apostolic Fathers, Sparks, 1978, Thomas Nelson, Inc., Publ.


      "I want to show you what the holy Spirit, which spoke with you in the form [μορφῇ] of the Church, showed you" - Hermas, Sim. 9:1:1, Sparks.


Also notice how the first Christian writers after the Apostolic fathers understood the meaning of morphe at Phil 2:6 itself:


"... who being in the shape of God, thought it not an object of desire to be treated like God" - Christian letter from 177 A.D. sometimes ascribed to Irenaeus, The Ante-Nicene Fathers (ANF), p. 784, vol. 8.


"... who being in the image of God, `thought it not ...'" - Tertullian, about 200 A.D., ANF, p. 549, vol. 3.


"...who being appointed in the figure of God ..." - Cyprian, about 250 A.D., ANF, p. 545, vol. 5.


We can see, then, that, with the originally-intended meaning of morphe, Paul is saying that before Jesus came to earth he had a form or an external appearance resembling that of God (as do the other heavenly spirit persons, the angels, also).[7]  


So one in the morphe of a slave is one who has the appearance of a slave (but is not in actuality - thus, "taking the disguise [morphe] of a slave" - Phil. 2:7, Living Bible.). 


This is the obvious meaning of "form" here and it is still used in this sense even today.  As an example The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology (TNIDONTT) says:


 "According to Gen 18:1 ff., God appeared to Abraham in the form of three men." - p. 706, vol. 1.  


Although scripturally incorrect (see the IMAGE study: "Actual physical representations") some trinitarians today say that God was in the form of three men (or angels).  Obviously they mean only that he appeared that way to men, but really was not what his outward appearance seemed: he was not actually three men!!).


Isaiah 44:13, for example, says in the Septuagint: "The artificer having chosen a piece of wood, marks it out with a rule, and fits it with glue, and makes it as the form [morphe] of a man" - Zondervan, 1976 printing.  Now a "Wooditarian" might well claim that the wood in this scripture `clearly has the full and complete essence, nature, etc. of Man,' but no objective, reasonable person would accept his wishful interpretation!  Instead an honest interpretation can only be that the artificer made the piece of wood to appear like a man. 

The fact that it is in the form (morphe) of a man shows conclusively (as we should know anyway) that it is not a man!  If the writer of this scripture had somehow intended to say that the artificer had indeed made the piece of wood into a real man, he would not have used morphe.  He would have written that the artificer "makes it into a man."  And, of course, it is equally true that Paul would not have said Jesus was in the form (morphe) of God if he had meant that Jesus was God!  The use of morphe there shows that Jesus was not God!


Yes, the fact that some trinitarians insist that morphe can mean the very essence or nature of a thing does not make it so.  We know that `essence,' `nature,' `essential nature,' etc. were not intended here by Paul simply because of the way this word is always used in scripture.  We know it also by the fact that there were words available to Paul which really did mean `essence' or `nature.'    If Paul, or any other Bible writer, had ever wished to use a word indicating the nature, substance, or essence of something, he could have used phusis or, possibly, even ousia.



Phusis, "φύσις... nature, i.e,  ....  d. the sum of innate properties and powers by which one person differs from others" - Thayer, #5449.

  Phusis, "φύσις, ... the nature, natural qualities, powers, constitution, condition, of a person or thing" - Liddell and Scott, p. 876.


"Phusis (φύσις), ... signifies (a) the nature (i.e., the natural powers or constitution) of a person or thing" - W. E. Vine, p. 775.


Ousia, "οὐσία ... that which is one's own, one's substance, ....   III. the being, essence, nature of a thing" - p. 579, Liddell and Scott's An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford Press.

 For example, Philo, the most popular Jewish scholar and teacher of these times (early to middle first century A.D.), used these two terms in speaking of God's nature:


"[The prophet asks concerning the Creator:] Is He a single Nature (phusis) ... or a composite Being? .... Nevertheless he did not succeed in finding anything by search respecting the essence [ousia] of Him"  -  p. 99, Philo, vol. V, "On Flight and Finding," Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1988 printing.


(Philo, as well as all other Jewish and Christian writers of this time never considered God to be more than one person, the Father alone! - see CREEDS, ISRAEL, and LOGOS studies.)

Paul himself was very familiar with at least one of these terms:


Formerly, when you did not know God, you were enslaved to beings that by nature [phusis] are not gods. - Gal. 4:8, NRSV.  (Cf. 2 Pet. 1:4)


Yes, if Paul had intended `nature,' `very essence,' etc., he certainly would not have used a word which means only external appearance (morphe).   He would have used one of the words which really mean absolute nature!


We also have morphe and isa as parallels in the "exalted pre-existent" (Phil. 2:6) first part of this passage.  And we have morphe, homoiomati, and schemati as parallels in the humble "fleshly existent" follow-up (Phil. 2:7-8).  Furthermore, the latter humbled "fleshly" part of this passage ("himself emptied taking morphe of a slave, becoming in homoiomati of men and having been found in the schemati of a man") is the antithetic parallel of the first "exalted" part ("morphe of God").


In other words, there is a common meaning in all these parallel terms.  They are used nearly synonymously.  For example, even hyper-trinitarian W. E. Vine admits: 


"`It is universally admitted that the two phrases ["morphe of God" and "morphe of a slave"] are directly antithetical, and that `form' [morphe] must therefore have the same sense in both.'"  - extreme trinitarian Vine is quoting from extreme trinitarian Gifford's "The Incarnation." -  An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words,  p. 454.


Therefore, if we can determine the meanings of the descriptive parallels (homoiomati and schemati) to "morphe" in the `humbled, fleshly' portion of this scripture, we will then know exactly what was intended by the word morphe in that phrase ("morphe of a slave").  And if we thus determine the meaning of morphe in "morphe of a slave," we will know exactly how morphe was intended to be understood in its exalted parallel: "morphe of God."

What meaning do all these parallel words share?  Like "image" they all mean, not the actual thing but a representation, a similarity, something with only the outward appearance of some other thing.  Therefore, since "morphe" in the phrase "morphe of a slave" is proven by its synonymous parallels (homoiomati, schemati) to mean merely a likeness, then "morphe" in the further parallel of "morphe of God" must also mean merely a likeness!  So, just with its own internal meaning alone, Phil. 2:6-8 shows that "morphe of God" must mean in a form like God's or similar to God!


In other words, when we see `morphe of a servant' being further paralleled (and explained) by "likeness [homoiomati] of men" and "in fashion [schemati] [8]  as a man," there should be no doubt left as to what Paul actually intended when he wrote `morphe of a servant'!  Homoioma (which, of course, includes the form used in Phil. 2:7 - homoiomati) means nothing else but `likeness'![9]   


Even if, as a few trinitarians improperly claim, homoiomati meant "the same as" [and it clearly does not!], it would be asinine to say "he came to be the same as a man" if you intended to say "he came to be a man"!  Either he is a man, or he is not!  Saying he is "the same as" a man clearly indicates he is not really a man!  


And when we know that `morphe of a servant' means `external appearance like  that of a servant,' then we know that this morphe's parallel in `morphe of God' must mean an "external appearance like that of God (or `a god')"!


Paul simply would not have written that Jesus was merely SIMILAR in appearance (morphe) to God (as all real evidence plainly shows) if he thought that Jesus was God!



---------------------------------------------- 


                                           Huparchon (or `Uparchon')


Another less than forthright rendering of  "being in form of God (or a god)" by a few trinitarian scholars involves the Greek word huparcho (translated "being" above).  Huparcho (huparchon or uparchon [ὑπάρχων in Greek letters] is the actual form of huparcho used in this scripture) is sometimes "interpreted" by a few trinitarians in an attempt to show an eternal pre-existence (see TEV).[10]   This is done in an attempt to deny the actuality of Jesus' creation by God. Similarly, Dr. Walter Martin in his The Kingdom of the Cults declares: 


 "Christ never ceased to be Jehovah even during His earthly incarnation.  It is interesting to note that the Greek term uparchon, translated `being' in Philippians 2:6 [KJV], literally means `remaining or not ceasing to be' (see also 1 Corinthians 11:7), hence in the context Christ never ceased to be God."  - p. 94, 1985 ed. 


If uparchon really had such a meaning, we would expect it to be used especially for God.  What else that exists has an eternal existence?  But search as we will we never see this word used for God!  Some examples where we would expect to see it used (if it really meant `eternal existence') in the Bible Greek of the ancient Septuagint are Is. 43:10, 25; 45:15, 22; 46:4, 9.  Like all other scriptures referring to God, they use forms of the "be" verb (eimi), which may be used to mean an eternal existence, but they never use uparchon to describe his existence!  (Is. 45:22, for example, says, "I am [eimi] the God and there is no other." - cf. James 2:19 [estin, form of eimi])[11]  So why is uparchon never used for the only thing in existence that has always existed (and which will never cease to exist)? 


Uparchon is never used for God because it actually, literally means (in spite of Martin's "scholarly" declaration above): 


"to make a beginning (hupo, `under'; arche, `a beginning')" - W. E. Vine's An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words, p. 390. 

Strong's Exhaustive Concordance also defines huparcho as "to begin under (quietly), i.e. COME INTO EXISTENCE" - #5225.  


And the authoritative (and trinitarian) An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon by Liddell and Scott tells us: 

"[huparcho] ... to begin, make a beginning ... 2.  to make a beginning of ... 3.  to begin doing ...   4.   to begin [doing] kindness to one ...  Pass. to be begun" - p. 831, Oxford University Press, 1994 printing. [12]


So, even though it may be rendered into English as "existed" or "is," it nevertheless seems it should also be understood as something that has come into existence at some point. 


In that sense, then, huparchon is very much like another NT word, ginomai, γινόμαι  [#1096, Thayer's], which also literally means "become" or "come into existence" but is sometimes translated into English as "is," "are," etc.  E.g., 1 Peter 3:6 "whose daughters ye are [ginomai]," KJV, NKJV, NAB, RSV, NIV, is more properly understood as "you have become [ginomai] her children," NASB, NRSV, NEB, NWT - Cf. John 6:17, "It was [ginomai] dark."   
 As respected trinitarian NT Greek expert Dr. Alfred Marshall tells us:


"[Ginomai] denotes the coming into existence of what did not exist before.... This verb [just like huparchon] is therefore not used of God...."[13]  


Marshall further explains that although ginomai is often translated into English as "is," "are," "were," etc. it must nevertheless be remembered that it still retains the additional meaning of having come into existence! - p. 106, New Testament Greek Primer, Zondervan Publishing House, 1978 printing. 


For another good example of the similarity of huparchon with ginomai see Luke 16:23 and 22:44.


Lk. 16:23  -  "he lifted up his eyes, being [huparchon] in torment," NASB.


Lk. 22:44  -  "and being [ginomai] in agony he was praying," NASB.


In very similar statements Luke has used the very similar (in meaning) huparchon and ginomai and the highly respected NASB has rendered them both "being."  But in both cases their fundamental meanings of "coming into existence" (or "coming to be") must be remembered.  In other words, the person had not always been in torment or agony, but at some point had "come to be" in such a condition!


If you examine the following examples of the Biblical usage of huparcho, you will find they are clearly speaking of conditions which once did not exist but which have come into existence ("have begun to be"): Luke 16:23; Acts 2:30; Acts 7:55; Acts 8:16; Ro. 4:19; 1 Cor. 11:18; 2 Cor. 8:17; James 2:15.


These last four verses not only show a state that has begun recently but a state that is transient, temporary - e.g., Abraham hadn't always been [huparchon] 100 years of age and certainly wouldn't continue to be 100 years of age: he had begun to be [huparchon] about 100 years old at this point - Ro. 4:19.


1 Cor. 11:18, KJV says: 


 "I hear that there be [huparchon] divisions among you [the Corinthian congregation]."  


Such divisions had not always existed there.  Nor must they always continue to be there, or Paul would not have bothered to counsel them to heal their divisions.  The complete understanding for this verse is, obviously:


 "I hear that there have begun to be [huparchon] divisions among you." 


2 Cor. 8:16, 17 tells us: 


"But thanks be to God, who puts the same earnestness on your behalf in the heart of Titus.  For he [Titus] ..., being [huparchon] himself very earnest, he has gone to you of his own accord." - NASB. 


It should be obvious to everyone that Titus hasn't been earnest from all  eternity.  He obviously came to be earnest at some point in time.  And, in fact, we are even told in verse 16 that at some point in time God put this earnestness in Titus' heart.  Obviously it was not always there if God put it in his heart at some point!  The meaning of huparchon as "having come [or begun] to be" is very certain from the context alone in these two verses. 


James 2:15 tells us, in the KJV: "If a brother or sister be [huparchon] naked [`without clothes' - NIV, NASB]," we must help him to become clothed again.  Obviously the brother has not been naked for all eternity but has very recently come to be in this condition.  It's equally obvious that the brother will not always continue in this condition.  In fact his brothers are commanded to ensure that he not continue in this naked state.  (Famed trinitarian Bible scholar Dr. Robert Young noted the correct, complete meaning for huparchon in this verse: "BEGIN to be [huparchon] naked" - Young's Concise Critical Bible Commentary, Baker Book House, 1977 ed.) 


Therefore, huparcho (or huparchon) does not mean "eternal pre-existence" as claimed by some trinitarians, and it certainly does not have to mean a condition that must continue to exist as Dr. Walter Martin also implies.  Notice the solitary example (1 Cor. 11:7) he has selected to "prove" that uparchon means "not ceasing to be":

"For a man ... is [huparchon] the image and glory of God" - NASB. 

My trinitarian NASB reference Bible refers this scripture to Gen. 1:26; 5:1; 9:6; and James 3:9.  These scriptures all state that man was created or made in the image of God.  (In fact James 3:9 literally says that men "have come to be [ginomai, #1096] in the likeness of God" and is usually translated in trinitarian Bibles as "have been made [or created] in the likeness of God." - NASB, NIV, RSV.) 


So there is the real parallel meaning for the huparchon of 1 Cor. 11:7 -  created!  There obviously was a time (before he was created) when a man was not the image of God.  Furthermore, Martin's solitary "example" states that "a man" (NASB) is the image of God.  This means that every man who lives has these qualities in some degree.  However, not every man will have these qualities forever.  Many, when they return to the dust of the earth, will cease to reflect God's qualities and glory!  It would be much better to translate this verse literally as "For a man ought not to have his head covered, since he has come into existence [huparchon] in the image and glory of God."


There is little doubt about what huparchon was actually intended to mean (regardless of how modern trinitarian translators wish to translate it).  Noted trinitarian scholar and translator Dr. Robert Young (Young's Analytical Concordance to the Bible;  Young's Literal Translation of the Holy Bible; etc.) has even admitted in his Young's Concise Critical Bible Commentary (p. 134, Baker Book House, 1977) that his own rendering of huparchon as "being" at Phil. 2:6 in his own published Bible translation should be, to be more literal,

"beginning secretly [huparchon] in (the) form of God ...." - Phil. 2:6 [14]  


So, rather than any "eternal pre-existence" being implied by Paul's use of huparchon at Phil. 2:6 ("who `always having been' in God's form" - cf. TEV), it is more likely just the opposite:  "Who came into existence (or was created) [huparchon] in a form [morphe] similar to God (or in God's image)"![15]    Of course, if Jesus first came into existence in God's image, then he cannot be the eternal, always-existent God of the Bible (nor even the always-existent God of the trinity doctrine)! 


Or, put even more simply, since huparchon is never used for God himself, then its use for the pre-existent Jesus shows, again, that Jesus cannot be God!


[To be honest, I must admit that a friend who is a NT Greek scholar disagrees with my understanding of huparchon. He believes that it is properly used as 'being' without regard to 'beginning.']


What we really have at Phil. 2:6-7, then, may be more accurately rendered: 


"who, even though he had come into existence as a glorious spirit person in a likeness [external form or guise] of God (or a god), never gave even the slightest consideration that by force he should try to become equal to God (in even a single aspect or quality), but, instead, emptied himself of his glorious form and took on the likeness [external form or guise] of a slave, being born in the likeness of men." 


When all is examined, Phil. 2:6 is, in reality, proof that Jesus has never been equally God with the Father! 

PHIL 2:6 - pt 2 (Notes)
NOTES



1. It is significant that it speaks of “equality with God” not “equality with the Father” in these two trinitarian Bibles. With their wordings of this verse one cannot even say that Jesus was equally God, although, somehow, subordinate to the Father, as some trinitarians attempt. 



2. No less an authority than highly trinitarian NT Greek scholar Dr. A. T. Robertson has admitted that “the few examples of harpagmos ... allow it to be understood as equivalent to harpagma, like baptismos and baptisma.”  - p. 444, vol. IV, Word Pictures.

Furthermore, the trinitarian The Expositor’s Greek Testament also admits that “It is generally admitted now that ἁρπαγμὸς [harpagmos] may be regarded as = ἁρπαγμa  [harpagma, as often found in the Septuagint OT].”

 If there should still be any question about the different endings here (harpagma / harpagmon) for the same basic word harpagmos, you can show the example of “blasphemous / blasphemer” as used in the New Testament Greek. Under the designation of blasphemos (#989 in Strong’s; Thayer’s; and the New American Standard Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible) we find this same NT Greek word has these endings: Blasphema (Acts 6:11) and Blasphemon (1 Tim. 1:13). Yes, like harpagmos: harpagma / harpagmon, the same basic NT word (blasphemos) is used as a noun at 1 Tim. 1:13 (blasphemon) and as an adjective at Acts 6:11 (blasphema). See Vine, p. 124; Thayer, p. 103; Strong’s, #989 in the “Greek Dictionary”; New American Standard Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, #989, p. 1639; and The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology (Zondervan 1986), vol. 3, p. 345. Another example is #1199 (desmos): Luke 8:29 (desma) and Mk. 7:35 (desmos). - See Thayer, Strong’s, etc. Also see Vine, p.88.



3. Robertson, desperately trying to maintain a trinitarian interpretation, goes on to ‘explain’ that at Phil. 2:6 Paul means “a prize [harpagmos interpreted as ‘a result’] to be held on to rather than something to be won [harpagmos interpreted as ‘an act’, e.g. ‘robbery,’ ‘seizure’]” - p. 444, vol. IV, Word Pictures. 

But if we really take harpagmos at Phil. 2:6 “to be equivalent to harpagma,” as Robertson states, we find it probably should be interpreted as an act (Robertson himself also admits that words ending in -mos were originally so intended) rather than a result. For example, Ezekiel (as found in the Septuagint) uses forms of harpagmos (harpagma and harpagmata) more than any other OT writer. In Ezek. 18:7, 12, 16, and 18 he uses harpagma, whereas in Ezek. 19:3, 6; 22:25, 27, and 29 he uses harpagmata. 

Each one of the 4 uses of harpagma in Ezek. 18 means an act of seizing by force. Each one of the 5 uses of harpagmata means a result: a “prize” or “spoil” or “prey” (all of which are the results of “taking by force”). So even if, as Robertson says, harpagmos is equivalent to harpagma, harpagmos still means an act of “taking by force”. 

In addition, even when the “result” meaning is used (harpagmata in the above Septuagint references), it always has a verb with it (usually harpazo, “taken by force”) showing what was being done to the “spoil.” So even if the “result” meaning (“spoil,” “prey”) were intended, it would have a verb indicating its use: “taken” (or, perhaps, even “held on to” as trinitarians want at Phil. 2:6). But there is no such verb at Phil. 2:6. Even if there were such a verb there, it would still be saying: “He didn’t even consider [holding on to his] forcefully-seized spoil: to be equal to God.” This is an unacceptable interpretation due to the inherent meaning (“forcefully seized”) of harpagmos (or harpagma or harpagmata). The only proper understanding at Phil. 2:6 must be: Even though he was in a likeness (or ‘outward appearance’) of God, he never gave any consideration to trying by forceful seizure to be equal to God.” - Compare GNB.



4. The trinitarian Revised English Bible’s rendering of Phil. 2:6 is also a compromise, but still more honest than NASB: “Yet he laid no claim to equality with God” - REB. This compromise is a result of recognizing the significance of harpagmos but giving a rendering which only allows the possibility of its true meaning. The REB gave up the usual trinitarian insistence that, somehow, Jesus was equal with God. They managed to twist the meaning just enough to imply that he may or may not have actually been equal to God, whereas a totally honest translation of harpagmos reveals that he definitely was NOT equal to God!



5. A good example is the use of isa (“equal” at Isaiah 51:23) in the Septuagint: Here God is speaking about those oppressors who commanded Israelites to lie down flat on the ground so they could be walked upon, and the Israelites “made their bodies equal [isa] with the ground” so they could be walked upon. Obviously the Israelites did not make their bodies absolutely equal with the ground thereby making themselves literal ground [or having the ‘absolute sameness of nature’ as the ground as Walter Martin would have to say] also, but merely made them equal in the attributes (neuter) of the ground: flatness, lowness, destined to be walked upon, of little worth, etc. 



6. As for the wishful thinking of a few trinitarian apologists that morphe had been used by the early pagan Greek philosophers with some kind of “essence” meaning and then slipped into the common language and then into the NT in this single verse: Most words used with different meanings by specialists (including philosophers) today do not slip into the common language, and they didn’t in the first centuries either. Morphe was no exception:

“Philosophical Use. morphe has no unequivocal sense in philosophy. .... The term never achieves any fixity that influences ordinary usage, and from Stoicism onward is rare in philosophy. Philo contrasts unformed matter with the creation, in which things have received their forms [appearances]. In general morphe in all its nuances represents what may be seen by the senses” - p. 608

“Phil. 2:6-7 speaks in hymnic style of the “form” of Christ. .... Prior to the incarnation he is in the form of God [Phil. 2:6], i.e., he bears the image of the divine majesty, and after the incarnation he is exalted again as the kyrios. In antithesis to the earlier and the later glory, his incarnation is a time of humble service when he bends his own will to that of others.” - p. 609, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (trinitarian) Abridged in One Volume (‘Little Kittel’), 1985, Eerdmans (trinitarian).

Phil. 2:6: [Trinitarian Dr. Adam Clarke agrees with the interpretation of trinitarians Dr. Macknight and Dr. Whitby. He quotes Dr. Macknight who says his] “interpretation is supported by the term μορφῇ  [morphe], form, here used, which signifies a person’s external shape or appearance, and not his nature or essence. Thus we are told, Mark 16:12, that Jesus appeared to his disciples in another μορφῇ, shape, or form. And, Matthew 17:2, μετεμορφώθη, he was transfigured before them — his outward appearance or form was changed. .... this sense of μορφῇ  [morphe] θεοῦ [theou], is confirmed by the meaning of μορφὴν δούλου  [morphe doulou], Philippians 2:7; which evidently denotes the appearance and behavior of a servant or bondman, and not the essence of such a person. See Whitby and Macknight.” - Clarke’s Commentary, NT, pp. 1100-1101, vol. 6A, Ages Software, Version 2.0, 1997.

    In a discussion concerning the definition of morphe, Paul R. wrote: 


“…. those who advocated "form" as a definition of "morphe" simply stated that it means such, while those who advocated "external appearance" also provided support for their interpretation, such as 4 Macc. 15.3 (4), Mark 16:12, 1 Clement 39:3, Job 4:16 LXX, Xenophon, Philo, Lucian, and Libanius.


“Can one prove a theory without supporting evidence?   I don't think so.”



7.  However, even if we allowed the modern, forced “nature” meaning for morphe, we still wouldn’t necessarily have to understand Jesus as being equally God with the Father. As the trinitarian Today’s Dictionary of the Bible, 1982, Bethany House Publ., tells us: 

“the name [‘angel’] does not denote their nature [just as the title ‘God’ or ‘god’ does not necessarily denote one’s nature], but their office as messengers” - p. 38. “As to their nature, they are spirits.” - p. 39.

Or, as the equally trinitarian New Bible Dictionary (2nd ed.), Tyndale House, 1982, tells us, angels are “uncorrupted spirit in original essence.” - p. 36.

Today’s Dictionary of the Bible also tells us that this nature (“spirit”) of angels is “the divine nature” - p. 593. And the New Bible Dictionary admits: “in his nature God is pure spirit.” - p. 427. 

Therefore, God, Jesus, and the angels all have the “essence” or “nature” of spirit. This obviously does not make them all equally God! Man, mouse, and canary are certainly not all equally man simply because they all have the same “essence” or “nature” of flesh! 




8.   “General. The term schema [which includes its form of schemati] denotes the outward structure or form that may be known by the senses. .... Philo [contemporary with NT writings] makes rich use of the term with the primary sense of what may be known from outside, e.g, forms, artistic or mathematical figures, forms of speech, also human bearing, disposition, posture, or position. He also uses the word for ‘distinctive character.’ Thus at the Passover every house takes on the schema of a sanctuary. [In this example, then, we see that Kittel’s ‘distinctive character’ is something which is not the reality but resembles it in ‘character’ only!]” - pp. 1129, 1130, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament Abridged in One Volume, (‘Little Kittel’).


9.    “homoioma. This rare word means ‘what is similar,’ ‘copy,’ with a stress on the aspect of ‘similarity.’ .... In Rom. 8:3 and Phil 2:7 Paul uses [homoioma] with reference to Christ’s earthly life. In Rom. 8:3 he stresses the reality of Christ’s humanity by saying that he came in the ‘likeness’ of sinful flesh; he entered the nexus of human sin but without becoming subject to the power of sin, as would be implied if Paul had simply said ‘in sinful flesh.’ The homoioma denotes likeness in appearance but distinction in essence. .... The term homoioma is clearly an attempt to overcome the difficulty of having to say that the Christ in whom human sin is condemned is not himself a sinner. .... It is not implied that he has ceased to be God [or ‘divine’ for non-trinitarians]; even in his humanity Christ is at the same time a being of another kind. In the fathers Ignatius refers to the resurrection of believers corresponding to Christ’s ‘likeness’ (Trallians 9.2), and an early sacramentary calls the bread the ‘likeness’ of Christ’s body.” - pp. 685, 686, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Abridged in One Volume, (‘Little Kittel’). The scholarly acclaim for this work is great, but so is its trinitarian bent!

Yes, as even most trinitarian scholars will tell you, homoiomati means “a likeness” “that which is made like something, a resemblance”! - W. E. Vine. Even super-trinitarian Vine himself agrees that Paul intended that Jesus only resembled men in that he was “not simply and merely man ... but the Incarnate Son of God” - W. E. Vine, quoting Gifford, quoting Meyer). 

It should be obvious that the trinitarian tactic of insisting that “likeness” here actually means the reality itself is unacceptable. But, to those who insist on such an interpretation, let’s look at James 3:9. Here James speaks of men “who have been made in the likeness of God” - NASB. Those trinitarians who insist that “likeness” at Phil. 2:7 provides a parallel with ‘morphe of God’ that makes Jesus God should, then, also insist that “likeness” at James 3:9 makes men God! (We might also examine “likeness” at Gen. 5:1. Here the Bible tells us that man was created “in the likeness of God”! - KJV; NKJV; NASB; ASV; NIV; RSV; NRSV; NAB; NJB; NEB; AT; MLB; etc. Again, then, trinitarian-type ‘evidence’ makes even men God!)



10. TEV (Today’s English Version, American Bible Society) reads at Phil. 2:6, “He always had [huparchon] the very nature [morphe] of God ...” 

There is no honest justification for such a rendering of huparchon. It simply emphasizes the desperation of trinitarians to find (or invent) some scriptural justification for their very unscriptural belief. See the HIST study to see how and why the trinity doctrine was developed in the 4th century A.D.

Even trinitarian NT scholar W. E. Vine tells us: 

“the present participle of huparcho, to exist, which always involves a pre-existent state, prior to the fact referred to, and a continuance of the state after the fact. Thus in Phil. 2:6, the phrase ‘who being (huparchon) in the form of God,’ implies His pre-existent Deity, previous to His Birth, and His continued Deity afterwards.” - p. 108, An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words, Nelson, 1983 printing. 

This is sheer poppycock, of course! There is no example to support objectively such a wishful interpretation and plenty to refute it! (See how huparchon is used at Ro 4:19, for example.)



11. The forms of the be verb (which include εἰ, ἐστὶν, ἦν,ἔσομαι, etc.) may or may not include the understanding of eternal existence. Therefore, they may be used to describe either God’s existence (eternal) or the existence of one of God’s transient creations. For example, Is. 46:9 says in the Greek of the Septuagint, ego eimi ho theos (ἐγὼ εἰμί ὁ θεὸς  - ‘I am God’), and Peter said at Acts 10:26 “stand up; I myself also am (εἰμί) a man.” In the first example eimi may be understood as including the meaning of eternal existence. In the second example it surely does not include such a meaning.



12. Even the extremely trinitarian A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature tells us: “ὑπάρχω  [huparcho] impf. ὑπάρχων … the basic idea: came into being fr[om] an originating point and so to take place; gener. ‘inhere, be there’.” – p. 1029, University of Chicago Press, 2000. Unfortunately, the rest of the entry attempts to show that its use in the NT is to be simply understood as to exist or be (ignoring the literal meaning of the word and a proper analysis of the word as used in the NT.) This trinitarian lexicon lists the following as examples of Paul’s use of the word: Ro. 4:19; 1 Cor. 7:26; 11:7; 11:18; 12:22; 13:3; 2 Cor. 8:17; 12:16; Gal. 1:14; 2:14; Phil. 2:6; 3:20.


 13. This is similar to the distinction between the use of kalos, the Greek NT word for “good” and agathos, another NT Greek word for “good.” One is never used for God, but only for His creations. The other may be used for God and his creations.

A man addressed Jesus as “Good [agathos] Teacher.” Jesus replied, “Why do you call me good [agathos]? No one is good [agathos] except one, God.” - Mark 10:17,18. Jesus clearly states that only God should be called agathos and strongly indicates that he, Jesus, is not that one who is to be called agathos. (It would appear that Jesus meant that only God is agathos in the ultimate sense of the word.)

However, Jesus also calls himself “the good [kalos] Shepherd.” - Jn 10:11. Not only does this not use the NT word agathos, but we see that true Christians are also “good” [kalos] just like Jesus! They are “good [kalos] ministers” - 1 Tim. 4:6, ASV, and “good [kalos] stewards” - 1 Peter 4:10, ASV. 

In fact, God Himself is described as “good” with agathos, but never with kalos in all the Greek Scriptures. The reason kalos is never (in its hundreds of uses in OT and NT) used for the person of God may be explained by the use of kalos at Gen. 1:4-31 in the Septuagint where each of God’s creations is called “good” [kalos]. Paul reinforces this usage at 1 Tim. 4:4 - “For every creature of God is good [kalos]”, ASV. 

The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology also admits that in the OT “kalos, as opposed to agathos, is what is pleasing to Yahweh, what he likes or what gives him joy, whereas agathos suggests more the application of an ethical standard.” - p. 103, vol. 2, Zondervan, 1986. And Thayer writes, “Thus even in the usage of the O.T. we are reminded of Christ’s words, Mk. x. 18, [‘no one is agathos except one, God’].” - p. 3, #18, Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Baker Book House, 1984 printing. 

The fact that Christians are called kalos in Scripture proves they are not God who, for whatever reason, is never called kalos! It also proves Jesus is not God! 



14. Early Christian writer Cyprian (ca. 250 A.D.) wrote of Phil. 2:6 that Paul wrote: “Who being established [translation of huparchon into Latin – constitutus(?)] in the form of God….” – p. 521; and “Who being appointed [another rendering of huparchon into the Latin used by Cyprian – constitutus (?)] in the figure of God….” – p. 545, vol. 5, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Eerdmans Publishing, 1990.



Even earlier, Tertullian quoted Phil. 2:6 in his 'On the Resurrection of the Flesh,' 6:4 (see ANF, vol. 3, p. 549, f.n. #14) by using the Latin constitutus in place of the Greek huparchon: "qui in effigie dei constitutus non rapinam existimavit pariari deo" ["who in image of god having been created (constitutus) ...."]. - http://tertullian.org/articles/evans_res/evans_res_03latin.htm  

……………..

Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary:


"con-stituo , ui, ūtum, 3, v. a. [statuo] , to cause to stand, put or lay down, to set, put, place, fix, station, deposit a person or thing somewhere (esp. firmly or immovably), etc. (the act. corresponding to consistere; class.). 


“....


"B. With the access. idea of preparation, to set up, erect, establish, found, build, construct, prepare, make, create, constitute (class[ical] and very freq[uent])."


……………………………………..

"constituo, constituere, constitui, constitutus V (3rd) [XXXAO] set up/in position, erect; place/dispose/locate; (call a) halt; plant (trees); decide/resolve; decree/ordain; appoint, post/station (troops); settle (colony); establish/create/institute; draw up, arrange/set in order; make up, form; fix" - William Whitaker's Words. - http://lysy2.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/words.exe?constituo



15. The knowledge of the intended meaning of huparchon helps correct the trinitarian mistranslation of the commentary on Gen. 49:21-26 by Hippolytus (ca. 160-235 A.D.) where he paraphrases Phil. 2:6 - 

“For as the only begotten Word [Logos] of God, being God of God [theos huparchon ek theou], emptied himself, according to the Scriptures, humbling himself of his own will to that which he was not before, and took unto himself this vile flesh, and appeared in the ‘form of a servant,’ and ‘became obedient to God the Father, even unto death,’ so hereafter he is said to be ‘highly exalted’...” - p. 167, vol. 5, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, the Rev. Alexander Roberts, D.D., and James Donaldson, LL.D., Eerdmans Publishing Co. 

We can see that, with the honest meaning of huparchon, this trinitarian interpretation (like Phil. 2:6 itself) actually becomes anti-trinitarian: “The only-begotten Word of God, a god who came into being from [ek - "out of"] God....” (It was previously admitted, in effect, by the translation of Hippolytus’ words on Ch. xxix of 'The Refutation of All Heresies' that God had made the Word “a god” - p. 151, vol. 5, The Ante-Nicene Fathers.)

Respected trinitarian historian Williston Walker, in his acclaimed A History of the Christian Church, also admits that Hippolytus taught that the Logos (the Word) was “created by God for the carrying out of his will.” - p. 86, Fourth Edition, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1985. (Also see the LOGOS study.) 

Equally trinitarian and highly respected The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, also admits that we cannot honestly say that Hippolytus definitely taught that the Logos (the pre-existent Christ) was even a person before being born on earth. This, of course, would mean that Hippolytus certainly did not teach that the Son was the always-existent, second person of the orthodox trinity doctrine. This trinitarian publication also tells us that Hippolytus did not even consider the Holy Spirit to be a person. (So much for the trinity doctrine being taught by “the most important 3rd century theologian of the Roman Church.”) - p. 652, F. L. Cross, Oxford University Press, 1990 reprint. - See the CREEDS study.

Posted by Elijah Daniels 





Posted by Elijah Daniels

On the value of the heterodoxy.

 Adult Stem-Cell Cure for HIV?


We must always be cautious about stories touting biotechnological cures. There is a lot of hype out there, but this seems genuine. An HIV/blood-cancer patient seems to have gone into permanent remission thanks to adult stem cells. From the Daily Mail story:

A California man is on the cusp of being declared cured of HIV and blood cancer.

Paul Edmonds, 68, who made international headlines last year when he shared his story, still has no traces of either condition five years after being given a transplant of cells that rid his body of both diseases.

In a new article by the medical team who treated him, doctors said he was officially cured of cancer and two years away from being declared cured of HIV — when he will have gone without any medication since 2020.

The adult (blood and bone marrow) stem cells were donated by a man with a particular genetic predisposition:

He was treated for the cancer with stem cell therapy, which involves replacing stem cells damaged by chemotherapy with healthy ones from a donor — when doctors spotted a unique opportunity: to find a donor with a HIV-resistant genetic mutation.

And, so they did.

To Great Apparent Success

Thanks to the ongoing breakthroughs in gene editing and other approaches, researchers hope to be able to create lines of these particular cells for use against HIV:

Dr Stephen Forman, a professor in the Department of Hematology & Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation, said the hospital was ‘not stopping there.’ ‘Our researchers are working on creating stem cells that have the genetic mutation that makes them naturally resistant to HIV, among other research initiatives,’ he said.

The “Settled Science”

I would be remiss if I didn’t note that during the great embryonic stem-cell debate, circa 2001-08, the “settled science” insisted that embryonic stem cells were the “gold standard” for future regenerative medical treatments. Those who disagreed were often castigated in the media, among the scientific establishment, and by politicians as “anti-science” or religious fanatics standing in the way of CURES! CURES! CURES!

Well, more than twenty years later, there are zero approved embryonic stem-cell therapies and very few human trials, demonstrating how a “consensus science” that seeks to stifle open scientific inquiry and heterodox advocacy harms the scientific quest for truth.

For those interested in the technical details of this promising approach, here’s a link to the New England Journal of Medicine report

Saturday, 2 March 2024

Darwin's hoped for simple beginning is still nowhere in sight?

 

A theory of everything re:design detection? IV

 Life and the Underlying Principle Behind the Second Law of Thermodynamics


Author’s note: If you trust your own common sense (recommended), you can just watch the short (6 minute) video “Evolution Is a Natural Process Running Backward” and save yourself some time. Or watch the short video “A Mathematician’s View of Evolution.” Otherwise, read on.


Extremely Improbable Events

The idea that what has happened on Earth seems to be contrary to the more general statements of the second law of thermodynamics is generally rebutted1 by noting that the Earth is an open system, and the second law only applies to isolated systems.

Nevertheless, the second law is all about probability and there is something about the origin and evolution of life, and the development of human intelligence and civilization, that appears to many to defy the spirit, if not the letter, of the second law even if the Earth is an open system. There seems to be something extraordinarily improbable about life.

In a 2000 Mathematical Intelligencer article2 I claimed that:

The second law of thermodynamics — at least the underlying principle behind this law — simply says that natural forces do not cause extremely improbable things to happen, and it is absurd to argue that because the Earth receives energy from the Sun, this principle was not violated here when the original rearrangement of atoms into encyclopedias and computers occurred.

One reader noted in a published reply3 to my article that any particular long string of coin tosses is extremely improbable, so my statement that “natural forces do not cause extremely improbable things to happen” is not correct. This critic was right, and I have since been careful to state (for example in a 2013 BIO-Complexity article4) that the underlying principle behind the second law is that

Natural (unintelligent) forces do not do macroscopically describable things that are extremely improbable from the microscopic point of view. 

Extremely improbable events must be macroscopically (simply) describable to be forbidden; if we include extremely improbable events that can only be described by an atom-by-atom (or coin-by-coin) accounting, there are so many of these that some are sure to happen. But if we define an event as “macroscopically describable” when it can be described in m or fewer bits, there are at most 2m macroscopically describable events. Then if we do 2k experiments and define an event as “extremely improbable” if it has probability less than 1/2n we can set the probability threshold for an event to be considered “extremely improbable” so low (n >> k+m) that we can be confident that no extremely improbable, macroscopically describable events will ever occur. And with 1023 molecules in a mole, almost anything that is extremely improbable from the microscopic point of view will be impossibly improbable. If we flip a billion fair coins, any particular outcome we get can be said to be extremely improbable, but we are only astonished if something extremely improbable and simply (macroscopically) describable happens, such as “only prime number tosses are heads” or “the last million coins are tails.”

Temperature and diffusing carbon distribute themselves more and more randomly (more uniformly) in an isolated piece of steel because that is what the laws of probability at the microscopic level predict: it would be extremely improbable for either to distribute itself less randomly, assuming nothing is going on but diffusion and heat conduction. The laws of probability dictate that a digital computer, left to the forces of nature, will eventually degrade into scrap metal and it is extremely improbable that the reverse process would occur, because of all the arrangements atoms could take, only a very few would be able to do logical and arithmetic operations. 

This principle is very similar to William Dembski’s observation5 that you can identify intelligent agents because they are the only ones that can do things that are “specified” (simply or macroscopically describable) and “complex” (extremely improbable). Any box full of wires and metal scraps could be said to be complex, but we only suspect intelligence has organized them if the box performs a complex and specifiable function, such as “playing DVDs.”

Extension to Open Systems
So does the origin and evolution of life, and the development of civilization, on a previously barren planet violate the more general statements of the second law of thermodynamics? It is hard to imagine anything that more obviously and spectacularly violates the underlying principle behind the second law than the idea that four fundamental, unintelligent, forces of physics alone could rearrange the fundamental particles of physics into computers, science texts, nuclear power plants, and smart phones. The most common reply to this observation is that all current statements of the second law apply only to isolated systems, for example, “In an isolated system, the direction of spontaneous change is from an arrangement of lesser probability to an arrangement of greater probability” and “In an isolated system, the direction of spontaneous change is from order to disorder.”6

Although the second law is really all about probability, many people try to avoid that issue by saying that evolution does not technically violate the above statements of the second law because the Earth receives energy from the sun, so it is not an isolated system. But in the above-referenced BIO-Complexity article4 and again in a 2017 Physics Essays article7 I pointed out that the basic principle underlying the second law does apply to open systems; you just have to take into account what is crossing the boundary of an open system in deciding what is extremely improbable and what is not. In both I generalized the second statement cited above6 to:

If an increase in order is extremely improbable when a system is isolated, it is still extremely improbable when the system is open, unless something is entering which makes it not extremely improbable.

Then in Physics Essays7 I illustrated this tautology by showing that the entropy associated with any diffusing component X (if X is diffusing heat, this is just thermal entropy) can decrease in an open system, but no faster than it is exported through the boundary. Since this “X-entropy” measures disorder in the distribution of X, we can say that the “X-order” (defined as the negative of X-entropy) can increase in an open system, but no faster than X-order is imported through the boundary.

In this analysis the rate of change of thermal entropy (S) was defined as usual by:




where Q is heat energy and T is absolute temperature, and the rate of change of X-entropy (Sx) was defined similarly by:


where C is the density (concentration) of X. In these calculations (which, remember, are just illustrating a tautology) I again assumed that nothing was going on but diffusion and heat conduction (diffusion of heat). I had first published this analysis in my reply “Can ANYTHING Happen in an Open System?”8 to critics of my Mathematical Intelligencer article2 and again in an appendix of a 2005 John Wiley text, The Numerical Solution of Ordinary and Partial Differential Equations9and again in Biological Information: New Perspectives.10

Everyone agrees that, in an isolated system, natural forces will never reorganize scrap metal into digital computers, because this is extremely improbable. If the system is open, it is still extremely improbable that computers will appear, unless something is entering the system from outside which makes the appearance of computers not extremely improbable. For example, computers.


Application to Our Open System

Now let’s consider just one of many events that have occurred on Earth (and only here, it appears) that seem to be extremely improbable: “From a lifeless planet, there arose spaceships capable of flying to its moon and back safely.” This is certainly macroscopically describable, but is it extremely improbable from the microscopic point of view? You can argue that it only seems extremely improbable, but it really isn’t. You can argue that a few billion years ago a simple self-replicator formed by natural chemical processes, and that over the millions of years natural selection was able to organize the duplication errors made by these self-replicators into intelligent, conscious, humans, who were able to build rockets that could reach the moon and return safely. 

I would counter that we with all our advanced technology are still not close to designing any self-replicating machine11; that is still pure science fiction. When you add technology to such a machine, to bring it closer to the goal of reproduction, you only move the goal posts, as now you have a more complicated machine to reproduce. So how could we believe that such a machine could have arisen by pure chance? And suppose we did somehow manage to design, say, a fleet of cars with fully automated car-building factories inside, able to produce new cars, and not just normal new cars, but new cars with fully automated car-building factories inside them. Who could seriously believe that if we left these cars alone for a long time, the accumulation of duplication errors made as they reproduced themselves would result in anything other than devolution, and eventually could even be organized by selective forces into more advanced automobile models? So I would claim that we don’t really understand how living things are able to pass their complex structures on to their descendants without significant degradation, generation after generation, much less how they evolve even more complex structures.

Many have argued12 that the fine-tuning for life of the laws and constants of physics can be explained by postulating a large or infinite number of universes, with different laws and constants. So some might be tempted to argue that if our universe is large enough, or if there are enough other universes, the development of interplanetary spaceships might occur on some Earth-like planets even if extremely improbable. But if you have to appeal to this sort of argument to explain the development of civilization, the second law becomes meaningless, as a similar argument could be used to explain any violation of the second law, including a significant decrease in thermal entropy in an isolated system.

Conclusions

There are various ways to argue that what has happened on Earth does not violate the more general statements of the second law as found in physics texts. The “compensation” argument, which says that “entropy” can decrease in an open system as long as the decrease is compensated by equal or greater increases outside, so that the total entropy of any isolated system containing this system still increases, is perhaps the most widely used1. Since in this context “entropy” is just used as a synonym for “disorder,” the compensation argument, as I paraphrased it in Physics Essays7, essentially says that extremely improbable things can happen in an open system as long as things are happening outside which, if reversed, would be even more improbable! This compensation argument is not valid even when applied just to thermal entropy, as the decrease in an open system is limited not by increases outside, but by the amount exported through the boundary, as I’ve shown7, 8, 9, 10. Since tornados derive their energy from the sun, the compensation argument could equally well be used to argue that a tornado running backward, turning rubble into houses and cars, would not violate the second law either.

But there is really only one logically valid way to argue that what has happened on Earth does not violate the fundamental principle underlying the second law — the one principle from which every application and every statement of this law draws its authority. And that is to say that it only seems impossibly improbable, but it really is not, that under the right conditions, the influx of stellar energy into a planet could cause atoms there to rearrange themselves into nuclear power plants and digital computers and encyclopedias and science texts, and spaceships that could travel to other planets and back safely.

And although the second law is all about probability, very few Darwinists are willing to make such an argument; they prefer to avoid the issue of probability altogether.

Friday, 1 March 2024

A theory of everything re:design detection?II

 Specified Complexity and a Tale of Ten Malibus


Yesterday in my series on specified complexity, I promised to show how all this works with an example of cars driving along a road. The example, illustrating what a given value of specified complexity means, is adapted from section 3.6 of the second edition of The Design Inference, from which I quote extensively. Suppose you witness ten brand new Chevy Malibus drive past you on a public road in immediate, uninter­rupted succession. The question that crosses your mind is this: Did this succession of ten brand new Chevy Malibus happen by chance?

Your first reaction might be to think that this event is a publicity stunt by a local Chevy dealership. In that case, the succession would be due to design rather than to chance. But you don’t want to jump to that conclusion too quickly. Perhaps it is just a lucky coincidence. But if so, how would you know? Perhaps the coincidence is so improbable that no one should expect to observe it as happening by chance. In that case, it’s not just unlikely that you would observe this coincidence by chance; it’s unlikely that anyone would. How, then, do you determine whether this succession of identical cars could reasonably have resulted by chance?

Obviously, you will need to know how many opportunities exist to observe this event. It’s estimated that in 2019 there were 1.4 billion motor vehicles on the road worldwide. That would include trucks, but to keep things simple let’s assume all of them are cars. Although these cars will appear on many different types of roads, some with traffic so sparse that ten cars in immediate succession would almost never happen, to say nothing of ten cars having the same late make and model, let’s give chance every opportunity to succeed by assuming that all these cars are arranged in one giant succession of 1.4 billion cars arranged bumper to bumper.

But it’s not enough to look at one static arrangement of all these 1.4 billion cars. Cars are in motion and continually rearranging themselves. Let’s therefore assume that the cars completely reshuffle themselves every minute, and that we might have the opportunity to see the succession of ten Malibus at any time across a hundred years. In that case, there would be no more than 74 quadrillion opportunities for ten brand new Chevy Malibus to line up in immediate, uninterrupted succession.

So, how improbable is this event given these 1.4 billion cars and their repeated reshuffling? To answer this question requires knowing how many makes and models of cars are on the road and their relative proportions (let’s leave aside how different makes are distributed geographically, which is also relevant, but introduces needless complications for the purpose of this illustration). If, per impossibile, all cars in the world were brand new Chevy Malibus, there would be no coincidence to explain. In that case, all 1.4 billion cars would be identical, and getting ten of them in a row would be an event of probability 1 regardless of reshuffling.

But Clearly, Nothing Like That Is the Case

Go to Cars.com, and using its car-locater widget you’ll find 30 popular makes and over 60 “other” makes of vehicles. Under the make of Chevrolet, there are over 80 models (not counting variations of models — there are five such variations under the model Malibu). Such numbers help to assess whether the event in question happened by chance. Clearly, the event is specified in that it answers to the short description “ten new Chevy Malibus in a row.” For the sake of argument, let’s assume that achieving that event by chance is going to be highly improbable given all the other cars on the road and given any reasonable assumptions about their chance distribution.

But there’s more work to do in this example to eliminate chance. No doubt, it would be remarkable to see ten new Chevy Malibus drive past you in immediate, uninterrupted succession. But what if you saw ten new red Chevy Malibus in a row drive past you? That would be even more striking now that they all also have the same color. Or what about simply ten new Chevies in a row? That would be less striking. But note how the description lengths covary with the probabilities: “ten new red Chevy Malibus in a row” has a longer description length than “ten new Chevy Malibus in a row,” but it corresponds to an event of smaller probability than the latter. Conversely, “ten new Chevies in a row” has shorter description length than “ten new Chevy Malibus in a row,” but it corresponds to an event of larger probability than the latter.

What we find in examples like this is a tradeoff between description length and probability of the event described (a tradeoff that specified complexity models). In a chance elimination argument, we want to see short description length combined with small probability (implying a larger value of specified complexity). But typically these play off against each other. “Ten new red Chevy Malibus in a row” corresponds to an event of smaller probability than “ten new Chevy Malibus in a row,” but its description length is slightly longer. Which event seems less readily ascribable to chance (or, we might say, worthier of a design inference)? A quick intuitive assess­ment suggests that the probability decrease outweighs the increase in description length, and so we’d be more inclined to eliminate chance if we saw ten new red Chevy Malibus in a row as opposed to ten of any color.

The lesson here is that probability and description length are in tension, so that as one goes up the other tends to go down, and that to eliminate chance both must be suitably low. We see this tension by contrasting “ten new Chevy Malibus in a row” with “ten new Chevies in a row,” and even more clearly with simply “ten Chevies in a row.” The latter has a shorter description length (lower description length) but also much higher probability. Intuitively, it is less worthy of a design inference because the increase in probability so outweighs the decrease in description length. Indeed, ten Chevies of any make and model in a row by chance doesn’t seem farfetched given the sheer number of Chevies on the road, certainly in the United States.

But There’s More

Why focus simply on Chevy Malibus? What if the make and model varied, so that the cars in succession were Honda Accords or Porsche Carreras or whatever? And what if the number of cars in succession varied, so it wasn’t just 10 but also 9 or 20 or whatever? Such questions underscore the different ways of specifying a succession of identical cars. Any such succession would have been salient if you witnessed it. Any such succession would constitute a specification if the description length were short enough. And any such succession could figure into a chance elimination argument if both the description length and the probability were low enough. A full-fledged chance-elimination argument in such circumstances would then factor in all relevant low-probability, low-description-length events, balancing them so that where one is more, the other is less.  

All of this can, as we by now realize, be recast in information-theoretic terms. Thus, a probability decrease corresponds to a Shannon information increase, and a description length increase corresponds to a Kolmogorov information increase. Specified complexity, as their difference, now has the following property (we assume, as turns out to be reasonable, that some fine points from theoretical computer science, such as the Kraft inequality, are approximately applicable): if the specified complexity of an event is greater than or equal to n bits, then the grand event consisting of all events with at least that level of specified complexity has probability less than or equal to 2^(–n). This is a powerful result and it provides a conceptually clean way to use specified complexity to eliminate chance and infer design. 

Essentially, what specified complexity does is consider an archer with a number of arrows in his quiver and a number of targets of varying size on a wall, and asks what is the probability that any one of these arrows will by chance land on one of these targets. The arrows in the quiver correspond to complexity, the targets to specifications. Raising the number 2 to the negative of specified complexity as an exponent then becomes the grand probability that any of these arrows will hit any of these targets by chance. 

Conclusion

Formally, the specified complexity of an event is the difference between its Shannon information and its Kolmogorov information. Informally, the specified complexity of an event is a combination of two properties, namely, that the event has small probability and that it has a description of short length. In the formal approach to specified complexity, we speak of algorithmic specified complexity. In the informal approach, we speak of intuitive specified complexity. But typically it will be clear from context which sense of the term “specified complexity” is intended.

In this series, we’ve defined and motivated algorithmic specified complexity. But we have not provided actual calculations of it. For calculations of algorithmic specified complexity as applied to real-world examples, I refer readers to sections 6.8 and 7.6 in the second edition of The Design Inference. Section 6.8 looks at general examples whereas section 7.6 looks at biological examples. In each of these sections, my co-author Winston Ewert and I examine examples where specified complexity is low, not leading to a design inference, and also where it is high, leading to a design inference.

For instance, in section 6.8 we take the so-called “Mars face,” a naturally occurring structure on Mars that looks like a face, and contrast it with the faces on Mount Rushmore. We argue that the specified complexity of the Mars face is too small to justify a design inference but that the specified complexity of the faces on Mount Rushmore is indeed large enough to justify a design inference.

Similarly, in section 7.6, we take the binding of proteins to ATP, as in the work of Anthony Keefe and Jack Szostak, and contrast it with the formation of protein folds in beta-lactamase, as in the work of Douglas Axe. We argue that the specified complexity of random ATP binding is close to 0. In fact, we calculate a negative value of the specified complexity, namely, –4. On the other hand, for the evolvability of a beta-lactamase fold, we calculate a specified complexity of 215, which corresponds to a probability of 2^(–215), or roughly a probability of 1 in 10^65. 

With all these numbers, we estimate a Shannon information and a Kolmogorov information and then calculate a difference. The validity of these estimates and the degree to which they can be refined can be disputed. But the underlying formalism of specified complexity is rock solid. The details of that formalism and its applications go beyond a series titled “Specified Complexity Made Simple.” Those details can all be found in the second edition of The design inference

The universe keeps trolling the script?

 

Fake it till you make it?

 Fossil Friday: Piltdown Lizard Was Too Good to Check


This Fossil Friday features Tridentinosaurus antiquus, which was discovered in 1931 and described by Leonardi (1959) from the Early Permian (ca. 280 million years old) sandstone of the Italian Alps. The 10-foot-long fossil animal looks like a dark imprint of an Anolis lizard. It was attributed by Dalla Veccia (1997) to the extinct Protorosauria (= Prolacertiformes) and considered to be “one of the oldest fossil reptiles and one of the very few skeletal specimens with evidence of soft tissue preservation” (Rossi et al. 2024), interpreted as carbonized skin showing the whole body outline like a photograph. Only the bones of the hind limbs were clearly visible.

The 90-year-old fossil find remained unique, as nothing similar was ever discovered again in the Permian of the Italian Alps (Starr 2024). This should have raised some red flags. However, why question a fossil that was “thought to be an important specimen for understanding early reptile evolution” (University College Cork 2024)? As journalists would say, it was too good to check. Instead the find was “celebrated in articles and books but never studied in detail” (University College Cork 2024).

Bombshell and Headlines

Now a new study (Rossi et al. 2024) of the famous fossil has turned out to be a bombshell, making global media headlines (University College Cork 2024). The scientists used sophisticated methods including ultraviolet light photography, 3D surface modeling, scanning electronic microscopy, and Fourier transformed infrared spectroscopy to analyze the apparent soft tissue of the fossil reptile. To their great surprise they discovered that “the material forming the body outline is not fossilized soft tissues but a manufactured pigment indicating that the body outline is a forgery,” which of course also throws into doubt the “validity of this enigmatic taxon.”

The study concludes that “The putative soft tissues of T. antiquus, one of the oldest known reptiles from the Alps, are fake and thus this specimen is not an exceptionally preserved fossil. Despite this, the poorly preserved long bones of the hindlimbs seem to be genuine.” But in the absence of novel information about the preserved skeleton, the authors “suggest caution in using T. antiquus in phylogenetic studies.”

Bombshell and Headlines

Now a new study (Rossi et al. 2024) of the famous fossil has turned out to be a bombshell, making global media headlines (University College Cork 2024). The scientists used sophisticated methods including ultraviolet light photography, 3D surface modeling, scanning electronic microscopy, and Fourier transformed infrared spectroscopy to analyze the apparent soft tissue of the fossil reptile. To their great surprise they discovered that “the material forming the body outline is not fossilized soft tissues but a manufactured pigment indicating that the body outline is a forgery,” which of course also throws into doubt the “validity of this enigmatic taxon.”

The study concludes that “The putative soft tissues of T. antiquus, one of the oldest known reptiles from the Alps, are fake and thus this specimen is not an exceptionally preserved fossil. Despite this, the poorly preserved long bones of the hindlimbs seem to be genuine.” But in the absence of novel information about the preserved skeleton, the authors “suggest caution in using T. antiquus in phylogenetic studies.”

Who Did It, and Why?

It is not known who perpetrated the forgery or why, but probably it was just a way to embellish the poor remains of the leg bones with some fancy painting (Starr 2024), coating it with varnish as a protective layer to hide the forgery from easy discovery (University College Cork 2024).

Italian paleontologist Valentina Rossi, the lead scientist of the study that uncovered the forgery, said in an article at The Conversation (Rossi 2024a) that “fake fossils are among us, passing almost undetected under the eye of experts all over the world. This is a serious problem — counterfeited specimens can mislead palaeontologists into studying an ancient past that never existed.” The reprinted article in Scientific American (Rossi 2024b) even admits in the subtitle, “Paleontology is rife with fake fossils that are made to cash in on illegal trade but end up interfering with science.” Let that sink in, and remember it when Darwinists try to ridicule Darwin critics, who bring up forgeries such as Piltdown Man or Archaeoraptor. Don’t let them get away with (despite knowing better) claiming that such forgeries are not a real problem in evolutionary biology.

Therefore, in loving memory of the Piltdown Man forgery, and the Piltdown Fly (Bechly 2022), we may in the future call this specimen the Piltdown Lizard.

A theory of everything re:design detection?

 Specified Complexity as a Unified Information Measure


With the publication of the first edition of my book The Design Inference and its sequel No Free Lunch, elucidating the connection between design inferences and information theory became increasingly urgent. That there was a connection was clear. The first edition of The Design Inference sketched, in the epilogue, how the relation between specifications and small probability (complex) events mirrored the transmission of messages along a communication channel from sender to receiver. Moreover, in No Free Lunch, both Shannon and Kolmogorov information were explicitly cited in connection with specified complexity — which is the subject of this series.

But even though specified complexity as characterized back then employed informational ideas, it did not constitute a clearly defined information measure. Specified complexity seemed like a kludge of ideas from logic, statistics, and information. Jay Richards, guest-editing a special issue of Philosophia Christi, asked me to clarify the connection between specified complexity and information theory. In response, I wrote an article titled “Specification: The Pattern That Signifies Intelligence,” which appeared in that journal in 2005

A Single Measure

In that article, I defined specified complexity as a single measure that combined under one roof all the key elements of the design inference, notably, small probability, specification, probabilistic resources, and universal probability bounds. Essentially, in the measure I articulated there, I attempted to encapsulate the entire design inferential methodology within a single mathematical expression. 

In retrospect, all the key pieces for what is now the fully developed informational account of specified complexity were there in that article. But my treatment of specified complexity there left substantial room for improvement. I used a counting measure to enumerate all the descriptions of a given length or shorter. I then placed this measure under a negative logarithm. This gave the equivalent of Kolmogorov information, suitably generalized to minimal description length. But because my approach was so focused on encapsulating the design-inferential methodology, the roles of Shannon and Kolmogorov information in its definition of specified complexity were muddied. 

My 2005 specified complexity paper fell stillborn from the press, and justly so given its lack of clarity. Eight years later, Winston Ewert, working with Robert Marks and me at the Evolutionary Informatics Lab, independently formulated specified complexity as a unified measure. It was essentially the same measure as in my 2005 article, but Ewert clearly articulated the place of both Shannon and Kolmogorov information in the definition of specified complexity. Ewert, along with Marks and me as co-authors, published this work under the title “Algorithmic Specified Complexity,” and then published subsequent applications of this work (see the Evolutionary Informatics Lab publications page). 

With Ewert’s lead, specified complexity, as an information measure, became the difference between Shannon information and Kolmogorov information. In symbols, the specified complexity SC for an event E was thus defined as SC(E) = I(E) – K(E). The term I(E) in this equation is just, as we saw in my last article, Shannon information, namely, I(E) = –log(P(E)), where P(E) is the probability of E with respect to some underlying relevant chance hypothesis. The term K(E) in this equation, in line with the last article, is a slight generalization of Kolmogorov information, in which for an event E, K(E) assigns the length, in bits, of the shortest description that precisely identifies E. Underlying this generalization of Kolmogorov information is a binary, prefix-free, Turing complete language that maps descriptions from the language to the events they identify. 

Not Merely a Kludge

There’s a lot packed into this last paragraph, so explicating it all is not going to be helpful in an article titled “Specified Complexity Made Simple.” For the details, see Chapter 6 of the second edition of The Design Inference. Still, it’s worth highlighting a few key points to show that SC, so defined, makes good sense as a unified information measure and is not merely a kludge of Shannon and Kolmogorov information. 

What brings Shannon and Kolmogorov information together as a coherent whole in this definition of specified complexity is event-description duality. Events (and the objects and structures they produce) occur in the world. Descriptions of events occur in language. Thus, corresponding to an event E are descriptions D that identify E. For instance, the event of getting a royal flush in the suit of hearts corresponds to the description “royal flush in the suit of hearts.” Such descriptions are, of course, never unique. The same event can always be described in multiple ways. Thus, this event could also be described as “a five-card poker hand with an ace of hearts, a king of hearts, a queen of hearts, a jack of hearts, and a ten of hearts.” Yet this description is quite a bit longer than the other. 

Given event-description duality, it follows that: (1) an event E with a probability P(E) has Shannon information I(E), measured in bits; moreover, (2) given a binary language (one expressed in bits — and all languages can be expressed in bits), for any description D that identifies E, the number of bits making up D, which in the last section we defined as |D|, will be no less than the Kolmogorov information of E (which measures in bits the shortest description that identifies E). Thus, because K(E) ≤ |D|, it follows that SC(E) = I(E) – K(E) ≥ I(E) – |D|. 

The most important take away here is that specified complexity makes Shannon information and Kolmogorov information commensurable. In particular, specified complexity takes the bits associated with an event’s probability and subtracts from it the bits associated with their minimum description length. Moreover, in estimating K(E), we then use I(E) – |D| to form a lower bound for specified complexity. It follows that specified complexity comes in degrees and could take on negative values. In practice, however, we’ll say an event exhibits specified complexity if it is positive and large (with what it means to be large depending on the relevant probabilistic resources). 

The Kraft Inequality

There’s a final fact that makes specified complexity a natural information measure and not just an arbitrary combination of Shannon and Kolmogorov information, and that’s the Kraft inequality. To apply the Kraft inequality of specified complexity here depends on the language that maps descriptions to events being prefix-free. Prefix-free languages help to ensure disambiguation, so that one description is not the start of another description. This is not an onerous condition, and even though it does not hold for natural languages, transforming natural languages into prefix-free languages leads to negligible increases in description length (again, see Chapter 6 of the second edition of The Design Inference). 

What the Kraft inequality does for the specified complexity of an event E is guarantee that all events having the same or greater specified complexity, when considered jointly as one grand union, nonetheless have probability less than or equal to 2 raised to the negative power of the specified complexity. In other words, the probability of the union of all events F with specified complexity no less than that of E (i.e., SC(F) ≥ SC(E)), will have probability less than or equal to 2^(–SC(E)). This result, so stated, may not seem to belong in a series of articles attempting to make specified complexity simple. But it is a big mathematical result, and it connects specified complexity to a probability bound that’s crucial for drawing design inferences. To illustrate how this all works, let’s turn next to an example of cars driving along a road.

There is nothing simple about this beginning? II

 Brian Miller: Rarity and Isolation of Proteins in Sequence Space


Was the universe designed to evolve through natural processes? In a recent book, theologian Rope Kojonen has argued that evolutionary mechanisms work in harmony with intelligent design to produce the diversity of life we see on Earth. But can these fundamentally different processes really work together? On a new episode of ID the Future, host Casey Luskin speaks with physicist Dr. Brian Miller to explore why Kojonen’s theory fails on scientific grounds.

In this episode, Dr. Miller delves into the rarity and isolation of proteins in sequence space. Kojonen takes mainstream evolutionary mechanisms for granted, positing that the laws of nature are specially designed to allow every protein in nature to evolve through standard natural processes. But Miller shows that the limits of protein evolution are very real and very problematic for Kojonen’s model. He explains in detail multiple lines of evidence that show how unlikely it is that protein sequences occur naturally or by chance in sequence space. Miller reports on research showing that the probability of a protein continuing to work after each mutation drops precipitously. He also explains that even the most similar proteins are about 80 percent different from each other. It all adds up to a headache for evolutionary theory, and the headache doesn’t go away when you marry mainstream evolutionary theory with intelligent design.

Download the podcast or listen to it here

We know it when we see it?

 Intuitive Specified Complexity: A User-Friendly Account


Even though this series is titled “Specified Complexity Made Simple,” there’s a limit to how much the concept of specified complexity may be simplified before it can no longer be adequately defined or explained. Accordingly, specified complexity, even when made simple, will still require the introduction of some basic mathematics, such as exponents and logarithms, as well as an informal discussion of information theory, especially Shannon and Kolmogorov information. I’ll get to that in the subsequent posts. 

At this early stage in the discussion, however, it seems wise to lay out specified complexity in a convenient non-technical way. That way, readers lacking mathematical and technical facility will still be able to grasp the gist of specified complexity. Here, I’ll present an intuitively accessible account of specified complexity. Just as all English speakers are familiar with the concept of prose even if they’ve never thought about how it differs from poetry, so too we are all familiar with specified complexity even if we haven’t carefully defined it or provided a precise formal mathematical account of it. 

In this post I’ll present a user-friendly account of specified complexity by means of intuitively compelling examples. Even though non-technical readers may be inclined to skip the rest of this series, I would nonetheless encourage all readers to dip into the subsequent posts, if only to persuade themselves that specified complexity has a sound rigorous basis to back up its underlying intuition. 

To Get the Ball Rolling…

Let’s consider an example by YouTube personality Dave Farina, known popularly as “Professor Dave.” In arguing against the use of small probability arguments to challenge Darwinian evolutionary theory, Farina offers the following example:

Let’s say 10 people are having a get-together, and they are curious as to what everyone’s birthday is. They go down the line. One person says June 13th, another says November 21st, and so forth. Each of them have a 1 in 365 chance of having that particular birthday. So, what is the probability that those 10 people in that room would have those 10 birthdays? Well, it’s 1 in 365 to the 10th power, or 1 in 4.2 times 10 to the 25, which is 42 trillion trillion. The odds are unthinkable, and yet there they are sitting in that room. So how can this be? Well, everyone has to have a birthday.

Farina’s use of the term “unthinkable” brings to mind Vizzini in The Princess Bride. Vizzini keeps uttering the word “inconceivable” in reaction to a man in black (Westley) steadily gaining ground on him and his henchmen. Finally, his fellow henchman Inigo Montoya remarks, “You keep using that word — I do not think it means what you think it means.”

Similarly, in contrast to Farina, an improbability of 1 in 42 trillion trillion is in fact quite thinkable. Right now you can do even better than this level of improbability. Get out a fair coin and toss it 100 times. That’ll take you a few minutes. You’ll witness an event unique in the history of coin tossing and one having a probability of 1 in 10 to the 30, or 1 in a million trillion trillion. 

The reason Farina’s improbability is quite thinkable is that the event to which it is tied is unspecified. As he puts it, “One person says June 13th, another says November 21st, and so forth.” The “and so forth” here is a giveaway that the event is unspecified. 

But now consider a variant of Farina’s example: Imagine that each of his ten people confirmed that his or her birthday was January 1. The probability would in this case again be 1 in 42 trillion trillion. But what’s different now is that the event is specified. How is it specified? It is specified in virtue of having a very short description, namely, “Everyone here was born New Year’s Day.” 

Nothing Surprising Here

The complexity in specified complexity refers to probability: the greater the complexity, the smaller the probability. There is a precise information-theoretic basis for this connection between probability and complexity that we’ll examine in the next post. Accordingly, because the joint probability of any ten birthdays is quite low, their complexity will be quite high. 

For things to get interesting with birthdays, complexity needs to be combined with specification. A specification is a salient pattern that we should not expect a highly complex event to match simply by chance. Clearly, a large group of people that all share the same birthday did not come together by chance. But what exactly is it that makes a pattern salient so that, in the presence of complexity, it becomes an instance of specified complexity and thereby defeats chance? 

That’s the whole point of specified complexity. Sheer complexity, as Farina’s example shows, cannot defeat chance. So too, the absence of complexity cannot defeat chance. For instance, if we learn that a single individual has a birthday on January 1, we wouldn’t regard anything as amiss or afoul. That event is simple, not complex, in the sense of probability. Leaving aside leap years and seasonal effects on birth rates, 1 out 365 people will on average have a birthday on January 1. With a worldwide population of 8 billion people, many people will have that birthday. 

Not by Chance

But a group of exactly 10 people all in the same room all having a birthday of January 1 is a different matter. We would not ascribe such a coincidence to chance. But why? Because the event is not just complex but also specified. And what makes a complex event also specified — or conforming to a specification — is that it has a short description. In fact, we define specifications as patterns with short descriptions.

Such a definition may seem counterintuitive, but it actually makes good sense of how we eliminate chance in practice. The fact is, any event (and by extension any object or structure produced by an event) is describable if we allow ourselves a long enough description. Any event, however improbable, can therefore be described. But most improbable events can’t be described simply. Improbable events with simple descriptions draw our attention and prod us to look for explanations other than chance.

Take Mount Rushmore. It could be described in detail as follows: for each cubic micrometer in a large cube that encloses the entire monument, register whether it contains rock or is empty of rock (treating partially filled cubic micrometers, let us stipulate, as empty). Mount Rushmore can be enclosed in a cube of under 50,000 cubic meters. Moreover, each cubic meter contains a million trillion micrometers. Accordingly, 50 billion trillion filled-or-empty cells could describe Mount Rushmore in detail. Thinking of each filled-or-empty cell as a bit then yields 50 billion trillion bits of information. That’s more information than contained in the entire World Wide Web (there are currently 2 billion websites globally). 

But of course, nobody attempts to describe Mount Rushmore that way. Instead, we describe it succinctly as “a giant rock formation that depicts the U.S. Presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt.” That’s a short description. At the same time, any rock formation the size of Mount Rushmore will be highly improbable or complex. Mount Rushmore is therefore both complex and specified. That’s why, even if we knew nothing about the history of Mount Rushmore’s construction, we would refuse to attribute it to the forces of chance (such as wind and erosion) and instead attribute it to design.

Take the Game of Poker

Consider a few more examples in this vein. There are 2,598,960 distinct possible poker hands, and so the probability of any poker hand is 1/2,598,960. Consider now two short descriptions, namely, “royal flush” and “single pair.” These descriptions have roughly the same description length. Yet there are only 4 ways of getting a royal flush and 1,098,240 ways of getting a single pair. This means the probability of getting a royal flush is 4/2,598,960 = .00000154 but the probability of getting a single pair is 1,098,240/2,598,960 = .423. A royal flush is therefore much more improbable than a single pair.

Suppose now that you are playing a game of poker and you come across these two hands, namely, a royal flush and a single pair. Which are you more apt to attribute to chance? Which are you more apt to attribute to cheating, and therefore to design? Clearly, a single pair would, by itself, not cause you to question chance. It is specified in virtue of its short description. But because it is highly probable, and therefore not complex, it would not count as an instance of specified complexity. 

Witnessing a royal flush, however, would elicit suspicion, if not an outright accusation of cheating (and therefore of design). Of course, given the sheer amount of poker played throughout the world, royal flushes will now and then appear by chance. But what raises suspicion that a given instance of a royal flush may not be the result of chance is its short description (a property it shares with “single pair”) combined with its complexity/improbability (a property it does not share with “single pair”). 

Let’s consider one further example, which seems to have become a favorite among readers of the recently released second edition of The Design Inference. In the chapter on specification, my co-author Winston Ewert and I consider a famous scene in the film The Empire Strikes Back, which we then contrast with a similar scene from another film that parodies it. Quoting from the chapter:

Darth Vader tells Luke Skywalker, “No, I am your father,” revealing himself to be Luke’s father. This is a short description of their relationship, and the relationship is surprising, at least in part because the relationship can be so briefly described. In contrast, consider the following line uttered by Dark Helmet to Lone Starr in Spaceballs, the Mel Brooks parody of Star Wars: “I am your father’s brother’s nephew’s cousin’s former room­mate.” The point of the joke is that the relationship is so compli­cated and contrived, and requires such a long description, that it evokes no suspicion and calls for no special explanation. With everybody on the planet connected by no more than “six degrees of separation,” some long description like this is bound to identify anyone.

In a universe of countless people, Darth Vader meeting Luke Skywalker is highly improbable or complex. Moreover, their relation of father to son, by being briefly described, is also specified. Their meeting therefore exhibits specified complexity and cannot be ascribed to chance. Dark Helmet meeting Lone Starr may likewise be highly improbable or complex. But given the convoluted description of their past relationship, their meeting represents an instance of unspecified complexity. If their meeting is due to design, it is for reasons other than their past relationship.

How Short Is Short Enough?

Before we move to a more formal treatment of specified complexity, we are well to ask how short is short enough for a description to count as a specification. How short should a description be so that combined with complexity it produces specified complexity? As it is, in the formal treatment of specified complexity, complexity and description length are both converted to bits, and then specified complexity can be defined as the difference of bits (the bits denoting complexity minus the bits denoting specification). 

When specified complexity is applied informally, however, we may calculate a probability (or associated complexity) but we usually don’t calculate a description length. Rather, as with the Star Wars/Spaceballs example, we make an intuitive judgment that one description is short and natural, the other long and contrived. Such intuitive judgments have, as we will see, a formal underpinning, but in practice we let ourselves be guided by intuitive specified complexity, treating it as a convincing way to distinguish merely improbable events from those that require further scrutiny.  

The other prisoner of conscience? III

 

James Tour wants to see a manager re:OOL Research

 Apparently there is a problem with his prebiotic soup.

There is information and then there is Information?

 Shannon and Kolmogorov Information


The first edition of my book The Design Inference as well as its sequel, No Free Lunch, set the stage for defining a precise information-theoretic measure of specified complexity — which is the subject of this series. There was, however, still more work to be done to clarify the concept. In both these books, specified complexity was treated as a combination of improbability or complexity on the one hand and specification on the other. 

As presented back then, it was an oil-and-vinegar combination, with complexity and specification treated as two different types of things exhibiting no clear commonality. Neither book therefore formulated specified complexity as a unified information measure. Still, the key ideas for such a measure were in those earlier books. Here, I review those key information-theoretic ideas. In the next section, I’ll join them into a unified whole.

Let’s Start with Complexity

As noted earlier, there’s a deep connection between probability and complexity. This connection is made clear in Shannon’s theory of information. In this theory, probabilities are converted to bits. To see how this works, consider tossing a coin 100 times, which yields an event of probability 1 in 2^100 (the caret symbol here denotes exponentiation). But that number also corresponds to 100 bits of information since it takes 100 bits to characterize any sequence of 100 coin tosses (think of 1 standing for heads and 0 for tails). 

In general, any probability p corresponds to –log(p) bits of information, where the logarithm here and elsewhere in this article is to the base 2 (as needed to convert probabilities to bits). Think of a logarithm as an exponent: it’s the exponent to which you need to raise the base (here always 2) in order to get the number to which the logarithmic function is applied. Thus, for instance, a probability of p = 1/10 corresponds to an information measure of –log(1/10) ≈ 3.322 bits (or equivalently, 2^(–3.322) ≈ 1/10). Such fractional bits allow for a precise correspondence between probability and information measures.

The complexity in specified complexity is therefore Shannon information. Claude Shannon (1916–2001, pictured above) introduced this idea of information in the 1940s to understand signal transmissions (mainly of bits, but also for other character sequences) across communication channels. The longer the sequence of bits transmitted, the greater the information and therefore its complexity. 

Because of noise along any communication channel, the greater the complexity of a signal, the greater the chance of its distortion and thus the greater the need for suitable coding and error correction in transmitting the signal. So the complexity of the bit string being transmitted became an important idea within Shannon’s theory. 

Shannon’s information measure is readily extended to any event E with a probability P(E). We then define the Shannon information of E as –log(P(E)) = I(E). Note that the minus sign is there to ensure that as the probability of E goes down, the information associated with E goes up. This is as it should be. Information is invariably associated with the narrowing of possibilities. The more those possibilities are narrowed, the more the probabilities associated with those probabilities decrease, but correspondingly the more the information associated with those narrowing possibilities increases. 

For instance, consider a sequence of ten tosses of a fair coin and consider two events, E and F. Let E denote the event where the first five of these ten tosses all land heads but where we don’t know the remaining tosses. Let F denote the event where all ten tosses land heads. Clearly, F narrows down the range of possibilities for these ten tosses more than E does. Because E is only based on the first five tosses, its probability is P(E) = 2^(–5) = 1/(2^5) = 1/32. On the other hand, because F is based on all ten tosses, its probability is P(F) = 2^(–10) = 1/(2^10) = 1/1,024. In this case, the Shannon information associated with E and F is respectively I(E) = 5 bits and I(F) = 10 bits. 

We Also Need Kolmogorov Complexity

Shannon information, however, is not enough to understand specified complexity. For that, we also need Kolmogorov information, or what is also called Kolmogorov complexity. Andrei Kolmogorov (1903–1987) was the greatest probabilist of the 20th century. In the 1960s he tried to make sense of what it means for a sequence of numbers to be random. To keep things simple, and without loss of generality, we’ll focus on sequences of bits (since any numbers or characters can be represented by combinations of bits). Note that we made the same simplifying assumption for Shannon information.

The problem Kolmogorov faced was that any sequence of bits treated as the result of tossing a fair coin was equally probable. For instance, any sequence of 100 coin tosses would have probability 1/(2^100), or 100 bits of Shannon information. And yet there seemed to Kolmogorov a vast difference between the following two sequences of 100 coin tosses (letting 0 denote tails and 1 denote heads):

0000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000

and

1001101111101100100010011
0001010001010010101110001
0101100000101011000100110
1100110100011000000110001

The first just repeats the same coin toss 100 times. It appears anything but random. The second, on the other hand, exhibits no salient pattern and so appears random (I got it just now from an online random bit generator). But what do we mean by random here? Is it that the one sequence is the sort we should expect to see from coin tossing but the other isn’t? But in that case, probabilities tell us nothing about how to distinguish the two sequences because they both have the same small probability of occurring. 

Ideas in the Air

Kolmogorov’s brilliant stroke was to understand the randomness of these sequences not probabilistically but computationally. Interestingly, the ideas animating Kolmogorov were in the air at that time in the mid 1960s. Thus, both Ray Solomonoff and Gregory Chaitin (then only a teenager) also came up with the same idea. Perhaps unfairly, Kolmogorov gets the lion’s share of the credit for characterizing randomness computationally. Most information-theory books (see, for instance, Cover and Thomas’s The Elements of Information Theory), in discussing this approach to randomness, will therefore focus on Kolmogorov and put it under what is called Algorithmic Information Theory (AIT). 

Briefly, Kolmogorov’s approach to randomness is to say that a sequence of bits is random to the degree that it has no short computer program that generates it. Thus, with the first sequence above, it is non-random since it has a very short program that generates it, such as a program that simply says “repeat ‘0’ 100 times.” On the other hand, there is no short program (so far as we can tell) that generates the second sequence. 

It is a combinatorial fact (i.e., a fact about the mathematics of counting or enumerating possibilities) that the vast majority of bit sequences cannot be characterized by any program shorter than the sequence itself. Obviously, any sequence can be characterized by a program that simply incorporates the entire sequence and then simply regurgitates it. But such a program fails to compress the sequence. The non-random sequences, by having programs shorter than the sequences themselves, are thus those that are compressible. The first of the sequences above is compressible. The second, for all we know, isn’t.

Kolmogorov’s information (also known as Kolmogorov complexity) is a computational theory because it focuses on identifying the shortest program that generates a given bit-string. Yet there is an irony here: it is rarely possible to say with certainly that a given bit string is truly random in the sense of having no compressible program. From combinatorics, with its mathematical counting principles, we know that the vast majority of bit sequences must be random in Kolmogorov’s sense. That’s because the number of short programs is very limited and can only generate very few longer sequences. Most longer sequences will require longer programs. 

Our Common Experience

But if for an arbitrary bit sequence D we define K(D) as the length of the shortest program that generates D, it turns out that there is no computer program that calculates K(D). Simply put, the function K is non-computable. This fact from theoretical computer science matches up with our common experience that something may seem random for a time, and yet we can never be sure that it is random because we might discover a pattern clearly showing that the thing in fact isn’t random (think of an illusion that looks like a “random” inkblot only to reveal a human face on closer inspection). 

Yet even though K is non-computable, in practice it is a useful measure, especially for understanding non-randomness. Because of its non-computability, K doesn’t help us to identify particular non-compressible sequences, these being the random sequences. Even with K as a well-defined mathematical function, we can’t in most cases determine precise values for it. Nevertheless, K does help us with the compressible sequences, in which case we may be able to estimate it even if we can’t exactly calculate it. 

What typically happens in such cases is that we find a salient pattern in a sequence, which then enables us to show that it is compressible. To that end, we need a measure of the length of bit sequences as such. Thus, for any bit sequence D, we define |D| as its length (total number of bits). Because any sequence can be defined in terms of itself, |D| forms an upper bound on Kolmogorov complexity. Suppose now that through insight or ingenuity, we find a program that substantially compresses D. The length of that program, call it n, will then be considerably less than |D| — in other words, n < |D|. 

Although this program length n will be much shorter than D, it’s typically not possible to show that this program of length n is the very shortest program that generates D. But that’s okay. Given such a program of length n, we know that K(D) cannot be greater than n because K(D) measures the very shortest such program. Thus, by finding some short program of length n, we’ll know that K(D) ≤ n < |D|. In practice, it’s enough to come up with a short program of length n that’s substantially less than |D|. The number n will then form an upper bound for K(D). In practice, we use n as an estimate for K(D). Such an estimate, as we’ll see, ends up in applications being a conservative estimate of Kolmogorov complexity. 

1Corinthians Ch.4:7:The Watchtower society's condensed commentary.

 



Wol.JW.org


Friday, March 1

Why do you boast?​—1 Cor. 4:7.


The apostle Peter urged his brothers to use whatever gifts and talents they had to build up their fellow believers. Peter wrote: “To the extent that each one has received a gift, use it in ministering to one another as fine stewards of God’s undeserved kindness.” (1 Pet. 4:10) We should not hold back from using our gifts to the fullest for fear that others may become jealous or get discouraged. But we must be careful that we do not boast about them. (1 Cor. 4:6) Let us remember that any natural abilities we may have are gifts from God. We should use those gifts to build up the congregation, not to promote ourselves. (Phil. 2:3) When we use our energy and abilities to do God’s will, we will have cause for rejoicing​—not because we are outdoing others or proving ourselves superior to them, but because we are using our gifts to bring praise to JEHOVAH. 

The Origin of Life remains darwinism's achilles heel?

 On the Origin of Life, a Measure of Intelligent Design’s Impact on Mainstream Science


Don’t let anyone tell you that intelligent design isn’t having an impact on the way mainstream scientists are thinking about problems like the origin of life (OOL). David Coppedge points out the “devastating assessment” of OOL that was just published in Nature, the world’s most prestigious science journal. The authors are Nick Lane and Joana Xavier. The latter is a chemist at Imperial College London. As Coppedge notes, she’s been frank in comments about intelligent design and specifically Stephen Meyer’s Signature in the cell.

“One of the Best Books I’ve Read”

From a 2022 conversation with Perry Marshall:

But about intelligent design, let me tell you, Perry, I read Signature in the Cell by Stephen Meyer…And I must tell you, I found it one of the best books I’ve read, in terms of really putting the finger on the questions. What I didn’t like was the final answer, of course. But I actually tell everyone I can, “Listen, read that book. Let’s not put intelligent design on a spike and burn it. Let’s understand what they’re saying and engage.” It’s a really good book that really exposes a lot of the questions that people try to sweep under the carpet….I think we must have a more naturalistic answer to these processes. There must be. Otherwise, I’ll be out of a job.

That is a remarkable statement. Paul Nelson first Noted it at Evolution News. 

Under the Carpet

Dr. Xavier rejects ID, which is fair enough, but recommends an ID book by Dr. Meyer to “everyone I can” because “it really exposes a lot of the questions that people try to sweep under the carpet.” In the book, Meyer finds that, in addressing the origin-of-life puzzle, all current materialist solutions fail. He has a politer way of saying what chemist James Tour does on the same subject.

So that’s September 2022. Now a year and a half later, Xavier is back in the pages of Nature exposing weaknesses in the OOL field as currently constituted. She still holds out for a “more naturalistic answer.” But do you think, in writing about those “questions that people try to sweep under the carpet,” she didn’t have Meyer’s book in the back of her mind? I’m no mind reader, but to me, the question seems self-answering.


Getting fraud down to a science?IV

 

Tuesday, 27 February 2024

The odd couple? II

 Can Evolution and Intelligent Design Work Together in Harmony?


Or is that wishful thinking? On a new episode of ID the Future, host Casey Luskin concludes his conversation with philosopher Stephen Dilley about a recent proposal to marry mainstream evolutionary theory with a case for intelligent design. Dr. Dilley is lead author of a comprehensive critique of Kojonen’s model co-authored with Luskin, Brian Miller, and Emily Reeves and published in the journal Religions.

In the second half of their discussion, Luskin and Dilley explain key scientific problems with Kojonen’s theistic evolutionary model. First up is Kojonen’s acceptance of both convergent evolution and common ancestry, two methods used by evolutionary biologists to explain common design features among different organisms. But if the design can be explained through natural processes, there is little need to invoke intelligent design. After all, the whole point of mainstream evolutionary theory is to render any need for design superfluous.

Dr. Dilley also explains why Kojonen’s model contradicts our natural intuition to detect design. If we look at a hummingbird under Kojonen’s proposal, we are still required to see unguided natural processes at work, the appearance of design without actual intelligent design. Yet we are also supposed to acknowledge that an intelligent designer front-loaded the evolutionary process with the creative power it needs to produce the hummingbird. So is it intelligently designed or isn’t it? The theist on the street is left scratching his or her head.

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