When is one not one?

 When ever a Trinitarian requires that it be so.

ECHAD (א ח ד)

Echad (‘Plural’ Oneness) and Yachid (‘Absolute’ Oneness)



I have seen Deut. 6:4 - “YHWH [Jehovah] our God, YHWH [Jehovah] one [Echad, א ח ד in Hebrew]” - rendered in several ways. (I prefer "Jehovah [is] our God, Jehovah alone.") Some trinitarians misinterpret this. They usually say something like this: “At Deut. 6:4 the word ‘one’ is echad [1] in Biblical Hebrew, which means ‘composite unity’ or ‘plural oneness’.”

The examples that they cite which are supposed to verify this understanding for  echad are usually either Gen. 2:24 - “They [two persons] shall be one [echad] flesh,” or Gen. 1:5 - “the evening and the morning were the first (or one) [echad] day,” or Numbers 13:23 - “one [echad] cluster of grapes.”

In addition to insisting that echad means “plural oneness” some of them also insist that, if God had intended the meaning of “absolute oneness” (singleness, only one individual) at Deut. 6:4, he would have used the word yachid (or yacheed).

So let’s examine the intended meanings of echad and yachid and the scriptures cited above.

First, it certainly wouldn’t be surprising to find that some recognized trinitarian authority on Biblical Hebrew had written somewhere that echad means “united or plural oneness.” but I haven’t found one yet!

Here is what I have found written about echad by authorities on Biblical Hebrew:

The only definition given for echad in the very trinitarian New American Standard Exhaustive Concordance is: “a prim[ary] card[inal] number; one”. We find no “plural oneness” there!

The highly respected Biblical Hebrew authority, Gesenius, says that echad is “a numeral having the power of an adjective, one.” He then lists the various meanings of echad as:

“(1) The same,”

“(2) first,”

“(3) some one,”

“(4) it acts the part of an indefinite article,”[2]

“(5) one only of its kind,”

“(6) when repeated [echad ... echad] ‘one ... another’,”

“(7) [K echad] AS one man.” [The initial consonant of this word, “K,” actually means “as” or “like,” so in this special form the meaning is close to that of a plural oneness. But this is not the form used at Deut. 6:4 !! ]

Gesenius also lists a plural form of the word (achadim, or /*miiydxa in Hebrew script) which means “joined in one, united.” This, too, is not the form used at Deut. 6:4 which context shows, instead, to have meaning #5 above. - See Gesenius’ Hebrew-Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament, #259, Baker Book House. Surely, if God (Jehovah) were really a union of persons, a united one, this form which truly means “united one” would have been used to describe “Him” repeatedly in the Holy Scriptures. But it and all other words with similar meanings were never used for God (or Jehovah)!

By using a good Bible Concordance (such as Strong’s or Young’s) we can find all the uses of echad in the Bible. Unfortunately (due to space limitations),Young’s and Strong’s both list the rare plural form (achadim, or /*miiydxa in Hebrew letters) and the “AS one” (Kechad, or dxak in Hebrew script) form along with the common singular form (echad) without distinguishing among them.

Nevertheless, since both the plural form achadim and the kechad form are used quite rarely (see Ezek. 37:17 and 2 Chronicles 5:13 for examples), we can see that the overwhelming majority of the uses of echad listed in these concordances (over 500) obviously have the meaning of singleness just as we normally use the word “one” today.

If you should find a scripture listed as using echad in your concordance that definitely has the meaning “plural oneness” or “together,” or “as one,” you should check it out in an interlinear Hebrew-English Bible. If the word in question is really the echad form of the word (as at Deut. 6:4), then it will end with the Hebrew letter “d” (similar to '7') in the Hebrew portion of your interlinear. If, however, it is really the plural form of the word (achadim), then it will end in the Hebrew letter “m” (similar to 'D'). And if the word is really Kechad (“AS one”), it will begin with the Hebrew letter “k” (similar to a backward 'C'). Remember, though, that Hebrew reads from right to left (so the LAST letter of a Hebrew word is really the letter at the extreme LEFT.)

Using your concordance along with an interlinear Hebrew-English Bible in this manner, I don’t believe you will ever find echad (as used at Deut. 6:4) literally meaning “plural oneness”!

Further emphasizing the impropriety of this “plural oneness” interpretation of echad are the many trinitarian renderings of Deut. 6:4. In the dozens of different trinitarian Bible translations that I have examined none of them have rendered Deut. 6:4 (or Mark 12:29 in the Greek NT) in such a way as to show anything even faintly resembling a “plural oneness”!!

Even the highly trinitarian The Living Bible, which, being a paraphrase Bible, is able to (and frequently does) take great liberties with the literal Greek and Hebrew meanings in order to make better trinitarian interpretations, renders Deut. 6:4 as “Jehovah is our God, Jehovah alone.” Notice that there’s not even a hint of a “plural oneness” Jehovah!

The equally trinitarian (and nearly as “freely” translated as The Living Bible) Good News Bible (GNB) renders it: “The LORD - and the LORD alone - is our God.” - Compare the equally “free-handed” (and trinitarian) The Amplified Bible.

And even among the more literal trinitarian translations of Deut 6:4 we find:

“The LORD is our God, the LORD alone.” - New Revised Standard Version.

“The LORD is our God, the LORD alone!” - New American Bible.

“The LORD is our God, the LORD alone.” - The Holy Bible in the Language of Today, Beck (Lutheran).

“Yahweh our God is the one, the only Yahweh.” - New Jerusalem Bible.

“Yahweh is our God, - Yahweh alone.” - The Emphasized Bible, Rotherham.

“The LORD is our God, the LORD alone.” - An American Translation (Smith-Goodspeed).

“The Eternal, the Eternal alone, is our God.” - A New Transation, Moffatt .

The trinitarian ASV (also the RSV) gives 4 different possible renderings of Deut. 6:4. One of them is identical with The Living Bible, and none of them includes an understanding of a “plural oneness” God!

The paraphrased The Living Bible also renders Mark 12:29 (where Jesus quotes Deut. 6:4 and an excellent spot for him to reveal a “trinity” God --- or even just a “plural oneness” God) as: “The Lord our God is the one and only God.” Notice the further explanation of the intended meaning of this scripture at Mark 12:32, 34. “’... you have spoken a true word in saying that there is only one God and no other...’ Realizing this man’s understanding, Jesus said to him, ‘You are not far from the Kingdom of God.’”

Why doesn’t this highly interpretive trinitarian paraphrase Bible (or any other Bible for that matter) bring out a “plural oneness” meaning at these scriptures (Deut. 6:4; Mark 12:29) if that can be a proper interpretation for echad?

Surely, if the trinitarian scholars who made this Bible had thought there was even the slightest justification for an echad = “plural oneness” interpretation, they would have rendered it that way: “Jehovah is a composite unity;” or “Jehovah is the United One;” or “Jehovah is a plural oneness;” etc.

Instead they have clearly shown that God (who inspired it), Moses (who wrote it under inspiration), and even Jesus himself (who taught that it was part of the most important commandment of all - Mark 12:28-29, LB; GNB; etc.) intended this scripture to show God as a single person only!

Similarly, the three annotated trinitarian study Bibles I own would certainly explain any intended “multiple-oneness” meaning for echad at Deut. 6:4 (if there were any possibility of such an interpretation). But the extremely trinitarian New American Bible, St. Joseph ed., gives no hint of such an understanding of echad in its footnote for Deut. 6:4 (or anywhere else). And the trinitarian The New Oxford Annotated Bible, 1977 ed., likewise gives no hint of such an understanding in its footnote for Deut. 6:4 (or anywhere else). And that trinitarian favorite: The NIV Study Bible, 1985, also gives no hint of such a meaning for echad in its footnote for Deut. 6:4 (or anywhere else). The only possible reason for all these trinitarian study Bibles ignoring this “proof” is that it simply is not true!

The examples given by some trinitarians to show a “plural oneness” meaning for echad don’t stand up either. The Gen. 2:24 example of a man and wife becoming “one (echad) flesh” certainly does not mean one literal body of flesh is composed of two people.

A man and wife becoming “one flesh” also doesn’t mean that two different persons suddenly become equal or identical. They are still two distinct individuals (one is lord and head over the other according to the Bible) and do not share nervous, circulatory, skeletal, etc. systems. They both did not have to (and, in fact, did not) come into existence at the same time, nor do they both have the same minds, personalities, nor even equal authority!

So, then, how did the Bible writers understand that the two became “one”? It should be enough to show that being “one” with someone else merely shows how two (or more) people are “united in purpose” as though they were one person in that respect only (purpose). - See the ONE study.Notice how the following scripture uses the very same “one flesh” reference:

Ephesians 5:31 "For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh." 32 This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the church. - NKJV.

This could be understood as in the “one in purpose” interpretation above, and/or it could be understood in the “close relationship” understanding below. But it clearly is speaking of Jesus and his followers being “one flesh.” 
Another way a man and wife can be considered “one flesh” has to do with what the word “flesh” (basar) meant in ancient Biblical Hebrew. Any good concordance will show you that “flesh” (basar) in Bible usage often means a close relative. Gen. 37:27 is an example of this: “for he is our brother and our flesh.”

And the equivalent NT Greek word for “flesh” (sarx) could be used in the same manner. At Ro 11:14, “my flesh (sarx)” - KJV is also rendered: “my fellow Jews” - RSV; “my own race” - MLB, TEV, GNB, NEB; “my own people” - NIV; “my fellow countrymen” - NASB.

The King James Version even translates this OT Hebrew word (basar) as “KIN” at Lev. 18:6 and 25:49. The New English Bible translates it “blood-relation.” With this common understanding for “flesh” it is clear that the expression “one flesh” at Gen. 2:24 can simply mean that the two married people are now to be considered as closely related as “blood-relatives.” In other words, their closest “flesh” (relatives) used to be their parents. Now they are to consider their new relationship to one another as being even stronger than that with their parents: “therefore shall a man leave his mother and father” - Gen. 2:24.

To argue that a man and woman somehow, in some mysterious supernatural way, literally become one flesh, is simply not what was intended in the original language.

It is no more mysterious than my saying that my wife Karen and I (and our children, Randy and Robin) have become a single (or “one”) family (“relationship,” “kin”). I certainly don’t mean to imply some “mysterious” plurality by the word “single” even though there happen to be two (or four) members in that one family (relationship, “flesh”). Or, a person could have dozens of members in his one, single family (“flesh”). Or, a person might be the sole surviving member (“absolute mathematical oneness”) of his one family - it’s still only one family and the singularity or plurality of its composition has nothing whatsoever to do with its being one single family!

It’s no different from talking about two families, three families, etc. We are talking about a definite mathematical number of families, not the numerical composition within those families. The “one flesh” example works exactly that same way.

A few “echad = multiple oneness” trinitarians even claim that a man and woman becoming “one flesh” means “they are one in nature ... one in human nature as the Father and Son are one in the God-nature.”

This kind of reasoning would mean that the man (or the woman) before marriage (before they “became one flesh”) was not by himself already equally “one” in human nature with the rest of mankind! Then what kind of nature did this person possess before he married?

Each person (whether they ever marry and become “one flesh” or not) obviously already possesses human nature equally with any other human being. But when they marry, they are supposed to become one in purpose, goals, etc., the closest of relatives, not suddenly become human beings and thereby gain human nature!

Strangely, one recent anti-Watchtower letter sent by a relative to a local Witness used the above example for “one” in marriage being “one” in nature and then said:

“‘the marriage relationship portrays the mystical oneness and union of Jesus, the Bridegroom with His Bride, His Church’ just as it portrays that the man and his wife ‘are ... one in nature ... as the Father and Son are one in the God-nature.’”

Yes, this writer was actually saying, then, that just as the Father and Son are one, so the man and wife are one, and so Jesus and his Church (all his true followers) are one! In other words, in trinitarian terms, Jesus and his Father are equally God; and Jesus (God in every sense, they would say) and his Church (also equal in nature with Jesus) must then be equally God also!!

Clearly it means, instead, that Jesus, the bridegroom, and his bride, his church (of “brothers”) are one in purpose only (as are God and his Son). -

“That they may all be one; even as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they may also be in us ... that they may be one even as we are one.” - John 17:21, 22, ASV.

Even if the Hebrew echad were used here at John 17:22 for “one” (as the famous Lutheran trinitarian scholar, Franz Delitzsch translated it in his Hebrew New Testament), it is obvious that it does not mean some mysterious plural oneness wherein the individuals are all equally the Father, or equally the Son, and certainly not all equally God! (In any case, John would have used the masculine form of “one” in the NT Greek, heis, at John 17:22 if he had intended any of the above “trinitarian” meanings. Instead, he used the neuter form, hen, in NT Greek which signifies a union of purpose - see the ONE study).

Delitzsch also translates the NT Greek heis at 1 Cor. 9:24 (“only one” - NIV, NEB, TEV, GNB, RSV; “only one person” - The Living Bible) as echad ! There is certainly no “plural oneness” intended here! - Hebrew New Testament, Delitzsch, The Trinitarian Bible Society, 1981.

If a person will not acknowledge the obvious figurative meaning of “one” as “united in purpose,” then he is saying that as man and wife become absolutely equal in nature by marriage (and as Jesus and the Father are “absolutely equal in nature” and are, therefore, equally God) so do Jesus and his Church become “one” or “equal in nature” and, therefore, the Church (Jesus’ “brothers”) is equally God!

Such reasoning is obviously ludicrous and illustrates what was really figuratively intended by “one” in marriage and other relationships: they are as though they were literally “one” in only one respect: unity of purpose!

As the bride is to become “one” in purpose with her husband (although he is designated to be head over his wife - 1 Cor. 11:3; Eph. 5:23), so, too, those chosen ones are to become “one” in purpose with Jesus (although he is to be their head - Eph. 5:23; 1 Cor. 11:3 - so he does not conform to their will and purpose, nor are they equal to him, but they willingly conform to his purpose so that they may be “one”), and so, in like manner, Jesus has become “one” in purpose with his Father (the only true God - John 17:3) who is his head. The Father does not conform to the will and purpose of Jesus, nor is Jesus in any way equal to the Father, but Jesus willingly and perfectly conforms to his Father’s purpose and will! - “The head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman (wife) is the man; and the head of Christ is God [not ‘Christ is equal to God’].” - 1 Cor. 11:3, ASV.

So, why couldn’t the absolute mathematical oneness of echad at Deut. 6:4 be describing a figurative unity of purpose just as the Greek “one” (hen) does at John 17:21, 22?

That is, if Jesus can describe certain chosen men, and his Father (God alone), and himself figuratively as all being “one” (in purpose only), why couldn’t God be telling us at Deuteronomy 6:4 that he is more than one person, all of whom are united in purpose? One reason is that the word used for “one” in this sense is neuter (hen). But the word used for “one” at Deut. 6:4 in the ancient Greek Septuagint (and at Mk 12:29 in the New Testament) is the masculine heis! - cf. Mk 2:7.

We also know that such an interpretation is ridiculous because of the clear context of Deut. 6 (and the clear statements of the rest of the Bible). Nowhere in Old or New Testament is God said to be more than one person. No one would have possibly understood Deut. 6:4 as meaning “Jehovah is a ‘many persons united in one purpose’ God” at that time or for thousands of years thereafter (certainly not until hundreds of years after Jesus’ death - see the HIST study, parts 2-5).

The context of Deut. 6:4 and 6:13-15 shows that God is not speaking of all persons who could be considered to be “united in purpose” with the Father (this would have included the Father and the Word, of course, but it would also have included the millions of faithful angels, and today it would include a large number of faithful Christians!). Remember that when “one” is used figuratively for “united in purpose” it is always describing a relationship between certain individuals or groups who are identified in context. There is no such identification (nor even the slightest suggestion of such an identification) found in Deut. 6.

We cannot believe that Deut. 6:4 is saying that all those who are “united in purpose” with Jehovah are Jehovah! But that is the only figurative use we could possibly have for echad at Deut. 6:4. Otherwise we are left with the literal meaning (mathematical oneness, a single individual) of echad (which is obviously intended in the vast majority of uses of echad and which is obviously intended at Deut. 6:4, 13-15 and further explained at Mark 12:29, 32.)

Just as no Bible translation (including all the many trinitarian translations I have examined) renders Deut. 6:4 with any kind of suggestion that “Jehovah is a multiple unity,” no translation suggests it should be rendered with the understanding that “Jehovah is united in purpose.”

It is also clear from other Bible statements that God is a single person: the Father in heaven. (Jehovah is never described as “the Son,” “the Messiah,” “the Holy Spirit,” or any other individual but the Father - Deut. 32:6; Is. 63:16; 64:8; Jer. 3:4; 3:19 - and conversely, no heavenly person except Jehovah is ever called the Father! - Matt. 23:9.)

Notice how Jesus used the word monos (“only,” “alone”) to describe God (Jehovah, the Father) at John 17:1, 3. “Father ... they should know thee the only [monos] True God.” Or, “Father ... who alone art truly God” - NEB.

But let’s look at another example where echad is supposed to literally mean “plural oneness.”

Almost anything we can name is composed of different elements or parts. If I should say, “Randy was the first (another way echad may be rendered into English) runner to cross the finish line,” I am not referring to the fact that he has two legs (or flesh, blood, and bones) which together help compose the whole of that one (or “first”) individual. I am saying (as everyone well knows) that, at the time he crossed the finish line, Randy was the only one who had done so (whether he had one or two legs, etc.). In the same sense of absolute mathematical order I would say that the very next runner (whether it should happen to be a woman, horse, octopus, snail, etc.) is the second individual runner to cross the finish line regardless of how many legs, arms, etc. that racer has. So, Robin, the second runner to cross the finish line is no more a “plural twoness” than Randy, the first one, is a “plural oneness”!

Therefore, “the evening and the morning were the first [echad] day [‘one day’ - RSV]” - Gen. 1:5, KJV - means exactly what it says, just as “the evening and the morning were the second [sheni] day” - Gen. 1:8 - means exactly what it says and so on through six days!

“The first [echad] day” does not in any sense refer to the individual parts which compose that day (or a “plural oneness”) any more than “the sixth day” refers to a “plural sixness” making up that single day! They are absolute mathematical numbers and do not refer to internal composition but, instead, to single, individual things.

And so it is with the example of “one [echad] cluster of grapes” at Numbers 13:23. Here again “one” [echad] obviously means only one (singleness, absolute mathematical oneness) for whatever word it is applied to.

It is the word “cluster” in this scripture which means “one thing composed of many individual items,” but there is only one single (absolute mathematical oneness) “cluster”!

This is no different from one (echad) single tribe (whether composed of one single, last person or millions of persons) at Judges 21:3, 6 and two tribes (whether each is composed of one person or millions) at Joshua 21:16. Echad literally means “single,” “only” as can plainly be seen at Exodus 12:46, “one house;” Ex. 33:5, “one moment;” Numbers 7:21, “one bullock, one ram, [etc.].”



Yachid

A few trinitarians insist that not only does echad mean “plural oneness,” but that, if singleness were intended by the Bible writer, the Hebrew word yachidwould have been used at Deut. 6:4.

Here is how it was presented to me by one trinitarian:

“The word for ‘one’ in this great declaration [Deut. 6:4] is not Yachid which is an absolute oneness but rather echad which means ‘united one.’ Had the Holy Spirit desired to state absolute mathematical oneness in this all-important declaration, He could have easily used the word yachid, couldn’t He?”

We have already seen the absolute falsity of the “echad-means-’plural-oneness’” idea. But what about yachid? Did the Bible writers really use it whenever they meant “absolute mathematical oneness”? We have already seen that they really used echad for “absolute mathematical oneness,” and a good concordance will show they did this consistently—many hundreds of times!

Yachid, on the other hand, is only used about 12 times in the entire Bible and then only in a narrow, specific sense.

The Old Testament language authority, Gesenius, tells us that yachid is used in three very specialized ways: (1) “only” but primarily in the sense of “only begotten”! - Gen. 22:2, 12, 16; Jer. 6:26; and Zech. 12:10. (2) “solitary” but with the connotation of “forsaken” or “wretched” ! - Ps. 25:16; 68:6. (3) As yachidah (feminine form) meaning “only one” as something most dear and used “poet[ically] for ‘life’ - Ps. 22:20; 35:17.” - p. 345 b.

We find yachid is never used to describe God anywhere in the entire Bible! But it is used to describe Isaac in his prefigured representation of the Messiah: Gen. 22:2, 12, 16. It is also used at Judges 11:34 for an only-begotten child. The ancient Greek Septuagint translates yachid at Judges 11:34 as monogenes (“only-begotten”): the same NT Greek word repeatedly used to describe Christ (even in his pre-human heavenly existence - 1 John 4:9). Monogenes, however, like the Hebrew yachid, is never used to describe the only true God, Jehovah (who is the Father alone).

So, if Jehovah were to describe himself as “forsaken” or “wretched,” or were speaking poetically about his “dear life,” or were describing himself as the “only-begotten son” (which he never does anywhere in the Bible!), then he might have used yachid.[3]

But since he was describing his “mathematical oneness” at Deut. 6:4, he properly used echad!

As we pointed out at the beginning, there are Hebrew words that mean “plural oneness,” but echad is not one of them. As another example, notice the clear meaning of echad as “absolute mathematical oneness” at Gen. 42:11 where the sons of Jacob say, “we are all one [echad] man’s sons.” They certainly weren’t saying “we are all sons of different men who together make up a ‘plural oneness’ man.”! Instead, the inspired Bible writer wrote that they were all sons of one [echad not yachid] single, solitary man.

We see the same thing at Malachi 2:10 even though we find two different interpretations by trinitarian translators.

Some translate it:

“have we not all one [echad] father? Has not one [echad] God created us?” -RSV.

The meaning of this rendering seems to be that everyone has a single person as his earthly father and, by comparison, we also all have a single [echad] person as our God and Creator in heaven.

Other trinitarian scholars translate Malachi 2:10 as:

“Have we not all the one Father? Has not the one God created us?” - NAB (1970 and 1991).

“Is there not one Father of us all? Did not one God create us?” - NJB.

“Have we not all one Father? Did not one God create us?” - JB.

“Have we not all one Father? Has not one God created us?” - NKJV.

“Have we not all one Father? Has not one God created us?” - The Amplified Bible.

“Is there not one Father to us all? Has not one God created us?” - MKJV, Green.

“Don’t all of us have one Father? Hasn’t one God created us?” - In the Language of Today, Beck.

“Do we not all have one Father? Has not one God made us?” - NLV.

We clearly see in these trinitarian translations that the common Hebrew use of parallelisms was intended by the inspired Bible writers. That is, the first half of the verse is differently worded but parallel in meaning with the second half. Therefore, the first half refers to God just as the second half does, so the translator has capitalized “Father” to make such an interpretation unmistakeable. The meaning in this interpretation, then, is:

“We all have one [echad] Father (the only person who is God),” and, in parallel meaning,

“We all have one [echad] Creator (a single person as God).” - Compare 1 Cor. 8:6; Eph. 4:6.

No matter which interpretation you prefer, it is clear that the comparison with (or parallel with) a single individual father (whether we interpret it as the single male human parent or the single person, God the Father), who is called “one [echad] father/Father,” is a single individual who is called “one [echad] God”! The comparison (or parallel) would be senseless if echad meant one single person for “father/Father” (as it must) in its first half and “plural oneness” persons for “God” (as it clearly doesn’t) in its second half!

The inspired Bible writers at Gen. 42:11, Malachi 2:10, and Deut. 6:4 could easily have used a word that really means “united one”[4] - but they didn’t! The inspired Bible writer at Deut. 6:4 could also have easily said (and definitely should have said if it were true) that “God is three persons who together make up the one God” or even just “the one God is three persons,” but he didn’t, and neither did any other Bible writer! He should also have used yachid repeatedly in the Bible for God if Jehovah is ever to be understood as being Jesus (“the only-begotten”), but no Bible writer describes Jehovah that way, ever!

A footnote for Deut. 6:4 in the very trinitarian The New American Bible, St. Joseph ed., 1970, says:

“this passage contains the basic principle of the whole Mosaic law, the keynote of the Book of Deuteronomy: since the Lord [Jehovah] alone is God, we must love him with an undivided heart. Christ cited these words as ‘the greatest and the first commandment,’ embracing in itself the whole law of God (Mt 22:37f and parallels [especially see Mark 12:28-34]).”

As the ASV renders it in a footnote for Deut. 6:4 - “Jehovah is our God; Jehovah is one”. Yes, the great distinction between Israel and all the nations around them was that they worshiped only one [”absolute mathematical oneness”] person as God (as they always have, and as they still do today - see the ISRAEL study).

The only honest interpretations of “this great declaration” of Deut. 6:4 are “Jehovah our God is only one [echad] person” or “Jehovah our God is only one God”!

Judging by the literal meanings of both the Hebrew Scriptures and the Greek (NT and Septuagint OT) Scriptures Deut. 6:4 actually says: “Hear Israel, Jehovah the God of us, Jehovah is one” (Sept. Greek) and “Jehovah our God, Jehovah [is] one” (Hebrew - Interlinear Bible). But in any case echad clearly refers to a single, solitary [absolute mathematical oneness] being, not a “multiple oneness”!

So even the very trinitarian literal translation, the New King James Version[5],  (like the very trinitarian ETRV [6] paraphrase Bible) translates echad at Deut. 6:4 correctly as: “Hear, O Israel: The LORD [Jehovah] our God, the LORD [Jehovah] is one!”

The meaning is clear. It is expressed perhaps even more clearly in the popular trinitarian paraphrase Bible, The Living Bible: “Jehovah is our God, Jehovah alone.”

Alpha and omega demystified.

 Elijah Daniels

Trinity 'Proof' Texts Refuted

Jesus and JEHOVAH God do NOT share the same title of "Alpha and Omega"
Some trinitarians attempt to prove their "JEHOVAH is Jesus" idea by pointing to Rev. 1:8 where God is clearly called "Alpha and Omega" and then saying that Jesus claims the same title at Rev. 22:13. They point to Rev. 22:16 in the KJV as proof that it is Jesus who is claiming to be the Alpha and Omega of verse 13. Since JEHOVAH is clearly Alpha and Omega (Rev. 1:8), they say, and Jesus is Alpha and Omega (Rev. 22:13), then Jesus IS JEHOVAH!

As you probably know, the original Bible writers didn't use any punctuation or capitalization and frequently ran the words of one speaker right into those of another speaker without any warning or indication. Eerdmans 1978 edition of Young's Analytical Concordance to the Bible, for example, warns Bible readers:

"The language of the MESSENGER frequently glides into that of the SENDER ..." and, "what a SERVANT says or does is ascribed to the MASTER." - "Hints and Helps to Bible Interpretation" - Preface.

There is another thing that helps show the originally-intended meaning here. Although it is very common that the words of one speaker slide right into those of another speaker (e.g., Is. 10:4, 7), it also happens that sometimes the writer identifies the new speaker. As we see in Daniel, for example, Daniel nearly always identifies himself as the new speaker when he uses the words "I, Daniel" whenever it might be confusing to the reader (especially after a different person has been speaking) - Dan. 7:15, 28; 8:15, 27; 12:5.

If we then examine Revelation (which is recognized as being similar to, patterned after, and frequently referring to, the Book of Daniel), we find that John also uses this technique. "I, John" identifies a new speaker in every instance John uses it: Rev. 1:9; 22:8. So Rev. 1:9 is merely the statement of a new speaker.

Now look again at Rev. 22:8-16.

John is identified as the speaker in 22:8. The angel speaks in (:9). The angel apparently continues speaking in (:10). The angel may be still speaking in (:11) --- or it could be John or even someone else (as implied in verse 10 in the NAB,1970 ed.).

Now is the angel still speaking in (:12) or is it God, or is it Jesus, or even John?

There is simply no way of telling who the speaker is from any of the early Bible manuscripts. It's entirely a matter of translator's choice. Some translators have decided it is the angel who continues to speak, and they punctuate it accordingly.

So the NASB, JB, and NJB use quotation marks to show that these are all words spoken by the angel.

However, the NKJV, NEB, REB, RSV, and NRSV show by their use of quotation marks that someone else is now speaking in verse 12.

Most Bibles indicate that the person who spoke verse 12 (whether God, angel, Jesus, or John) also spoke verse 13 ("I am Alpha and Omega").

So the big question is: Is it clear that the speaker of verses 12 and 13 continues to speak? Some Bibles indicate this. But other highly respected trinitarian translations do not!

The RSV, NRSV, NASB, NEB, REB, NKJV, and NAB (1991 ed.) show (by quotation marks and indenting) that Rev. 22:14 and 15 are not the words of the speaker of verses 12 and 13 but are John's words. (The Jerusalem Bible and the NJB show us that the angel spoke all the words from verse 10 through verse 15.)

Then they all show Jesus as a new speaker beginning to speak in verse 16.

So, if you must insist that the person speaking just before verse 16 is the same person who is speaking in verse 16, then, according to the trinitarian NEB, RSV, NKJV, and NASB Bibles, you are saying John is Jesus! (According to the JB and NJB you would be insisting that the angel is Jesus!)

Remember, "I, John" indicated a new speaker in Revelation.

So Rev. 22:16 - "I, Jesus" also introduces a new speaker. This means, of course, that the previous statement ("I am the Alpha and Omega") was made by someone else!

Even the KJV (and NKJV ) translators have shown by their use of the word 'his' ('His' in the NKJV ) in verse 14 that they didn't mean that Jesus was the same speaker as the Alpha and Omega. The speaker of verse 13 is Almighty God. The comment in verse 14 of these Bibles (as literally translated from the Received Text ) explains the importance of doing "His Commandments" (not "My Commandments")! Therefore, the speaker of verse 14 is obviously not God as clearly stated by those Bibles which were translated from the Received Text , e.g., KJV; NKJV; KJIIV; MKJV; Young's Literal Translation; Webster Bible (by Noah Webster); and Revised Webster Bible .

So we can easily see that there is no reason to say Jesus spoke the words recorded at Rev. 22:13 (or the above-named trinitarian Bibles would surely have so translated it!) and, in fact, the context really identifies the speaker as being the same person who spoke at Rev. 1:8, God Almighty, JEHOVAH, the Father.

The only other use of the title "Alpha and Omega" confirms this understanding.

"And He who sits on the throne said, `Behold, I am making all things new.' .... And He said to me, `It is done. I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end. .... He who overcomes shall inherit these things, and I will be his God and he will be My son.'" - Rev. 21:5-7, NASB .

"Revelation 21:6, 7 indicates that Christians who are spiritual conquerors are to be `sons' of the one known as the Alpha and the Omega. That is never said of the relationship of spirit-anointed Christians to Jesus Christ. Jesus spoke of them as his `brothers.' (Heb. 2:11; Matt. 12:50; 25:40) But those `brothers' of Jesus are referred to as `sons of God [the Father].' (Gal. 3:26; 4:6)." - pp. 412-413, Reasoning from the Scriptures , WBTS, 1985.

So Rev. 21:6, 7 confirms the understanding that the Alpha and Omega is the Father, not Jesus.

Furthermore, The only one "seated on the throne" in Rev. is the Father, JEHOVAH alone. (See, for example, Rev. 4 & 5 where the "Lion that is of the tribe of Judah," the lamb [the Son] approaches the one seated on the throne!)

In short, there is no reason, other than a desire to support the trinity tradition, to believe that Jesus is being called "Alpha and Omega" in Rev. 22. And there is good evidence to believe that it is his Father only who uses this title for himself.

1Timothy3:16 demystified.

 

1 Tim. 3:16 ("God was manifest in the flesh")As this is translated in the KJV it makes Paul say that Jesus is God “manifest in the flesh.”


Although the KJV translates 1 Tim. 3:16 with “God” as above, nearly all other translations today use a word which refers, not to God, but to Jesus: “he” (NIV; RSV; NRSV; JB; NJB; REB; NAB [‘70]; AT; GNB; CBW; and Beck’s translation), “he who” (ASV; NASB; NEB; MLB; BBE; Phillips; and Moffatt),“who,” or “which.”Even the equally old Douay version has “which was manifested in the flesh.” All the very best modern NT texts by trinitarian scholars (including Westcott and Hort, Nestle, and the text by the United Bible Societies) have the NT Greek word ὃς (“who”) here instead of θεὸς (“God”).Why do the very best trinitarian scholars support this NON-trinitarian translation of 1 Tim. 3:16?


Noted trinitarian Bible scholar Dr. Frederick C. Grant writes: “A capital example [of NT manuscript changes] is found in 1 Timothy 3:16, where ‘OS’ (OC or ὃς, ‘who’) was later taken for theta sigma with a bar above, which stood for theos (θεὸς, ‘god’). Since the new reading suited …. the orthodox doctrine of the church [trinitarian, at this later date], it got into many of the later manuscripts – though the majority even of Byzantine manuscripts still preserved the true reading.” – p. 656, Encyclopedia Americana, vol. 3, 1957 ed. (This same statement by Dr. Grant was still to be found in the latest Encyclopedia Americana that I examined – the 1990 ed., pp.696-698, vol. 3.)
A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament by the United Bible Societies (1971 ed.) tells why the trinitarian UBS Committee chose ὃς [‘who’ or ‘he who’] as the original reading in their NT text for this verse: 
“it is supported by the earliest and best uncials.” And, “Thus, no uncial (in the first hand [by the ORIGINAL writer]) earlier than the eighth or ninth century supports θεὸς [“God”]; all ancient versions presuppose ὃς [or ΘC, “who” - masc.] or ὅ[“which” - neut.]; and no patristic writer prior to the last third of the fourth century [370 A.D.] testifies to the reading θεὸς. The reading θεὸςarose either (a) accidentally, through the misreading of OC as ΘC, or (b) deliberately....” - p. 641. 

In actuality it appears to be a combination of both (with the emphasis on the latter). You see, the word ὃς was written in the most ancient manuscripts as OC(“C” being a common form for the ancient Greek letter “S” at that time). Most often at this time the word for God (θεὸς) was written in abbreviated form as ΘC. However, to show that it was an abbreviated form a straight line, or bar, was always drawn above ΘC. So no copyist should have mistaken ὃς (or OC) for ΘC, in spite of their similarities, simply because of the prominent bar which appeared over the one and not over the other. What may have happened was discovered by John J. Wetstein in 1714. As he was carefully examining one of the oldest NT manuscripts then known (the Alexandrine Manuscript in London) he noticed at 1 Tim. 3:16 that the word originally written there was OC but that a horizontal stroke from one of the words written on the other side of the manuscript showed through very faintly in the middle of the O. This still would not qualify as an abbreviation for θεὸς, of course, but Wetstein discovered that some person at a much later date and in a different style from the original writer had deliberately added a bar above the original word! Anyone copying from this manuscript after it had been deliberately changed would be likely to incorporate the counterfeit ΘC [with bar above it] into his new copy (especially since it reflected his own trinitarian views)!
Of course, since Wetstein’s day many more ancient NT manuscripts have been discovered and none of them before the eighth century A.D. have been found with ΘC (“God”) at this verse! 
Trinitarian scholar Murray J. Harris also concludes: “The strength of the external evidence favoring OC [‘who’], along with considerations of transcriptional and intrinsic probability, have prompted textual critics virtually unanimously to regard OC as the original text, a judgment reflected in NA(26) [Nestle-Aland text] and UBS (1,2,3) [United Bible Societies text] (with a ‘B’ rating) [also the Westcott and Hort text]. Accordingly, 1 Tim 3:16 is not an instance of the Christological [‘Jesus is God’] use of θεὸς.” - Jesus as God, p. 268, Baker Book House, 1992.

And very trinitarian (Southern Baptist) NT Greek scholar A. T. Robertson wrote about this scripture:





“He who (hos [or OC in the original text]). The correct text, not theos (God) the reading of the Textus Receptus ... nor ho (neuter relative [pronoun]), agreeing with [the neuter] musterion [‘mystery’] the reading of Western documents.” - p. 577, Vol. 4, Word Pictures in the New Testament, Broadman Press.And even hyper-trinitarian NT Greek scholar, Daniel B. Wallace uses the relative pronoun ὃς (‘who’) in this scripture and tells us:

“The textual variant θεὸς [‘god’] in the place of ὃς[‘who’ or ‘he who’] has been adamantly defended by some scholars, particularly those of the ‘majority text’ school. Not only is such a reading poorly attested, but the syntactical argument that ‘mystery’ (μυστήριον) being a neuter noun, cannot be followed by the masculine pronoun (ὃς) is entirely without weight. As attractive theologically [for trinitarians, of course] as the reading θεὸς may be, it is spurious. To reject it is not to deny the deity of Christ, of course; it is just to deny any explicit reference in this text.” [italicized emphasis is by Wallace]. - pp. 341-342, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, Zondervan, 1996.

The correct rendering of 1 Tim. 3:16, then, is: “He who was revealed in the flesh ….” - NASB. Cf. ASV; RSV; NRSV; NAB; JB; NJB; NIV; NEB; REB; ESV; Douay-Rheims; TEV; CEV; BBE; NLV; God’s Word; New Century Version; Holman NT; ISV NT; Lexham English Bible; The Message; Weymouth; Moffatt; etc.
Even if we were to insist that those later manuscripts that used theos were, somehow, correct, we would have to recognize that it is the anarthrous (without the definite article) theos which we find. This is rarely, if ever, the form used for the only true God (when the known exceptions are taken into account - see MARTIN study paper). Instead, it either points to the probability that it is a corrupted OC (which of course would not have the article in the first place), or, less probable, but still possible, that Christ is being called “a god” - see the BOWGOD and DEF study papers.

Darwinist are just following the science?

 Does Darwinism Meet the Tests of a True Theory?

Eric Hedin

Commenting on the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics, physicist Richard Feynman said, “It is not true that we can pursue science completely by using only those concepts which are directly subject to experiment….The basis of a science is its ability to predict.” (The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Vol. III, pp. 2-9)

We can appreciate this statement by contrasting it with the popular view, where science is a matter of measuring and experimenting with observable reality. Feynman points out that with the advent of quantum mechanics, the scientific reality of nature is no longer directly observable, even in principle. Probabilistic predictions are actually all that quantum theory allows. 

However, while predictive accuracy is a necessary attribute of a scientific theory, it is by no means a sufficient indicator of the theory’s truth. A theory may predict well enough, but we need to ascertain if its assumptions are true. In other words, do the assumptions of the theory correspond to reality? The concept of reality means an accurate description of nature that is consistent with experimental observations and established laws of physics. Such tests can tell us if an idea counts as a true scientific theory.

Let’s illustrate these requirements by considering several cases from the history of science — including Darwinian theory. But first, let us look further back to attempts to develop a theory that explained the motions of the celestial sphere — the astronomical realm thought to contain the stars and planets visible from Earth. 

The Geocentric Model

Readers will be familiar with the geocentric model of the solar system, most often associated with Ptolemy (second century CE). This model, embellished with planetary epicycles, gave reasonable predictions of the trajectories of the five visible planets, including their periodic episodes of retrograde motion. It also comported with the prevailing Aristotelean philosophy of the cosmos and agreed with everyday observations, in which all heavenly bodies appear to revolve around a stationary Earth. Nonetheless, the geocentric model was completely wrong.

Clues supporting the correct heliocentric model remained below the level of observational resolution until the advent of the telescope. 

Galileo was the first to use a crude telescope to obtain observational data that proved inconsistent with the geocentric model. His observations showed sunspots, which disappointed those who held to celestial perfection….Galileo also detected a full set of phases of the planet Venus, which was inconsistent with geocentricism. In sum, Galileo’s more accurate observations showed that this long-standing theory of how the solar system worked was incompatible with several aspects of physical reality. 

CANCELED SCIENCE, P. 178

The heliocentric model, first published by Copernicus in 1543 (21 years before Galileo’s birth), although conceptually simpler and cleaner than the Ptolemaic model, initially failed to make better predictions. That was because Copernicus assumed perfect circles for the planetary orbits. In the early 1600s, Kepler analyzed detailed naked-eye observations of the planets to deduce the correct elliptical shape of their orbits around the sun, allowing for more accurate predictions. 

The point is that successful predictions of a theory do not prove its correctness. With technological developments in observational astronomy, evidence unequivocally demonstrated the foundational errors in the assumptions of the geocentric model. Ptolemy’s Earth-centered model is now taught only as an interesting phase in the history of astronomy. 

Spontaneous Generation

Another example of a now-discarded theory is that of spontaneous generation, a hypothetical process of living organisms developing from nonliving matter. The theory made accurate predictions, such as “maggots will appear in rotting meat,” but Pasteur’s experiments proved that the underlying assumption of the theory was false. We might ponder the significance of the timing of this example. Pasteur’s experiments, disproving the ancient belief in the spontaneous generation of life, coincided with the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in 1859.

Darwinian evolution as a theory of the development of life on Earth makes predictions that overlap with various lines of observational evidence, such as shared genetic and morphological traits among numerous species, both living and extinct. Given some predictive successes, along with observations of the mechanism of natural selection, extended assumptions of the theory have been presumed true. However, many shortcomings remain, both with the predictions and assumptions of Darwinian evolution. In a classic article, Casey Luskin details numerous failed predictions of Darwinism.

In Darwin’s day, the deep and interconnected functional biocomplexity of every living cell lay beneath the observational resolution available to science. Even so, as Robert Shedinger remarks in Darwin’s Bluff, Darwin “base[d] his continued confidence in his theory on the grounds that it, ‘explains so many facts.’” However, Shedinger adds, as we have already discussed, “this does not prove that a particular theory is correct.” (p. 57)

In Need of Restraint

The Bohr model of the hydrogen atom yielded a stunningly precise prediction of the wavelengths of the spectral lines of hydrogen. Yet a closer look involving quantum theory showed that fundamental assumptions of the Bohr model were incorrect. It is very tempting, especially for the inventor of a theory, to believe that the theory must be correct if it produces predictions that overlap with reality. But utmost restraint needs to be employed not to conflate successful predictions of a theory with the truth of the theory’s assumptions.

An assumption of evolution is that natural processes suffice to have produced the vast information required for cellular reproduction and function. This represents an increase in information by natural processes over the passage of time, in disagreement with established laws of theoretical physics.

Meanwhile it has turned out that the predictions of the theory of Darwinian evolution have an overall accuracy that is arguably worse than that of the long-entrenched geocentric theory of the solar system. With ongoing scientific advances, the assumptions of Darwinism, both those on which it is based, and other assumptions extrapolated from the theory’s presumptive truth, have come under increasingly critical scrutiny. Darwin’s original theory and modern syntheses of it thus fail to satisfy the requirements of a valid scientific theory: Several of its predictions don’t adequately match reality, while its fundamental assumption, of life in all its forms arising without a designer, conflicts with established laws of physics. 

The influence of evolutionary thought arises as an outgrowth of uncritical acceptance of its assumptions, but the theory deflates like a punctured balloon when those assumptions are exposed as falsehoods. Rather than its continuing to dominate scientific thought, the curtain has been pulled back on Darwinian evolution. As evidence continues to accumulate contrary to the predictions and assumptions of evolution, its place on the shelf of discarded theories in the history of science is already being prepared.

The watchtower society's memorial campaign

 JW.org

MEMORIAL CAMPAIGN

Jesus Will End War

 While on earth, Jesus showed great love for people, even to the point of sacrificing his life for them. (Matthew 20:28; John 15:13) Soon, he will again prove his love for people by using his authority as King of God’s Kingdom to bring “an end to wars throughout the earth.”—Psalm 46:9.

 Notice how the Bible describes what Jesus will do:

 “He will rescue the poor who cry for help, also the lowly one and whoever has no helper. He will have pity on the lowly and the poor, and the lives of the poor he will save. From oppression and from violence he will rescue them.”—Psalm 72:12-14.

 How can we show appreciation for all that Jesus has done and will yet do for us? At Luke 22:19, Jesus told his followers to remember his death. That is why each year, on the anniversary of his death, Jehovah’s Witnesses gather together. We invite you to join us in observing the Memorial of Jesus’ death on Sunday, March 24, 2024.

Find one near you

John5:23 demystified.

John 5:23 - "That all may honor the Son JUST AS [kathos] they honor the Father." - NIV

Jn 5:23 - "That all may honor the Son JUST AS [kathos] they honor the Father."  - NIV
     Some trinitarians insist that if we honor the Son just as we honor the only true God (in the person of the Father), then we are honoring him as God!  However, kathos simply does not have to mean "exactly equal" as these trinitarians want us to believe.  Therefore John 5:23 does not have to mean that the honor given to the Son has to be exactly equal in quantity and quality as that given to the Father. 

     For example,  

"just as [kathos] Moses lifted up the [copper] serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of Man be lifted up" - John 3:14, NRSV.  

     These two events are hardly exactly equal.  There is a degree of similarity only.  Just as there was  a "lifting up" in one part of the comparison, there was also  a "lifting up" (of a different kind and to a different degree) in the other part.  We know Moses didn't lift up a timber as large and heavy as the one Jesus died on.  We know he didn't swing it up and anchor one end in a hole in the ground until the copper serpent died a horrible death.  We know that the one act was much more important than the other in all respects.  It was a similar act only in a certain respect and to a certain degree. 

     And examine Luke 11:30, 

"Just as [kathos] Jonah became a sign to the people of Ninevah, so the Son of man will be to this generation," - NRSV
     
     This does not mean the two signs are equal either literally or figuratively.  The details of the sign to the Ninevites were very different from the sign of Jesus' death and resurrection.  The degree of importance of the sign of Jonah was much less than that of Jesus! 

     And John 17:16, 

"[Jesus followers] are not of the world, just as [kathos] I am not of the world." -  NKJV

     It would be foolish to insist that, in every aspect of the phrase, Jesus' followers were not of the world precisely as he was not.  We could, in such a case, end up `proving' that Jesus' followers had been created in heaven as spirit persons before all the rest of creation, just as he had been.  (Or for trinitarians, that they had always existed as God Himself from all eternity.)

     It seems evident from context alone that kathos, as used by Jesus in all the above examples at least, merely means that one event or circumstance is just as certain as the other event:

     (1) "Just as certainly as Moses lifted up the copper serpent in the desert, so must the 
             Son of man be lifted up."

     (2) "Just as surely as Jonah became a sign ..., so the Son of man will be to this 
             generation."

     (3) "[Jesus' followers] are not of the world, just as surely as I am not of the world."

     (4) "That all may honor the Son just as surely as they also honor the Father."

     There are many such examples (e.g., Jn 13:15; 17:18; 1 Jn 4:17 ["like" in NIV]).  They also illustrate the fact that the honor of the Son may be of a lesser degree and/or kind than that of the Father in spite of "just as" [kathos] at John 5:23. 

(There is another word that can mean "as," "just as," "equal to," etc.  That is ὡς - see Thayer, # 5613, [2. c.].   At Matt. 5:48 we read: "You  [true worshipers of God] must therefore be perfect, just as (ὡς)  your heavenly father is perfect." - NJB.  But  God (and only God) is absolutely perfect.  So what happens when you apply the same type of trinitarian reasoning as above to this scripture?  - -  The same thing happens if you insist on interpreting kathos at John 17:18 with the "exactly equal" understanding:  Jesus' followers, in that case, were spirit creatures in heaven before the creation of the earth [and equally God, trinitarians would be forced to say], and Jesus sent them to earth to assume fleshly bodies and to die sacrificial deaths to ransom all of mankind!  Surely such an interpretation of kathos in this scripture is unacceptable to Christians!)

     Another interpretation for Jn 5:23 for those who will not acknowledge the truth of the above grammatical and contextual evidence, but insist on an "absolute equality of honor" interpretation:  

     Just as an official representative or ambassador sent from a king was to be treated by the king's subjects with the same honor as the king himself (when the ambassador was acting in his official capacity) in those times, so Jesus (sent by God himself) was to be given the same honor in his capacity as God's appointed judge as God himself would expect.  Although the honor actually due the individual ambassador in his own right may have been very little (if any), when he was representing the king, the honor given to him was considered to be actually given through this representative to the king himself!  Honoring Jesus' judgments would be honoring the one who sent him.  "He who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him." - Jn 5:23.

Posted by Elijah Daniels

Revelation ch.21:4: The watchtower society's condensed commentary

He will wipe out every tear from their eyes, and death will be no more, neither will mourning nor outcry nor pain be anymore.​—Rev. 21:4.

Who will benefit from these wonderful provisions? First of all, the great crowd of Armageddon survivors, along with any children who may be born in the new world. But Revelation chapter 20 also promises that the dead will be resurrected. (Rev. 20:11-13) Faithful “righteous” ones who died in the past along with “unrighteous” ones​—who did not receive an adequate opportunity to learn about Jehovah—​will all come back to life here on the earth. (Acts 24:15; John 5:28, 29) Does this mean that everyone will be resurrected during the Thousand Year Reign? No. Those who wickedly rejected the opportunity to serve Jehovah before their death will not be raised to life. They had their chance and proved that they were not worthy of life on the Paradise earth.​—Matt. 25:46; 2 Thess. 1:9; Rev. 17:8; 20:15. w22.05 18 ¶16-17

Question from readers re: funeral for suicide victim.

 Questions From Readers

If someone commits suicide, would it be advisable for a Christian minister to give the funeral talk?

Each Christian minister would have to decide for himself whether he in good conscience could conduct a funeral for someone who seems to have committed suicide. When making the decision, he should consider the following questions: How does Jehovah view suicide? Was the death really a self-inflicted murder? Did a mental or emotional disorder trigger the suicide? How is suicide viewed in the locality?

As Christians, we are interested in how Jehovah views suicide. To Jehovah human life is precious and sacred. (Genesis 9:5; Psalm 36:9) The intentional killing of oneself is self-murder, and it is therefore displeasing in God’s eyes. (Exodus 20:13; 1 John 3:15) Does that fact preclude the giving of a funeral talk for a suicide victim?

Consider the case of King Saul of Israel. When he realized that he would not survive his final battle against the Philistines, rather than letting his enemy treat him abusively, “Saul took the sword and fell upon it.” When the Philistines found his corpse, they fastened it on the wall of the city of Beth-shan. Upon finding out what the Philistines had done, the inhabitants of Jabesh-gilead removed the corpse and burned it. Then they took his bones and buried them. They even fasted for seven days, a traditional mourning rite among the Israelites. (1 Samuel 31:4, 8-13; Genesis 50:10) When David, the anointed of Jehovah, found out what the inhabitants of Jabesh-gilead had done, he said: “Blessed may you be of Jehovah, because you exercised this loving-kindness toward your lord, toward Saul, in that you buried him. And now may Jehovah exercise toward you loving-kindness and trustworthiness.” (2 Samuel 2:5, 6) The divine record does not indicate that the inhabitants of Jabesh-gilead were condemned for performing what may be considered a funeral rite for King Saul. Compare that with the case of those who were deprived of burial because of their wrongdoing. (Jeremiah 25:32, 33) A Christian minister may consider the account about Saul in deciding whether he can give a funeral talk for a suicide victim.

The minister may also want to consider the purpose of a funeral service. Unlike people who believe in the immortality of the soul, Jehovah’s Witnesses do not perform funerals with the erroneous idea of sending the deceased off to another world. Rather than to benefit the deceased, the main purpose of having a memorial service is to comfort the bereaved and to give a witness concerning the condition of the dead to those who attend. (Ecclesiastes 9:5, 10; 2 Corinthians 1:3-5) Another important reason for having a funeral is to help all in attendance to reflect on the transitoriness of life. (Ecclesiastes 7:2) Will these purposes be served by performing the memorial service for the suicide victim?

Granted, some may feel that the person took his life intentionally, fully aware that he was sinning against Jehovah. But is there always a way to substantiate such a feeling? Could it have been a spur-of-the-moment act? Some who attempt suicide feel regret and do not go through with it. A person cannot after death repent for what he has done.

Another important factor is that of mental and emotional disorders that are involved in many suicides. These can really be called suicide victims. According to some statistics, 90 percent of those who commit suicide have some kind of mental, emotional, or addictive problem. Will Jehovah forgive the self-murder committed by people in such a mental state? We are not in a position to judge whether the deceased committed an unforgivable sin in the eyes of Jehovah. A Christian minister may take into account the circumstances and medical history of the deceased when he considers whether to perform a funeral service for the suicide victim.

There is one more aspect to consider: How do people in the community view suicide and the death of the person? This is especially of concern to the elders, who are interested in the reputation of the local congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Depending on the general attitude toward suicide in the locality, and particularly toward the case involved, the elders may prefer not to sponsor such a funeral publicly or to have it in the Kingdom Hall.

Still, if a Christian minister is asked to preside at the funeral, he may feel that on a private basis, he can do so. If he decides to do so, he should be discreet in not making any firm statements about whether a resurrection might be possible. Any future prospect for the dead is in the hands of Jehovah, and no one is in a position to say whether the deceased will be resurrected or not. The minister can concentrate on the Bible truths about death and offer comfort for the bereaved.

In search of the ultimate rube Goldberg.

 

In search of planet IX

 

The first step in becoming a spacefaring civilization?

 

The war to liberate the agrora rages on?

 

A theory of everything re:design detection? V

 Orgelian Specified Complexity

William Dembski

As I noted at the start of this series on “specified complexity,” which I’m concluding today, Leslie Orgel introduced that term in his 1973 book The Origins of Life. Although specified complexity as developed by Winston Ewert, Robert Marks, and me attempts to get at the same informational reality that Orgel was trying to grasp, our formulations differ in important ways. 

For a fuller understanding of specified complexity, as an appendix to the series, it will therefore help to review what Orgel originally had in mind and to see where our formulation of the concept improves on his. Strictly speaking, this subject is mainly of historical interest. Because The Origins of Life is out of print and hard to get, I will quote from it extensively, offering exegetical commentary. I will focus on the three pages of his book where Orgel introduces and then discusses specified complexity (pages 189–191). 

"Terrestrial Biology”

Orgel introduces the term “specified complexity” in a section titled “Terrestrial Biology.” Elsewhere in his book, Orgel also considers non-terrestrial biology, which is why the title of his book refers to the origins (plural) of life — radically different forms of life might arise in different parts of the universe. To set the stage for introducing specified complexity, Orgel discusses the various commonly cited defining features of life, such reproduction or metabolism. Thinking these don’t get at the essence of life, he introduces the term that is the focus of this series:

It is possible to make a more fundamental distinction between living and nonliving things by examining their molecular structure and molecular behavior. In brief, living organisms are distinguished by their specified complexity. Crystals are usually taken as the prototypes of simple, well-specified structures because they consist of a very large number of identical molecules packed together in a uniform way. Lumps of granite or random mixtures of polymers are examples of structures which are complex but not specified. The crystals fail to qualify as living because they lack complexity; the mixtures of polymers fail to qualify because they lack specificity. (p. 189)

So far, so good. Everything Orgel writes here makes good intuitive sense. It matches up with the three types of order discussed at the start of this series: repetitive order, random order, complex specified order. Wanting to put specified complexity on a firmer theoretical basis, Orgel next connects it to information theory:

These vague ideas can be made more precise by introducing the idea of information. Roughly speaking, the information content of a structure is the minimum number of instructions needed to specify the structure. One can see intuitively that many instructions are needed to specify a complex structure. On the other hand, a simple repeating structure can be specified in rather few instructions. Complex but random structures, by definition. need hardly be specified at all. (p. 190)

Orgel’s elaboration here of specified complexity calls for further clarification. His use of the term “information content” is ill-defined. He unpacks it in terms of “minimum number of instructions needed to specify a structure.” This suggests a Kolmogorov information measure. Yet complex specified structures, according to him, require lots of instructions, and so suggest high Kolmogorov information. By contrast, specified complexity as developed in this series requires low Kolmogorov information. 

At the same time, for Orgel to write that “complex but random structures … need hardly be specified at all” suggests low Kolmogorov complexity for random structures, which is exactly the opposite of how Kolmogorov information characterizes randomness. For Kolmogorov, the random structures are those that are incompressible, and thus, in Orgel’s usage, require many instructions to specify (not “need hardly be specified at all”). 

Perhaps Orgel had something else in mind — I am trying to read him charitably — but from the vantage of information theory, his options are limited. Shannon and Kolmogorov are, for Orgel, the only games in town. And yet, Shannon information, focused as it is on probability rather than instruction sets, doesn’t clarify Orgel’s last remarks. Fortunately, Orgel elaborates on them with three examples:

These differences are made clear by the following example. Suppose a chemist agreed to synthesize anything that could be described accurately to him. How many instructions would he need to make a crystal, a mixture of random DNA-like polymers or the DNA of the bacterium E. coli? (p. 190)

This passage seems promising for understanding what Orgel is getting at with specified complexity. Nonetheless, it also suggests that Orgel is understanding information entirely in terms of instruction sets for building chemical systems, which then weds him entirely to a Kolmogorov rather than Shannon view of information. In particular, nothing here suggests that he will bring both views of information together under a coherent umbrella. 

The Language of Short Descriptions

Here’s is how Orgel elaborates the first example, which is replete with the language of short descriptions (as in the account of specified complexity given in this series):

To describe the crystal we had in mind, we would need to specify which substance we wanted and the way in which the molecules were to be packed together in the crystal. The first requirement could be conveyed in a short sentence. The second would be almost as brief, because we could describe how we wanted the first few molecules packed together, and then say “and keep on doing the same.” Structural information has to be given only once because the crystal is regular. (p. 190)

This example has very much the feel of our earlier example in which Kolmogorov information was illustrated in a sequence of 100 identical coin tosses (0 for tails) described very simply by “repeat ‘0’ 100 times.” For specified complexity as developed in this series, an example like this one by Orgel yields a low degree of specified complexity. It combines both low Shannon information (the crystal forms reliably and repeatedly with high probability and thus low complexity) and low Kolmogorov information (the crystal requires a short description of instruction set). It exhibits specified non-complexity, or what could be called specified simplicity.

A Fatal Difficulty

Orgel’s next example, focused on randomness, is more revealing, and indicates a fatal difficulty with his approach to specified complexity:

It would be almost as easy to tell the chemist how to make a mixture of random DNA-like polymers. We would first specify the proportion of each of the four nucleotides in the mixture. Then, we would say, “Mix the nucleotides in the required proportions, choose nucleotide molecules at random from the mixture, and join them together in the order you find them.” In this way the chemist would be sure to make polymers with the specified composition, but the sequences would be random. (p. 190)

Orgel’s account of forming random polymers here betrays information-theoretic confusion. Previously, he was using the terms “specify” and “specified” in the sense of giving a full instruction set to bring about a given structure — in this case, a given nucleotide polymer. But that’s not what he is doing here. Instead, he is giving a recipe for forming random nucleotide polymers in general. Granted, the recipe is short (i.e., bring together the right separate ingredients and mix), suggesting a short description length since it would be “easy” to tell a chemist how to produce it. 

But the synthetic chemist here is producing not just one random polymer but a whole bunch of them. And even if the chemist produced a single such polymer, it would not be precisely identified. Rather, it would belong to a class of random polymers. To identify and actually build a given random polymer would require a large instructional set, and would thus indicate high, not low Kolmogorov information, contrary to what Orgel is saying here about random polymers.

Finally, let’s turn to the example that for Orgel motivates his introduction of the term “specified complexity” in the first place:

It is quite impossible to produce a corresponding simple set of instructions that would enable the chemist to synthesize the DNA of E. coli. In this case, the sequence matters: only by specifying the sequence letter-by-letter (about 4,000,000 instructions) could we tell the chemist what we wanted him to make. The synthetic chemist would need a book of instructions rather than a few short sentences. (p. 190)

Orgel’s Takeaway

Given this last example, it becomes clear that for Orgel, specified complexity is all about requiring a long instructional set to generate a structure. Orgel’s takeaway, then, is this:

It is important to notice that each polymer molecule on a random mixture has a sequence just as definite as that of E. coli DNA. However, in a random mixture the sequences are not specified. Whereas in E. coli, the DNA sequence is crucial. Two random mixtures contain quite different polymer sequences, but the DNA sequences in two E. coli cells are identical because they are specified. The polymer sequences are complex but random: although E. coli DNA is also complex, it is specified In a unique way. (pp. 190–191)

This is confused. The reason it’s confused is that Orgel’s account of specified complexity commits a category mistake. He admits that a random sequence requires just as long an instruction set to generate as E. coli DNA because both are, as he puts it, “definite.” Yet with random sequences, he looks at an entire class or range of random sequences whereas with E. coli DNA, he is looking at one particular sequence. 

Orgel is correct, as far as he goes, that from an instruction set point of view, it’s easy to generate elements from such a class of random sequences. And yet, from an instruction set point of view, it is no easier to generate a particular random sequence than a particular non-random sequence, such as E. coli DNA. That’s the category mistake. Orgel is applying instruction sets in two very different ways, one to a class of sequences, the other to particular sequences. But he fails to note the difference. 

A Different Tack

The approach to specified complexity that Winston Ewert and I take, as characterized in this series, takes a different tack. Repetitive order yields high probability and specification, and therefore combines low Shannon and low Kolmogorov information, yielding, as we’ve seen, what can be called specified simplicity. This is consistent with Orgel. But note that our approach yields a specified complexity value (albeit a low one in this case). Specified complexity, as a difference between Shannon and Kolmogorov complexity, takes continuous values and thus comes in degrees. For repetitive order, specified complexity, as characterized in this series, will thus take on low values.

That said, Orgel’s application of specified complexity to distinguish a random nucleotide polymer from E. coli DNA diverges sharply from how specified complexity as outlined in this series applies to these same polymers. A random sequence, within the scheme outlined in the series, will have large Shannon information but also, because it has no short description, will have large Kolmogorov information, so the two will cancel each other, and the specified complexity of such a sequence will be low or indeterminate.

On the other hand, for E. coli DNA, within the scheme outlined in this series, there will be work to do in showing that it actually exhibits specified complexity. The problem is that the particular sequence in question will have low probability and thus high Shannon information. At the same time, that particular sequence will be unlikely to have a short exact description. Rather, what will be needed to characterize the E. coli DNA as exhibiting specified complexity within the scheme of this series is a short description to which the sequence answers but which also describes an event of small probability, thus combining high Shannon information with low Kolmogorov information. 

Specified complexity as characterized in this series and applied to this example will thus mean that the description will include not just the particular sequence in question but a range of sequences that answer to the description. Note that there is no category mistake here as there was with Orgel. The point of specified complexity as developed in this series is always with matching events and descriptions of those events, where any particular event is described provided it answers to the description. For instance, a die rolls exhibiting a 6 answers to the description “an even die roll.”

So, is there a simple description of the E. coli DNA that shows this sequence to exhibit specified complexity in the sense outlined in this series? That’s in fact not an easy question to answer. The truth of Darwinian evolution versus intelligent design hinges on the answer. Orgel realized this when he wrote the following immediately after introducing the concept of specified complexity, though his reference to miracles is a red herring (at issue is whether life is the result of intelligence, and there’s no reason to think that intelligence as operating in nature need act miraculously):

Since, as scientists, we must not postulate miracles we must suppose that the appearance of “life” is necessarily preceded by a period of evolution. At first, replicating structures are formed that have low but non-zero information content. Natural selection leads to the development of a series of structures of increasing complexity and information content, until one is formed which we are prepared to call “living.” (p. 192)

Orgel is here proposing the life evolves to increasing levels of complexity, where at each stage nothing radically improbable is happening. Natural selection is thus seen as a probability amplifier that renders probable what otherwise would be improbable. Is there a simple description to which the E. coli DNA answers and which is highly improbable, not just when the isolated nucleotides making up the E. coli DNA are viewed as a purely random mixture but rather by factoring in their evolvability via Darwinian evolution?

A Tough Question

That’s a tough question to answer precisely because evaluating the probability of forming E. coli DNA with or without natural selection is far from clear. Given Orgel’s account of specified complexity, he would have to say that the E. coli DNA exhibits specified complexity. But within the account of specified complexity given in this series, ascribing specified complexity always requires doing some work, finding a description to which an observed event answers, showing the description to be short, and showing the event precisely identified by the description has small probability, implying high Shannon information and low Kolmogorov information. 

For intelligent design in biology, the challenge in demonstrating specified complexity is always to find a biological system that can be briefly described (yielding low Kolmogorov complexity) and whose evolvability, even by Darwinian means, has small probability (yielding high Shannon information). Orgel’s understanding of specified complexity is quite different. In my view, it is not only conceptually incoherent but also stacks the deck unduly in favor of Darwinian evolution. 

To sum up, I have presented Orgel’s account of specified complexity at length so that readers can decide for themselves which account of specified complexity they prefer, Orgel’s or the one presented in this series.

Editor’s note: This article appeared originally at BillDembski.com