Thursday 4 January 2024

Could Laws of Nature Give Rise to Platonic Forms?

Did the laws of nature give rise to “platonic” forms, which then constrain matter (and perhaps protein formation) in certain ways that make it easier for mutation and selection to search for and find biological forms? That question is thoughtfully posed by theologian Rope Kojonen in his recent book, The Compatibility of Evolution and Design. My colleagues and I reviewed the book in the journal Religions. Over the past two days, as part of a longer series, I’ve been looking at how Kojonen’s model would work practically.

Here is a third interpretation of Kojonen’s model, which I want to consider now.

The laws of nature gave rise to “platonic” forms, which then constrained evolution in ways that allowed selection and mutation to build biological forms. These “forms” are “an emergent consequence of the laws of chemistry and physics.” In this interpretation, the laws created these forms. The forms themselves are more than simply laws and matter under a different guise; they are non-physical. In this view, laws generated these forms, which then shaped the physical tendencies of matter such that (with possible contingency and other factors in play) they produced biological information sufficient for selection and mutation to evolve all manner of proteins, protein machines, unique human abilities, and the like.

Denton’s Structuralist View

Biologist Michael Denton’s structuralist view says that underlying structural principles govern the form of living things. Denton argues that these principles transcend the specifics of individual species and that the structural organization of living organisms is not merely the result of random processes but reflects a fundamental and innate order in nature. But how would this interpretation understand these “forms”? Kojonen helpfully writes:

[I]f we accept the idea of a platonic library of forms that makes evolution possible, it seems that evolution no longer explains the forms themselves, but only their actualization. In Wagner’s (2016) words, before evolution, the forms “already exist in a world of concepts, the kind of abstract concepts that mathematicians explore.” (p. 152)

On this interpretation, it seems that forms are abstract concepts that exist independently of and prior to evolution. They influence physical matter and its properties. Andreas Wagner’s statement about “abstract concepts” that exist “in a world of concepts” suggests that forms are not physical entities, forces, or patterns. They are non-physical phenomena that influence physical phenomena.

A Library of Forms

This viewpoint raises a variety of questions and concerns. First, since Kojonen describes the library of forms as “an emergent consequence” of physical laws, it is unclear how the laws of physics and chemistry — including gravity, electrostatics, the strong nuclear force, and so on — could (1) produce immaterial phenomena that (2) in turn exercise their own independent causal influence on matter and energy that are (3) still governed by the laws of nature. This is in part because it’s difficult to imagine how an emergent phenomenon can have its own independent causal powers over and above its ontological substrate. It’s also difficult to imagine how non-physical phenomena affect material phenomena that are apparently also fully governed by the material substrate that underlies them.

A second worry is that Kojonen’s viewpoint would most likely be seen as believable only by those with very specific background beliefs. Some people believe that non-physical phenomena can emerge from physical phenomena. (Some believe, for example, that brain states produce mental states.) Others believe that non-physical phenomena can exert a causal influence on physical phenomena. (For example, some believe that irreducible minds can cause brain states.) But it’s quite another matter to claim that physical phenomena gave rise to non-physical things, which then exercise independent causal power back on (other) physical phenomena — which are also still under the governance of the laws of physics and chemistry. If Kojonen’s account of the origin of biological information relies on this particular set of claims, then many thinkers will understandably find it unpersuasive.

Abandon Mainstream Physics and Chemistry?

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the “platonic” interpretation of Kojonen’s model deviates dramatically from mainstream scientists’ understanding of physical and chemical laws and their effects on the natural (and biological) world. If Kojonen’s idea necessitates abandoning mainstream physics and chemistry, it’s unclear why compatibility with mainstream biology is as valuable as Kojonen argues. In that case the model’s “mainstream” status appears arbitrary.

Finally, several of the issues mentioned above apply with equal or greater force when it comes to the emergence of human capabilities. Can the laws of nature produce platonic forms to explain ourselves? Could that explain our capacity for abstract thought, volition, and the like? For many reasons, this is doubtful.