Laws of thought
Logic
Written by: The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica
Laws of thought, traditionally, the three fundamental laws of logic: (1) the law of contradiction, (2) the law of excluded middle (or third), and (3) the principle of identity. That is, (1) for all propositions p, it is impossible for both p and not p to be true, or symbolically, ∼(p · ∼p), in which ∼ means “not” and · means “and”; (2) either p or ∼p must be true, there being no third or middle true proposition between them, or symbolically p ∨ ∼p, in which ∨ means “or”; and (3) if a propositional function F is true of an individual variable x, then F is indeed true of x, or symbolically F(x) ⊃ F(x), in which ⊃ means “formally implies.” Another formulation of the principle of identity asserts that a thing is identical with itself, or (∀x) (x = x), in which ∀ means “for every”; or simply that x is x.
Aristotle cited the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle as examples of axioms. He partly exempted future contingents, or statements about unsure future events, from the law of excluded middle, holding that it is not (now) either true or false that there will be a naval battle tomorrow, but that the complex proposition that either there will be a naval battle tomorrow or that there will not is (now) true. In the epochal Principia Mathematica (1910–13) of A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, this law occurs as a theorem rather than as an axiom.
That the laws of thought are a sufficient foundation for the whole of logic, or that all other principles of logic are mere elaborations of them, was a doctrine common among traditional logicians. It has been shown, however, that these laws do not even comprise a sufficient set of axioms for the most elementary branch of logic, the propositional calculus, nor for the traditional theory of the categorical syllogism or the logic of terms.
The law of excluded middle and certain related laws have been rejected by L.E.J. Brouwer, a Dutch mathematical intuitionist, and his school, who do not admit their use in mathematical proofs in which all members of an infinite class are involved. Brouwer would not accept, for example, the disjunction that either there occur ten successive 7’s somewhere in the decimal expansion of π or else not, since no proof is known of either alternative; but he would accept it if applied, for instance, to the first 10100 digits of the decimal, since these could in principle actually be computed.
In 1920 Jan Łukasiewicz, a leading member of the Polish school of logic, formulated a propositional calculus that had a third truth-value, neither truth nor falsity, for Aristotle’s future contingents, a calculus in which the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle both failed. Other systems have gone beyond three-valued to many-valued logics—e.g., certain probability logics having various degrees of truth-value between truth and falsity.
Of course only an academic could deny the axiomatic nature of the premise that a claim cannot be both true and false at the same time and/or in the same way or not realise that the fact that there are claims that are neither true nor false does not in anyway falsify that premise.
Logic
Written by: The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica
Laws of thought, traditionally, the three fundamental laws of logic: (1) the law of contradiction, (2) the law of excluded middle (or third), and (3) the principle of identity. That is, (1) for all propositions p, it is impossible for both p and not p to be true, or symbolically, ∼(p · ∼p), in which ∼ means “not” and · means “and”; (2) either p or ∼p must be true, there being no third or middle true proposition between them, or symbolically p ∨ ∼p, in which ∨ means “or”; and (3) if a propositional function F is true of an individual variable x, then F is indeed true of x, or symbolically F(x) ⊃ F(x), in which ⊃ means “formally implies.” Another formulation of the principle of identity asserts that a thing is identical with itself, or (∀x) (x = x), in which ∀ means “for every”; or simply that x is x.
Aristotle cited the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle as examples of axioms. He partly exempted future contingents, or statements about unsure future events, from the law of excluded middle, holding that it is not (now) either true or false that there will be a naval battle tomorrow, but that the complex proposition that either there will be a naval battle tomorrow or that there will not is (now) true. In the epochal Principia Mathematica (1910–13) of A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, this law occurs as a theorem rather than as an axiom.
That the laws of thought are a sufficient foundation for the whole of logic, or that all other principles of logic are mere elaborations of them, was a doctrine common among traditional logicians. It has been shown, however, that these laws do not even comprise a sufficient set of axioms for the most elementary branch of logic, the propositional calculus, nor for the traditional theory of the categorical syllogism or the logic of terms.
The law of excluded middle and certain related laws have been rejected by L.E.J. Brouwer, a Dutch mathematical intuitionist, and his school, who do not admit their use in mathematical proofs in which all members of an infinite class are involved. Brouwer would not accept, for example, the disjunction that either there occur ten successive 7’s somewhere in the decimal expansion of π or else not, since no proof is known of either alternative; but he would accept it if applied, for instance, to the first 10100 digits of the decimal, since these could in principle actually be computed.
In 1920 Jan Łukasiewicz, a leading member of the Polish school of logic, formulated a propositional calculus that had a third truth-value, neither truth nor falsity, for Aristotle’s future contingents, a calculus in which the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle both failed. Other systems have gone beyond three-valued to many-valued logics—e.g., certain probability logics having various degrees of truth-value between truth and falsity.
Of course only an academic could deny the axiomatic nature of the premise that a claim cannot be both true and false at the same time and/or in the same way or not realise that the fact that there are claims that are neither true nor false does not in anyway falsify that premise.
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