Saturday, 29 December 2018
The death of privacy? II
Never mind the police state,thanks to technology,your next door neighbour could be as big a threat.
How
long will it be before common criminals are walking around with drones
in their pockets.What will become of our privacy then.
Darwin's tree vs. the real world's forest.
Nature's Dis-Continuum: Why Structural Explanations Win Hands Down:
Michael Denton February 22, 2016 3:26 AM
Editor's note: In his new book Evolution: Still a Theory in Crisis, Michael Denton not only updates the argument from his groundbreaking Evolution: A Theory in Crisis (1985) but also presents a powerful new critique of Darwinian evolution. This article is one in a series in which Dr. Denton summarizes some of the most important points of the new book. For the full story, get your copy of Evolution: Still a Theory in Crisis. For a limited time, you'll enjoy a 30 percent discount at CreateSpace by using the discount code QBDHMYJH.
There is no evidence to support the Darwinian claim that the biological world is a functional continuum where it is possible to move from the base of the trunk to all the most peripheral branches in tiny incremental adaptive steps.
On the contrary, all of the evidence as reviewed in the first six chapters of Evolution: Still a Theory in Crisis implies that nature is a discontinuum. The tree is a discontinuous system of distinct Types characterized by sudden and saltational transitions and sudden origins of taxa-defining novelties and homologs, exactly as I claimed in Evolution thirty years ago. The claim has weathered well!
The grand river of life that has flowed on earth over the past four billion years has not meandered slowly and steadily across some flat and featureless landscape, but tumbled constantly through a rugged landscape over endless cataracts and rapids. No matter how unfashionable, no matter how at odds with current thinking in evolutionary biology, there is no empirical evidence for believing that organic nature is any less discontinuous than the inorganic realm. There is not the slightest reason for believing that the major homologs were achieved gradually via functional continuums. It is only the a priori demands of Darwinian causation that have imposed continuity on a basically discontinuous reality.
No matter how "unacceptable," the notion that the organic world consists of a finite set of distinct Types, which have been successively actualized during the evolutionary history of life on earth, satisfies the facts far better that its Darwinian rival.
Firstly, the absence of transitional sequences leading from antecedent structures to the each of the thousands of Type-defining homologs actualized during phylogeny is far more consonant with typology than Darwinism. The Darwinian claim that all the homologs were gradually achieved over millions of generations by incremental functionalism -- the genetic code, human language, the flower, the feather, the diaphragm, etc. -- is a phantasm. The near-universal absence of intermediates leading from antecedent structures to the homologs speaks volumes.
Secondly, on any Darwinian account, one must assume that previously plastic forms, "the homologs in the making," became fixed for some absolutely mysterious reason at specific points in phylogeny and thereafter remained invariant. This is a curiously non-adaptive picture, and highly incongruous in the context of a biology wedded to pan-adaptationism and a biological worldview that posits all living forms as part of an ever-mutating continuum.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, in the case of many of the homologous patterns -- and particularly the Bauplans like the tetrapod limb -- there is no evidence that they are basically adaptive forms. Certainly in the vast majority of cases, they have never been shown to serve some functional end. Self-evidently, in accounting for the evolutionary emergence of homologs that serve no specific adaptive function, structural explanations win hands down.
Michael Denton February 22, 2016 3:26 AM
Editor's note: In his new book Evolution: Still a Theory in Crisis, Michael Denton not only updates the argument from his groundbreaking Evolution: A Theory in Crisis (1985) but also presents a powerful new critique of Darwinian evolution. This article is one in a series in which Dr. Denton summarizes some of the most important points of the new book. For the full story, get your copy of Evolution: Still a Theory in Crisis. For a limited time, you'll enjoy a 30 percent discount at CreateSpace by using the discount code QBDHMYJH.
There is no evidence to support the Darwinian claim that the biological world is a functional continuum where it is possible to move from the base of the trunk to all the most peripheral branches in tiny incremental adaptive steps.
On the contrary, all of the evidence as reviewed in the first six chapters of Evolution: Still a Theory in Crisis implies that nature is a discontinuum. The tree is a discontinuous system of distinct Types characterized by sudden and saltational transitions and sudden origins of taxa-defining novelties and homologs, exactly as I claimed in Evolution thirty years ago. The claim has weathered well!
The grand river of life that has flowed on earth over the past four billion years has not meandered slowly and steadily across some flat and featureless landscape, but tumbled constantly through a rugged landscape over endless cataracts and rapids. No matter how unfashionable, no matter how at odds with current thinking in evolutionary biology, there is no empirical evidence for believing that organic nature is any less discontinuous than the inorganic realm. There is not the slightest reason for believing that the major homologs were achieved gradually via functional continuums. It is only the a priori demands of Darwinian causation that have imposed continuity on a basically discontinuous reality.
No matter how "unacceptable," the notion that the organic world consists of a finite set of distinct Types, which have been successively actualized during the evolutionary history of life on earth, satisfies the facts far better that its Darwinian rival.
Firstly, the absence of transitional sequences leading from antecedent structures to the each of the thousands of Type-defining homologs actualized during phylogeny is far more consonant with typology than Darwinism. The Darwinian claim that all the homologs were gradually achieved over millions of generations by incremental functionalism -- the genetic code, human language, the flower, the feather, the diaphragm, etc. -- is a phantasm. The near-universal absence of intermediates leading from antecedent structures to the homologs speaks volumes.
Secondly, on any Darwinian account, one must assume that previously plastic forms, "the homologs in the making," became fixed for some absolutely mysterious reason at specific points in phylogeny and thereafter remained invariant. This is a curiously non-adaptive picture, and highly incongruous in the context of a biology wedded to pan-adaptationism and a biological worldview that posits all living forms as part of an ever-mutating continuum.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, in the case of many of the homologous patterns -- and particularly the Bauplans like the tetrapod limb -- there is no evidence that they are basically adaptive forms. Certainly in the vast majority of cases, they have never been shown to serve some functional end. Self-evidently, in accounting for the evolutionary emergence of homologs that serve no specific adaptive function, structural explanations win hands down.
Matthew Henry's commentary on Michael the Great Prince of Jehovah's people.
It
is usual with the prophets, when they foretel the grievances of the
church, to furnish it at the same time with proper antidotes, a remedy
for every malady. And no relief is so sovereign, of such general
application, so easily accommodated to every case, and of such powerful
efficacy, as those that are fetched from Christ and the future state;
thence the comforts here are fetched.
I. Jesus Christ shall appear his church’s patron and protector: At that time, when the persecution is at the hottest, Michael shall stand up, Dan. 12:1. The angel had told Daniel what a firm friend Michael was to the church, Dan. 10:21. He all along showed this friendship in the upper world; the angels knew it; but now Michael shall stand up in his providence, and work deliverance for the Jews, when he sees that their power is gone, Deut. 32:3. 6. Christ is that great prince, for he is the prince of the kings of the earth, Rev. 1:5. And, if he stand up for his church, who can be against it? But this is not all: At that time (that
is, soon after) Michael shall stand up for the working out of our
eternal salvation; the Son of God shall be incarnate, shall be manifested to destroy the works of the devil. Christ stood for the children of our people when
he was made sin and a curse for them, stood in their stead as a
sacrifice, bore the cure for them, to bear it from them. He stands for
them in the intercession he ever lives to make within the veil, stands
up for them, and stands their friend. And after the destruction of
antichrist, of whom Antiochus was a type, Christ shall stand at the latter day upon the earth, shall appear for the complete redemption of all his.
II. When Christ appears he will recompense tribulation to those that trouble his people. There shall be a time of trouble, threatening to all, but ruining to all the implacable enemies of God’s kingdom among men, such trouble as never was since there was a nation. This is applicable. 1. To the destruction of Jerusalem, which Christ calls (perhaps with an eye to this prediction) such a great tribulation as was not since the beginning of the world to this time, Matt. 24:21. This the angel had spoken much of (Dan. 9:26, 27); and it happened about the same time that Christ set up the gospel-kingdom in the world, that Michael our prince stands up. Or, 2. To the judgment of the great day, that day that shall burn as an oven, and consume the proud and all that do wickedly; that will be such a day of trouble as never was to all those whom Michael our prince stands against.
Ps.here is John Wesley's take on Michael in Daniel 12:1
For the children - The meaning seems to be, as after the death of Antiochus the Jews had some deliverance, so there will be yet a greater deliverance to the people of God, when Michael your prince, the Messiah shall appear for your salvation. A time of trouble - A the siege of Jerusalem, before the final judgment. The phrase at that time, probably includes all the time of Christ, from his first, to his last coming.
Ps.here is John Wesley's take on Michael in Daniel 12:1
For the children - The meaning seems to be, as after the death of Antiochus the Jews had some deliverance, so there will be yet a greater deliverance to the people of God, when Michael your prince, the Messiah shall appear for your salvation. A time of trouble - A the siege of Jerusalem, before the final judgment. The phrase at that time, probably includes all the time of Christ, from his first, to his last coming.
MicroRNAs = Macro-problems for Darwinism.
MicroRNAs Don’t Fit the Evolution Model
Cornelius Hunter
MicroRNAs are small RNA gene products, typically consisting of 20-24 nucleotides, which help to regulate protein synthesis, for example by pausing or halting the ribosome translation process. Like the small drill bit that is inserted into the much larger drill tool, the small microRNAs are attached to a much larger molecular machine that performs the regulation. The microRNA role is to help the molecular machine recognize the correct RNA target.
In other words, instead of the cell having to construct a large quantity of different molecular machines to perform the regulatory role on a large quantity of RNA targets, the cell can construct a more generic type of molecular machine, and then simply attach the instructions — the microRNA — as needed.
This design approach requires the existence of these two entities: the big molecular machine and its little instruction set. Remove either entity, and this particular regulatory process isn’t going to happen.
That does not fit the evolutionary narrative. According to evolution you need a slow, gradual buildup of designs, not all-or-nothing scenarios. But not surprisingly biology is chocked full of the latter. And so with evolution we must say that the different parts just happened to arise, perhaps serving some other roles, and then just luckily they worked fantastically together to achieve a new function.
MicroRNAs are yet another finding that must be force-fit into evolutionary theory. But this irreducible complexity is only the beginning of the problem. With microRNAs, it only gets worse.
A completely different problem that microRNAs pose for evolutionary “theory” is that microRNAs do not fit the common descent pattern. As a recent paper in Genome Biology and Evolution admitted:
There is no evidence of conservation of miRNAs between the phylogenetic groups, indicating that miRNA systems evolved independently in each lineage
Evolved independently?
In other words, microRNAs do not fit the evolution model. The evidence contradicts the theory. Of course one can always make up an explanation. In this case, we say that the microRNAs “evolved independently.”
There you go, problem solved.
But let’s be honest — this is not indicated by the evidence. When the paper states that there is no evidence of conservation of miRNAs between the phylogenetic groups, thus “indicating” that miRNA systems evolved independently, it is simply misrepresenting the science.
There is precisely zero scientific evidence that microRNAs “evolved independently.” Zero. That is not my opinion. That is not conjecture. That is scientific fact.
Evolutionists talk a lot about scientific “fact.” They insist evolution is such a “fact.” But let’s just be honest. What is a scientific fact here is not evolution, but rather the exact opposite. The “fact” is the microRNAs show “no evidence of conservation.”
That fact does not “indicate” evolution, it contradicts evolution. Let’s just be honest. For once.
The paper finds yet another example of this failure in the microRNAs in brown algae. The study investigated the microRNAs in the species Saccharina japonica and compared them to previously investigated microRNAs, including those in a different brown algae species. Their findings were, as usual, “surprising.” The microRNAs in the two brown algae species were different. Completely different.
There was not a single pair of microRNAs, between the two species, that showed any sign of statistically significant sequence similarity.
Interestingly, the microRNAs in the two species did generally share some structural and genomic features. So the evolutionists had to conclude that the microRNAs in the two species evolved from a common ancestor, but then their respective sequences evolved like crazy, leaving zero trace of sequence similarity.
This. Makes. No. Sense.
Here how the paper spun the results:
Surprisingly, none of the S. japonica miRNAs share significant sequence similarity with the Ectocarpus sp. miRNAs. However, the miRNA repertoires of the two species share a number of structural and genomic features indicating that they were generated by similar evolutionary processes and therefore probably evolved within the context of a common, ancestral miRNA system. This lack of sequence similarity suggests that miRNAs evolve rapidly in the brown algae (the two species are separated by ∼95 Myr of evolution). The sets of predicted targets of miRNAs in the two species were also very different suggesting that the divergence of the miRNAs may have had significant consequences for miRNA function.
“Probably evolved within the context of a common, ancestral miRNA system”? So what does “within the context” mean?
The answer is this is a meaningless cover phrase that masks the fact that the evidence contradicts the theory. It is evo-speak for “We don’t know what we’re talking about.” A more polite description is “hand-waving.” A less polite, but more accurate description won’t be repeated here.
I will now consider the elephant in the room: Why is evolution being used to interpret the results in the first place? The theory is superfluous. It is redundant. It is vacuous. It is non-parsimonious. It is meaningless.
The theory does nothing to help us understand, interpret, elucidate, guide, or formulate meaningful predictions. Its only justification is itself. We use the theory of evolution to interpret the results because the theory is true. And how do we know it is true? Because it is true?
The theory is self-referential. It is circular. It is famous for being famous. It is a hold-over from the Epicureans of antiquity, the schoolmen of the Middle Ages, the rationalists of the 17th century, and the Darwinists today, and it has made a mockery of science.
Cornelius Hunter
MicroRNAs are small RNA gene products, typically consisting of 20-24 nucleotides, which help to regulate protein synthesis, for example by pausing or halting the ribosome translation process. Like the small drill bit that is inserted into the much larger drill tool, the small microRNAs are attached to a much larger molecular machine that performs the regulation. The microRNA role is to help the molecular machine recognize the correct RNA target.
In other words, instead of the cell having to construct a large quantity of different molecular machines to perform the regulatory role on a large quantity of RNA targets, the cell can construct a more generic type of molecular machine, and then simply attach the instructions — the microRNA — as needed.
This design approach requires the existence of these two entities: the big molecular machine and its little instruction set. Remove either entity, and this particular regulatory process isn’t going to happen.
That does not fit the evolutionary narrative. According to evolution you need a slow, gradual buildup of designs, not all-or-nothing scenarios. But not surprisingly biology is chocked full of the latter. And so with evolution we must say that the different parts just happened to arise, perhaps serving some other roles, and then just luckily they worked fantastically together to achieve a new function.
MicroRNAs are yet another finding that must be force-fit into evolutionary theory. But this irreducible complexity is only the beginning of the problem. With microRNAs, it only gets worse.
A completely different problem that microRNAs pose for evolutionary “theory” is that microRNAs do not fit the common descent pattern. As a recent paper in Genome Biology and Evolution admitted:
There is no evidence of conservation of miRNAs between the phylogenetic groups, indicating that miRNA systems evolved independently in each lineage
Evolved independently?
In other words, microRNAs do not fit the evolution model. The evidence contradicts the theory. Of course one can always make up an explanation. In this case, we say that the microRNAs “evolved independently.”
There you go, problem solved.
But let’s be honest — this is not indicated by the evidence. When the paper states that there is no evidence of conservation of miRNAs between the phylogenetic groups, thus “indicating” that miRNA systems evolved independently, it is simply misrepresenting the science.
There is precisely zero scientific evidence that microRNAs “evolved independently.” Zero. That is not my opinion. That is not conjecture. That is scientific fact.
Evolutionists talk a lot about scientific “fact.” They insist evolution is such a “fact.” But let’s just be honest. What is a scientific fact here is not evolution, but rather the exact opposite. The “fact” is the microRNAs show “no evidence of conservation.”
That fact does not “indicate” evolution, it contradicts evolution. Let’s just be honest. For once.
The paper finds yet another example of this failure in the microRNAs in brown algae. The study investigated the microRNAs in the species Saccharina japonica and compared them to previously investigated microRNAs, including those in a different brown algae species. Their findings were, as usual, “surprising.” The microRNAs in the two brown algae species were different. Completely different.
There was not a single pair of microRNAs, between the two species, that showed any sign of statistically significant sequence similarity.
Interestingly, the microRNAs in the two species did generally share some structural and genomic features. So the evolutionists had to conclude that the microRNAs in the two species evolved from a common ancestor, but then their respective sequences evolved like crazy, leaving zero trace of sequence similarity.
This. Makes. No. Sense.
Here how the paper spun the results:
Surprisingly, none of the S. japonica miRNAs share significant sequence similarity with the Ectocarpus sp. miRNAs. However, the miRNA repertoires of the two species share a number of structural and genomic features indicating that they were generated by similar evolutionary processes and therefore probably evolved within the context of a common, ancestral miRNA system. This lack of sequence similarity suggests that miRNAs evolve rapidly in the brown algae (the two species are separated by ∼95 Myr of evolution). The sets of predicted targets of miRNAs in the two species were also very different suggesting that the divergence of the miRNAs may have had significant consequences for miRNA function.
“Probably evolved within the context of a common, ancestral miRNA system”? So what does “within the context” mean?
The answer is this is a meaningless cover phrase that masks the fact that the evidence contradicts the theory. It is evo-speak for “We don’t know what we’re talking about.” A more polite description is “hand-waving.” A less polite, but more accurate description won’t be repeated here.
I will now consider the elephant in the room: Why is evolution being used to interpret the results in the first place? The theory is superfluous. It is redundant. It is vacuous. It is non-parsimonious. It is meaningless.
The theory does nothing to help us understand, interpret, elucidate, guide, or formulate meaningful predictions. Its only justification is itself. We use the theory of evolution to interpret the results because the theory is true. And how do we know it is true? Because it is true?
The theory is self-referential. It is circular. It is famous for being famous. It is a hold-over from the Epicureans of antiquity, the schoolmen of the Middle Ages, the rationalists of the 17th century, and the Darwinists today, and it has made a mockery of science.
Why the talking ape is undeniably exceptional.
I and Thou — Roger Scruton on What Makes Human Beings Unique -
Wesley J. Smith
Writing in the New York Times, philosopher Roger Scruton denies the divine spark argument that supports human exceptionalism — which I agree is not required to support HE — and focuses instead on our unique moral natures. He cites the “astonishing moral equipment of the human being — including rights and duties, personal obligations, justice, resentment, judgment, forgiveness,” which Scruton believes arises solely out of evolution.
Yes, I note before going on, this appeared in the New York Times, a newspaper that publishes articles denying or attacking human exceptionalism so often that when it publishes a piece supportive of our uniqueness, fairness requires that notice be taken.
Whatever its cause, our moral natures do indeed distinguish us from fauna. But Scruton adds our ability to relate to each other — and use language consistent with — all of us being subjects rather than objects. From“If We Are Not Just Animals, What Are We ?“:
We human beings do not see one another as animals see one another, as fellow members of a species. We relate to one another not as objects but as subjects, as creatures who address one another “I” to “you” — a point made central to the human condition by Martin Buber, in his celebrated mystical meditation “I and Thou.”
Yes. And this is a distinction between us and animals that extends beyond mere biology to the moral realm. Scruton concludes:
By speaking in the first person we can make statements about ourselves, answer questions, and engage in reasoning and advice in ways that bypass all the normal methods of discovery. As a result, we can participate in dialogues founded on the assurance that, when you and I both speak sincerely, what we say is trustworthy: Hence as persons we inhabit a lifeworld that is not reducible to the world of nature, any more than the life in a painting is reducible to the lines and pigments from which it is composed.
If that is true, then there is something left for philosophy to do, by way of making sense of the human condition. Philosophy has the task of describing the world in which we live — not the world as science describes it, but the world as it is represented in our mutual dealings, a world organized by language, in which we meet one another I to I.
This is not a matter of pins and angels. Accepting human exceptionalism is a crucial predicate to attaining and philosophically defending universal human rights.
Because if human interactions are not always subject-to-subject — as Roger Scruton contends correctly — but, in some cases, can be reduced to subject interacting with human object, those denigrated as the latter will be vulnerable to oppression, exploitation, and destruction.
Wesley J. Smith
Writing in the New York Times, philosopher Roger Scruton denies the divine spark argument that supports human exceptionalism — which I agree is not required to support HE — and focuses instead on our unique moral natures. He cites the “astonishing moral equipment of the human being — including rights and duties, personal obligations, justice, resentment, judgment, forgiveness,” which Scruton believes arises solely out of evolution.
Yes, I note before going on, this appeared in the New York Times, a newspaper that publishes articles denying or attacking human exceptionalism so often that when it publishes a piece supportive of our uniqueness, fairness requires that notice be taken.
Whatever its cause, our moral natures do indeed distinguish us from fauna. But Scruton adds our ability to relate to each other — and use language consistent with — all of us being subjects rather than objects. From“If We Are Not Just Animals, What Are We ?“:
We human beings do not see one another as animals see one another, as fellow members of a species. We relate to one another not as objects but as subjects, as creatures who address one another “I” to “you” — a point made central to the human condition by Martin Buber, in his celebrated mystical meditation “I and Thou.”
Yes. And this is a distinction between us and animals that extends beyond mere biology to the moral realm. Scruton concludes:
By speaking in the first person we can make statements about ourselves, answer questions, and engage in reasoning and advice in ways that bypass all the normal methods of discovery. As a result, we can participate in dialogues founded on the assurance that, when you and I both speak sincerely, what we say is trustworthy: Hence as persons we inhabit a lifeworld that is not reducible to the world of nature, any more than the life in a painting is reducible to the lines and pigments from which it is composed.
If that is true, then there is something left for philosophy to do, by way of making sense of the human condition. Philosophy has the task of describing the world in which we live — not the world as science describes it, but the world as it is represented in our mutual dealings, a world organized by language, in which we meet one another I to I.
This is not a matter of pins and angels. Accepting human exceptionalism is a crucial predicate to attaining and philosophically defending universal human rights.
Because if human interactions are not always subject-to-subject — as Roger Scruton contends correctly — but, in some cases, can be reduced to subject interacting with human object, those denigrated as the latter will be vulnerable to oppression, exploitation, and destruction.
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