On Darwinian apologists' word games. V

Is "Evolution" a "Theory" or "Fact" or Is This Just a Trivial Game of Semantics? (Part 5)
Casey Luskin 

Many intelligent people use the "evolution is just a theory, not a fact" line--but they immediately get into trouble because, as I discussed in Part 1, the formal scientific definition of theory is typically understood to mean a "well-substantiated scientific explanation of some aspect of the natural world." In other words, when talking to a scientifically minded crowd, calling evolution "just a theory" is not a good way to express scientific doubts about neo-Darwinism. As I noted in a previous post, an article recently in The Scientist observed that, "public discontent with classical evolution as an inclusive theory stems partly from an intuitive appreciation of its limits." Thus those who call evolution "just a theory, not a fact" are trying to communicate some legitimate underlying truth about their scientific criticisms of neo-Darwinism. They are simply using poor terminology to communicate their point.

Sadly, Darwinists often then ridicule or scold Darwin-skeptics who use the "evolution is just a theory, not a fact" line by treating them as ignorant or uninformed regarding the proper definition of theory. Let's explore what people really mean when they say "evolution is just a theory, not a fact," and then I'll offer some final advice regarding how Darwin-skeptics can effectively communicate their doubts about Darwin.

All I wanted to say is that I'm a scientific skeptic of neo-Darwinism. How can I convey such skepticism without getting stepping on a semantic land mine and getting scolded by Darwinists?
Great scientific claims must be backed by great scientific evidence. When most people claim that "evolution is just a theory, not a fact," what they really mean is that there is not convincing scientific evidence to justify the great claim that all life is related through universal common ancestry and that it evolved via an process of unguided natural selection acting upon random mutation. Doubts about neo-Darwinian evolution might stem from:

The failure of evolutionary biology to provide detailed evolutionary explanations for the origin of complex biochemical features (see Opening Darwin's black box for a brief discussion);
The failure of the fossil record to provide support for Darwinian evolution; (see The abrupt appearance of biological forms or Punctuated Equilibrium and Patterns from the Fossil Record for discussions);
The failure of molecular biology to provide evidence for universal common descent; (See Barking up the Wrong Tree for a brief discussion);
The failure of genetics and chemistry to explain the origin of the genetic code; (see Problems with the Natural Chemical "Origin of Life" (updated) or The origin of life remains a mystery for discussions);
The failure of developmental biology to explain why vertebrate embryos diverge from the beginning of development. (see Evolving views of embryology for a discussion).
But how does one simply communicate such viewpoints without getting into semantic trouble? As I explained in Part 4, I don't recommend one-liner sound-byte arguments against evolution because they don't communicate anything about the content of the scientific deficiencies of neo-Darwinism. Here's why:

When someone says "evolution is just a theory," it sounds like the speaker cannot cite actual scientific evidence against evolution, and that the only objection the speaker can muster is based upon appealing to postmodern rhetoric which asserts that we really can't know if anything is true. The truth is that science is capable of studying the validity of historical scientific theories such as neo-Darwinism, but the "evolution is just a theory" line makes it sound like the speaker is not interested in studying or discussing that evidence. In the debate over evolution, discussions of evidence are what matter most. As stated previously, calling something a theory doesn't necessarily tell you about the state of the evidence. The best way to express dissent from evolution is to actually discuss its failure to explain the scientific evidence. 

The "evolution is just a theory" line can come off as if the speaker really thinks "evolution is just a guess, so I don't have to believe it if I don't want to." In fact, neo-Darwinian evolution as a whole is not merely a guess and most Darwinian scientists will provide reasons why they think it is the best explanation for the diversification of life. If you're like me, and you think that neo-Darwinian evolution has scientific problems, then you should be able to provide reasons beyond stating "it's just a theory." As noted above, the best strategy is for you to be prepared to give a few specific scientific reasons why you question Darwinian evolution.

But if you really must use short, one-liner sound-bytes to describe doubts about neo-Darwinian evolution, here is my advice: As we learned in Part 1, the technical definitions of theory do indeed mean "a more or less verified or established explanation," whereas a hypothesis has the meaning of "a conjecture put forth as a possible explanation." In this sense, when evolution is defined to include both universal common descent and a driving force of natural selection acting upon random mutation to produce the complexity of life (i.e. neo-Darwinian evolution), for Darwin-skeptics like me, such evolution is not a theory, nor is it fact. It is "just a hypothesis."

But as I noted above, it's best to give more information than one-liner sound-bytes. So I don't recommend that Darwin-skeptics go around saying "evolution is just a hypothesis," even though such a phrase would more-accurately use the technical definitions of "theory" and "hypothesis." What follows is a slightly longer description of what one might say to communicate doubts about neo-Darwinism without falling into soundbyte arguments:

When evolution is defined as mere change over time within species, no one disputes that such evolution is a fact. But Neo-Darwinian evolution--the great claim that unguided natural selection acting upon random mutations is the driving force that produced the complexity of life--has many scientific problems because such random and unguided processes do not tend to build complexity. According to the technical definitions of "theory," "fact," and "hypothesis," neo-Darwinian evolution is neither theory nor fact. It's just a hypothesis."
Closing Thoughts

In the end, my final advice for everyone is this: Whether you think "evolution" is "fact," "theory," or "hypothesis," or some combination thereof, it's important to use all of these terms carefully and if possible, define them when you use them. It's also important to have patience with those who may misuse these terms, for each of these terms can have multiple meanings, allowing ample opportunities for confusion and miscommunication in this highly-charged debate.

On Darwinian apologists' word games.IV

s "Evolution" a "Theory" or "Fact" or Is This Just a Trivial Game of Semantics? (Part 4)
Casey Luskin

Darwinists love to bash Darwin-skeptics who call evolution "just a theory, not a fact." The truth is that I rarely, if ever, hear people who are closely involved with the ID movement using this line to oppose evolution. The "evolution is just a theory, not a fact" phrase tends to come from the vox populi--intelligent people who studied this issue in their biology class or perhaps have read books like Darwin's Black Box, Icons of Evolution, or Darwin on Trial, but otherwise don't follow the issue very closely. As I discussed in Part 1, many of us who are closely involved with the ID movement actually agree with the Darwinists that the "evolution is 'just a theory', not a fact" line not only (in the technical sense) misuses the word theory but generally comes off as a meaningless statement. In this post I'll offer four reasons why I think that Darwin-skeptics should not use the "evolution is just a theory, not a fact" line and answer the question, "Is it best for Darwin skeptics to call evolution 'just a theory, not a fact'?"

Having taken over a dozen courses covering evolutionary biology at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, I'm a scientific skeptic of neo-Darwinism. But I've long opposed using such a rhetorical line of "evolution is just a theory, not a fact" to oppose evolution because it gets you caught up in a semantic debate over the proper definition of fact and theory, and communicates very little about the most important component of this debate--the scientific evidence. (For an early example of my writings on this topic, see my Response to the ACLU ID FAQ.) I'll start with criticism of people on my own side of this debate by offering four reasons why I oppose using the "evolution is just a theory, not a fact" line:

1. The statement "evolution is just a theory, not a fact," hopes to convey some kind of skepticism regarding evolution, but it fails to adequately define the term. As we learned in Part 3, no one doubts evolution when it is defined as "populations of living organisms change over time." Evolution so-defined is an unquestionable fact. But when evolution is defined as "natural selection acting on random mutation serves as the primary driving force that built the complexity of life" or even "all species share a universal common ancestor" (collectively called "neo-Darwinian evolution") then you've traipsed into more controversial definitions of evolution.

2. The "evolution is just a theory" line is simply not a good way of expressing skepticism about neo-Darwinian evolution because it assumes that a theory is something which necessarily lacks evidentiary support. As we learned in Part 1, the problem with this phrase is that the word "theory" can indeed mean a scientific idea that is well-backed by large amounts of scientific evidence.

3. When someone says "evolution is just a theory," it sounds like the speaker cannot cite actual scientific evidence against evolution, and that the only objection the speaker can muster is based upon appealing to postmodern rhetoric which asserts that we really can't know if anything is true. The truth is that science is capable of studying the validity of historical scientific theories such as neo-Darwinism, but the "evolution is just a theory" line makes it sound like the speaker is not interested in studying or discussing that evidence. In the debate over evolution, discussions of evidence are what matter most. As stated previously, calling something a theory doesn't necessarily tell you about the state of the evidence. The best way to express dissent from evolution is to actually discuss its failure to explain the scientific evidence.

4. The "evolution is just a theory" line can come off as if the speaker really thinks "evolution is just a guess so I don't have to believe it if I don't want to." In fact, neo-Darwinian evolution as a whole is not merely a guess, and most Darwinian scientists will provide reasons why they think it is the best explanation for the diversification of life. If you're like me, and you think that neo-Darwinian evolution has scientific problems, then you should be able to provide reasons why you're a skeptic beyond stating "it's just a theory." As noted above, the best strategy is for you to be prepared to give a few specific scientific reasons why you question Darwinian evolution.


So if we shouldn't call evolution "just a theory, not a fact" then how should us Darwin-skeptics refer to evolution? Theory? Fact? Hypothesis? Something else? I'll explore this question in the final installment of this series, Part 5.

On Darwinian apologists' word games. III

Is "Evolution" a "Theory" or "Fact" or Is This Just a Trivial Game of Semantics? (Part 3)
Casey Luskin 

Darwinists claim that it is inappropriate to call "evolution a theory, not a fact" because a theory means "a well-substantiated scientific explanation of some aspect of the natural world." In Part 1 and in Part 2, I discussed the fact that the word "theory" can have multiple meanings, ranging from a conjecture or guess (the soft definition) to "a well-substantiated scientific explanation of some aspect of the natural world" (the hard definition). In this installment, I will address the question, "Is it correct to call evolution a 'fact'?"

A new article in Current Biology about Darwin Day celebrations quoted Johnjoe McFadden from the University of Surrey stating that "evolution is no longer just a theory. It is as much a fact as gravity or erosion. Scientists have measured evolutionary changes in scores of organisms." The leading 20th century evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr quite dogmatically (and wrongly) claimed that, "No educated person any longer questions the validity of the so-called theory of evolution, which we now know to be a simple fact." Similarly, according to the ardently pro-Darwin U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS), evolution is a "fact":

Is Evolution a Theory or a Fact? It is both. But that answer requires looking more deeply at the meanings of the words "theory" and "fact." (U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Science, Evolution, and Creationism, pg. 11 (National Academy Press, 2008).)
What these Darwinist authors miss is that the legitimacy of calling evolution a "fact" depends on the meaning of the word "evolution."
The debate over evolution can be confusing because equivocation has crept into the discussion. Some people use evolution to refer to something as simple as small changes in the sizes of birds' beaks. Others use the same word to mean something much more far-reaching. Used the first way, the term "evolution" isn't controversial at all; used the latter way, it's hotly debated. Used equivocally, evolution is too imprecise to be useful in a scientific discussion. Darwin's theory is not a single idea. Instead, it is made up of several related ideas, each supported by specific arguments:***

Evolution #1: First, evolution can mean that the life forms we see today are different than the life forms that existed in the distant past. Evolution as "change over time" can also refer to minor changes in features of individual species -- changes which take place over a short amount of time. We can observe this type of evolution going on in the present and even skeptics of Darwin's theory agree that this type of "change over time" takes place. Evolution in this sense is "fact." However, it is invariably the case that when Darwinists cite some present-day observations of change within a species, they will be small-scale changes that are not easily extrapolated to explain how complex biological features arose.
Evolution #2: Some scientists associate the word "evolution" with the idea that all the organisms we see today are descended from a single common ancestor somewhere in the distant past. This claim became known as the Theory of Universal Common Descent. This theory paints a picture of the history of life on earth as one great branching tree. While this meaning of evolution is not necessarily incompatible with intelligent design, there are many scientific skeptics of evolution who are skeptical of Universal Common Descent.
Evolution #3: Finally, some people use the term "evolution" to refer to a cause or mechanism of change, the biological process Darwin thought was responsible for the branching pattern. Darwin argued that unguided natural selection had the power to produce fundamentally new forms of life. Together, the ideas of Universal Common Descent and natural selection form the core of Darwinian evolutionary theory. "Neo-Darwinian" evolution combines our knowledge of DNA and genetics to claim that random mutations in DNA provide the variation upon which natural selection acts in a completely unguided fashion. It is this form of evolution that is the most controversial meaning of evolution.
So is evolution a fact? If by "evolution" one simply means "evolution #1," i.e. small-scale change over time within a species, then evolution is indeed a fact. No one disputes this kind of "evolution." Thus when Johnjoe McFadden states that "[s]cientists have measured evolutionary changes in scores of organisms" and therefore evolution "is as much a fact as gravity or erosion," he is stating the obvious because he is simply referring to evolution #1.

But Dr. McFadden is pulling a bait-and-switch: he is using relatively trivial examples of evolution #1 to bolster more controversial definitions of "evolution." Thus if by "evolution" one means universal common descent (evolution #2), or neo-Darwinian evolution (evolution #3), where the primary adaptive force building the complexity of life is unguided natural selection acting upon random mutations, then many scientists would argue that such "evolution" most certainly is not a fact.

A Final Look at the NAS' Mistake
Finally, consider how the NAS defines evolution as a fact:

In science, a "fact" typically refers to an observation, measurement, or other form of evidence that can be expected to occur the same way under similar circumstances. However, scientists also use the term "fact" to refer to a scientific explanation that has been tested and confirmed so many times that there is no longer a compelling reason to keep testing it or looking for additional examples. In that respect, the past and continuing occurrence of evolution is a scientific fact. Because the evidence supporting it is so strong, scientists no longer question whether biological evolution has occurred and is continuing to occur. Instead, they investigate the mechanisms of evolution, how rapidly evolution can take place, and related questions.
(U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Science, Evolution, and Creationism, pg. 11 (National Academy Press, 2008).)

I won't dispute the NAS's definition of fact, but it's clear that unless by "evolution" they mean evolution #1, then there are many scientists who will disagree with their claim that evolution is a fact. However, the NAS DID define evolution as evolution #3, i.e. being driven by natural selection acting upon mutation-caused variation:
In the century and a half since Darwin, scientists have uncovered exquisite details about many of the mechanisms that underlie biological variation, inheritance, and natural selection, and they have shown how these mechanisms lead to biological change over time. Because of this immense body of evidence, scientists treat the occurrence of evolution as one of the most securely established of scientific facts. ... The atomic structure of matter, the genetic basis of heredity, the circulation of blood, gravitation and planetary motion, and the process of biological evolution by natural selection are just a few examples of a very large number of scientific explanations that have been overwhelmingly substantiated.
(U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Science, Evolution, and Creationism, pg. xiii, 12 (National Academy Press, 2008).)

The NAS is wrong. Since the NAS defines "evolution" as full-blown neo-Darwinian evolution, there are many scientists who will not agree that it is a fact.

***Some parts of this post were adapted from the textbook Explore Evolution: The Arguments For and Against Neo-Darwinism.

On Darwinian apologists' word games II

Is "Evolution" a "Theory" or "Fact" or Is This Just a Trivial Game of Semantics? (Part 2)
Casey Luskin 

In Part 1, I assessed the question of whether Darwinists are correct to define theory as a "well-substantiated scientific explanation of some aspect of the natural world" or a "comprehensive explanation of some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence" (the hard definition of theory). I found that they are correct to use such a definition, but that Darwinists sometimes overly downplay the fact that theory can also legitimately mean merely "a proposed explanation whose status is still conjectural," "contemplation or speculation," or "guess or conjecture" (the soft definition of theory). As I observed, Darwinists are also wrong to imply that scientists never use the term "theory" to mean "a proposed explanation whose status is still conjectural."

Previously I quoted Bruce Charlton, editor-in-chief of the journal Medical Hypotheses, observing that "[a]n old joke about the response to revolutionary new scientific theories states that there are three phases on the road to acceptance: 1. The theory is not true; 2. The theory is true, but it is unimportant; 3. The theory is true, and it is important -- but we knew it all along." Charlton goes on to contend that those who propose new revolutionary theories face difficult battles:

The defining feature of a revolutionary theory is precisely that it seeks to replace the assumptions of an already-existing theory -- so a new theory cannot be evaluated on the basis of the assumptions of the old theory. This is why a new and revolutionary theory will almost invariably strike people as false. ... The path to fame as a theorist surely is long, winding and replete with pitfalls.
It seems clear that scientists can use the word "theory" to mean "conjecture," but it is also fair to say that typical circumstances, when scientists say "theory," they mean the hard usage of the term: "a more or less verified or established explanation."
This thus leads to the question, under such a strong definition of the term, does evolution qualify as a theory?

Assuming that we are using the hard definition of theory, different people will give different answers to that question. Under such an understanding of the term, if we define theory as "a more or less verified or established explanation," then theory is in the eye of the beholder. Darwin-skeptics will not agree that neo-Darwinian evolution is "a more or less verified or established explanation." But Darwinists will agree. So the question over whether neo-Darwinian evolution should be called a "theory" is not the core question of this debate. A better question would be: "Is neo-Darwinian evolution 'a more or less verified or established explanation'?"

Darwinists have the right to believe that neo-Darwinian is a verified and established explanation--i.e. that it meets the hard definition of theory. But they do not have the right to insist that Darwin-skeptics must call evolution a "theory," so defined. While Darwinists are correct that the technical definition of "theory" means a well-established and verified explanation, they should not insist that evolution can never be called "just a theory." When they do this, they are actually imposing onto the debate their conclusion that evolution must be considered by all to be a verified and established explanation. Were they to tolerantly allow Darwin-skeptics to dissent from the orthodox neo-Darwinian position, Darwinists would not insist that Darwin-skeptics entirely abandon the phrase "evolution is just a theory."


However, given that the technical, scientific, hard definition of theory does typically mean a well-established and verified explanation, then it is best if Darwin-skeptics take the high road and avoid calling neo-Darwinian evolution "just a theory." And as we shall see in the next installment of this series, the question "is evolution a 'more or less verified or established explanation'"? is also a complex question, for it can also depend on the definition of "evolution."

On Darwinian apologists' word games.

Is "Evolution" a "Theory" or "Fact," or Is This Just a Trivial Game of Semantics? (Part 1)
Casey Luskin 

Many members of the general public who are skeptics of Darwinian evolution are intelligent people with a decent understanding of some of the scientific weaknesses with neo-Darwinian evolution. In fact, a recent article in The Scientist suggests that, "public discontent with classical evolution as an inclusive theory stems partly from an intuitive appreciation of its limits." (Eric Smith, "Before Darwin," The Scientist, June 2008:32-38.) But in this highly nuanced debate, such Darwin-skeptics must avoid semantic land mines if they are to accurately, clearly, and effectively communicate their views. I have often seen that some people who oppose neo-Darwinian evolution are fond of calling evolution "only a theory" or "just a theory, but not a fact." After using such a phrase, they are immediately scolded by Darwinists, who tell them that "a theory" is a "well-substantiated scientific explanation of some aspect of the natural world" and that evolution should be considered "both fact and theory." Ken Miller just wrote a book titled, "Only a theory," basically opposing people who use such an argument. Similarly, an opinion article recently condescended:

One of the greatest misconceptions about evolution is embedded in the misuse of the word 'theory' in its application to science. The common antecedents that result in this misuse of the word are manifested in either genuine ignorance, or disguised ignorance. People are either genuinely mistaken of the word's intent, or they are well aware of the word's scientific definition, but still use the nonscientific definition in an effort to spawn doubt. ... Evolution, because it's a theory, is a higher form of knowledge than a fact.
Similarly, the NCSE's Glenn Branch recently co-wrote an article taking the condescending approach: it labeled those who use the "evolution is 'just a theory' line as being "pejorative" and favorably cited a Darwinist who scolded, "To claim that evolution is 'just a theory' is to reveal both a profound ignorance of modern biological knowledge and a deep misunderstanding of the basic nature of science."
Upon receiving such a scolding, the Darwin-skeptic who said that evolution is "just a theory, but not a fact" may feel quite bad. She innocently had no intent to violate any rules of semantics or misuse any terms; she merely wanted to communicate her skepticism of neo-Darwinism. In this tangled web of ambiguously defined terms, the Darwin-skeptic is then confronted by a number of confusing questions of rhetoric and semantics:

1. Are Darwinists correct to define "theory" as "a well-substantiated scientific explanation of some aspect of the natural world" or "a comprehensive explanation of some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence"?
2. Under such a strong definition of "theory," does evolution qualify as a "theory"?
3. Is it correct to call evolution a "fact"?
4. Is it best for Darwin skeptics to call evolution "just a theory, not a fact"?
5. All I wanted to say is that I'm a scientific skeptic of neo-Darwinism. How can I convey such skepticism without stepping on a semantic land mine and getting scolded by Darwinists?"
These are all good questions. In a series of five posts, I will attempt to answer all five questions, exploring the argument that evolution is "just a theory, not a fact" and providing criticism of people on both sides of this debate, as well as some friendly communications advice for Darwin-skeptics. And from the outset, I should state that I have always opposed using the "evolution is just a theory, not a fact" line to communicate one's skepticism regarding neo-Darwinian evolution.

Question 1: Are Darwinists correct to define "theory" as "a well-substantiated scientific explanation of some aspect of the natural world" or "a comprehensive explanation of some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence"?

According to the 1998 edition of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences' (NAS) Science and Creationism: A View from the National Academy of Sciences, a theory is "a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural world that can incorporate facts, laws, and tested hypotheses." In 2008, the NAS released a new edition, Science, Evolution, and Creationism, stating that a theory is "a comprehensive explanation of some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence." Darwinists routinely invoke these and other similar definitions of "theory" when scolding Darwin-skeptics for calling evolution "just a theory, not a fact." Are Darwinists correct to define "theory" in this fashion? The answer to this question is both yes and no.

"Theory" can have multiple definitions. When I look up "theory" in my 1996 edition of Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (WEUDEL), the word "theory" has 7 or 8 different entries:

1. a coherent group of general propositions used as principles of explanation for a class of phenomena: Einstein's theory of relativity. 
2. a proposed explanation whose status is still conjectural, in contrast to well-established propositions that are regarded as reporting matters of actual fact. 
3. Math. a body of principles, theorems, or the like, belonging to one subject: number theory. 
4. the branch of a science or art that deals with its principles or methods, as distinguished from its practice: music theory. 
5. a particular conception or view of something to be done or of the method of doing it; a system of rules or principles. 
6. contemplation or speculation. 
7. guess or conjecture.
According to entry #2, "theory" can mean "a proposed explanation whose status is still conjectural, in contrast to well-established propositions that are regarded as reporting matters of actual fact." Similarly, entries #6 and #7 define "theory" as "contemplation or speculation" or "guess or conjecture." We'll say these comprise the soft definition of theory and represent the definitions that the average person has in mind when they say, "evolution is just a theory, not fact."
The upshot of the soft definition of theory is that Darwinists who imply that the term "theory" can never mean that "conjecture or guess" are in fact wrong, because "theory" can in fact mean conjecture or guess. On the other hand, if you're a Darwin-skeptic who thinks that "theory" necessarily means "conjecture" or a "guess" and can never mean a verified scientific explanation, then you are wrong: After listing these entries, my 1996 edition of WEUDEL elaborates on proper usage of the word "theory" within the scientific community:

1. THEORY, HYPOTHESIS are used in non-technical contexts to mean untested idea or opinion. The THEORY in technical use is a more or less verified or established explanation accounting for known facts or phenomena: the theory of relativity. A hypothesis is a conjecture put forth as a possible explanation of phenomena or relations, which serve as a basis of argument or experimentation to reach the truth: This idea is only a hypothesis.
Within technical scientific discussions, the term "theory" typically is understood to mean "a more or less verified or established explanation." We'll call this the hard definition of theory. But is this hard definition of theory the only way that scientists use the word "theory"?
When a Darwin-skeptic says "evolution is a theory, not a fact," Darwinists often pounce and assert that the colloquial or "pejorative" (Glenn Branch's label) usage of "theory" can mean "conjecture" or "guess," but scientists never use the word "theory" to mean conjecture or guess. For example, Branch favorably quotes Ken Miller's 2007 edition of the textbook Biology, implying that there is a united front and complete conformity within the scientific community regarding proper usage of the word "theory": "In science, the word theory applies to a well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range of observations." Such Darwinist claims of unanimity within the scientific community are also questionable.

While scientists do typically imply the "hard" definition when using the word "theory," they don't always use it in that sense. If scientists always meant the "hard" definition of "theory," then scientists would virtually never use the phrase "new theory" because an idea does not attain the status of a theory until it becomes well-established and verified, withstanding many tests until it is no longer "a proposed explanation whose status is still conjectural." Yet a quick search of PubMed for the phrase "new theory" reveals dozens and dozens of hits from the technical scientific literature where scientists offered "a proposed explanation whose status is still conjectural" but called that explanation a theory.

Three recent examples of such usage of "new theory," where theory represented an unverified idea, will suffice.

In the April, 2008 issue of the journal Medical Hypotheses, editor-in-chief Bruce G. Charlton uses the phrase "new theory" multiple times. The meaning implied by the term "theory" in this case was a proposed explanation whose status is still conjectural, in contrast to well-established propositions that are regarded as reporting matters of actual fact. As Charlton observes:

An old joke about the response to revolutionary new scientific theories states that there are three phases on the road to acceptance: 1. The theory is not true; 2. The theory is true, but it is unimportant; 3. The theory is true, and it is important -- but we knew it all along. ... Theory for scientists is like water for fish: the invisible medium in which they swim.
(Bruce G. Charlton, "False, trivial, obvious: Why new and revolutionary theories are typically disrespected," Medical Hypotheses Vol. 71:1--3 (2008).)

Charlton goes on to say, "When a new theory is revolutionary, then it is perceived as an observation which is incompatible with the old theory. From this perspective either the new theory must be rejected, or else the old theory abandoned." Clearly Charlton uses the word "theory" as if it can, in some circumstances, mean a new idea that has not yet undergone widespread testing and verification, and may not have experienced widespread acceptance.
As a second example, a recent sociology paper from Archives of Suicide Research states, "Although the study has offered some support for the new theory, future research with more rigorous quantitative data needs to be conducted to further test the theory on a more comprehensive level." (J. Zhang, D. Lester, " Psychological Tensions Found in Suicide Notes: A Test for the Strain Theory of Suicide," Archives of Suicide Research, VOl. 12(1):67-73 (2008).) Clearly this study uses the word "theory" to describe a new idea that has not yet been fully verified nor accepted.

Finally, even within the context of evolutionary biology, theory can mean a new idea that does not yet have widespread verification or universal acceptance. A recent article in Current Biology entitled "Social Evolution: The Decline and Fall of Genetic Kin Recognition," by Andy Gardner and Stuart A. West of the Institute of Evolutionary Biology, University of Edinburgh, contains a subheading which asserts, "New theory confirms that genetic kin recognition is inherently unstable, explaining its rarity." Yet the article goes on to describe a vigorous scientific debate between evolutionary biologists about whether kin selection is a genetically viable explanation to account for the evolutionary origin of altruism and cooperation. According to the article, a new study concludes that "there is relatively poor empirical support for this mechanism in nature" because "[a] new theoretical study of genetic kin recognition ... reveals that, left to its own evolutionary devices, this mechanism will drive itself to ruin." But other leaders in that field disagree, implying that this theory is not "a well-substantiated scientific explanation of some aspect of the natural world" or "a comprehensive explanation of some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence."

There are many other examples from the technical literature where theory is used in a similar sense, and it does not mean "a more or less verified or established explanation." It should be clear that scientists sometimes DO use the term "theory" to refer to a new idea that has not yet undergone extensive testing and is simply "a proposed explanation whose status is still conjectural."

Conclusion
In closing, we must return to the question, Are Darwinists correct to define "theory" as "a well-substantiated scientific explanation of some aspect of the natural world" or "a comprehensive explanation of some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence"? The answer is yes, but they are not entitled to claim that such a hard definition is the exclusively acceptable usage of theory both for scientists and non-scientists. Darwinists are wrong to imply that scientists always necessarily use the hard definition of theory, because even scientists occasionally use theory as if it means new idea, or a "a proposed explanation whose status is still conjectural."

The problem underlying debates over the proper usage of theory is that the term can have multiple definitions, even among scientists, ranging from "a proposed explanation whose status is still conjectural, in contrast to well-established propositions" to "a more or less verified or established explanation." But the upshot is this: Because the term "theory" can mean "a more or less verified or established explanation," it is inappropriate for a Darwin skeptic who is trying to communicate doubts about Darwin to use the "evolution is a theory, not a fact" line, because it ignores the truth that in many venues, theory does indeed mean, as WEUDEL explains, "a more or less verified or established explanation."

Invoking devolution in Darwin's defense.

Christopher Hitchens and His Cave Myths
Casey Luskin

In his book God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, atheist author Christopher Hitchens calls intelligent design (ID) "tripe" and "a huge menacing lurch forward by the forces of barbarism." While supporting the evolution of humans, he asserts that there is "[n]o divine plan" and that "[e]verything works without that assumption." Hitchens laments the existence of religion because "millions of people in all societies still prefer the myths of the cave and the tribe and the blood sacrifice." (pg. 282) In his debate against Jay Wesley Richards, Hitchens reportedly argued against God by alleging that God would not create certain features we observe, to which Richards aptly replied, "A sneer is not an argument." Unfortunately, Hitchens is still using sneers as arguments. What's more, it now seems that it is Hitchens who prefers myths about caves.

In a recent article published on Slate.com, Hitchens claims that intelligent design is refuted due to the presence of vestigial eyes on blind cave salamanders. He even got Richard Dawkins to back him up, saying: "Vestigial eyes, for example, are clear evidence that these cave salamanders must have had ancestors who were different from them--had eyes, in this case. That is evolution. Why on earth would God create a salamander with vestiges of eyes? If he wanted to create blind salamanders, why not just create blind salamanders?"

Ignoring the fact that Hitchens and Dawkins misconstrue ID in theological terms, the problem with the argument is that ID fully accepts that varying degrees of Darwinian evolution can take place, and in fact ID proponents regularly point out that evolution is quite good at effecting loss-of-function. While random mutations usually fail miserably at creating new complex biological functions, they are in fact quite good at messing up complex biological functions (or doing nothing). When natural selection occasionally prefers the "messed up" state, it's quite capable of preserving it. But the neo-Darwinian mechanism is not good at producing new complex functions. As I wrote earlier this year regarding species that live in caves:

[E]xamples of loss-of-function in organisms may be best explained by natural processes of random mutation and natural selection. In this regard, features like functionless eyes on blind cave fish are probably best explained by Darwinian evolution. This poses no challenge to the validity of intelligent design in other cases. ID is far more interested in explaining the GAIN of biological function rather than loss of function.
("Another Intelligent Design Prediction Fulfilled: Function for a Pseudogene")

In his book The Making of the Fittest, biologist Sean B. Carroll uses such "loss of function" examples to explain how the "fittest" are "made." As I wrote in response to Carroll:
Carroll gives a few other examples in his chapter explaining "the making and evolution of complexity." The first involves the fact that single mutations in various genes can abolish eyes or the pelvis in fish. These are simple mutations which turn off regulatory genes, thereby preventing an organ structure from forming. His second example deals with the loss of wing spots on butterfly wings. Again, the mechanism is a simple mutation which turns off the wing-spot genes. These examples all invoke loss of function by turning of pre-existing genes. Exactly how are the fittest made? Carroll's examples don't answer that question.
(Casey Luskin, "The Evolutionary Gospel According to Sean B. Carroll".)

Hitchens, Dawkins and Carroll can have all the evidence they want that the neo-Darwinian mechanism can mess things up, turn genes off, and cause "loss-of-function." No one on any side of this debate doubts that random mutations are quite good at destroying complex features. Us folks on the ID side suspect that random mutation and natural selection aren't good at doing very much more than that. And the constant citations by Darwinists of "loss of function" examples as alleged refutations of ID only strengthens our argument.

Meanwhile, ID proponents seek to explain a far more interesting aspect of biological history: the origin of new complex biological features. Despite his quotation of Michael Shermer on the evolution of the eye, Hitchens has yet to do that.

Exploring the edge of Darwin's world.

Best of Behe: A Quick Reprise of The Edge of Evolution
Michael Behe

Editor's note: In celebration of the 20th anniversary of biochemist Michael Behe's pathbreaking book  Darwin's Black Box  and the release of the new documentary Revolutionary: Michael Behe and the Mystery of Molecular Machines , we are highlighting some of Behe's "greatest hits." The following was published here on August 20, 2014. Remember to get your copy of Revolutionary  now! See the trailer here.

On his blog, Sandwalk, University of Toronto biochemistry professor Laurence Moran expressed uncertainty concerning the basic argument of my book  The Edge of Evolution: The Search for the Limits of Darwinism. So for anyone who wants a quick reprise of the book's reasoning, below is a list of annotated bullet points plus some commentary summarizing it.

If the development of some particular adaptive biochemical feature requires more than one specific mutation to an organism's genome, and if the intermediate mutations are deleterious (and to a lesser extent even if they are neutral), then the probability of the multiple mutations randomly arising in a population and co-existing in a single individual so as to confer the adaptation will be many orders of magnitude less than for cases in which a single mutation is required.

The decreased probability means either that a much larger population size of organisms would be required on average to produce the multiple mutations in the same amount of time as needed for a single mutation, or that for the same population size a multiple-mutation feature would be expected to require many more generations to appear than a single mutation one.

As a matter of simple population genetics theory, the two points above should be uncontroversial. Now let's look at some empirical data.

In The Edge of Evolution I cited the development of chloroquine resistance in the malaria parasite Plasmodium falciparum as a very likely real-life example of this phenomenon.  recent paper by Summers et al. confirms that two specific mutations are required to confer upon the protein PfCRT the ability to pump chloroquine, which is necessary but may not be sufficient for resistance in the wild.

The best estimate of the per-parasite occurrence of de novo resistance is  Nicholas White's value of 1 in 1020. This number is surely made up of several components, including: 1) the probability of the two required mutations identified by Summers et al. coexisting in a single pfcrt gene; 2) the value of the selection coefficient (which can be thought of as the likelihood that the de novo mutant will successfully recrudesce in a person treated by chloroquine and be transmitted to another person); and 3) the probability of any possible further PfCRT mutation needed to confer chloroquine resistance in the wild coexisting in the same gene with the other mutations.

The known point mutation rate of P. falciparum, combined with the apparent deleterious effect of the required mutations occurring singly, suggests that component 1 from the previous bullet point will account for the lion's share of White's estimate, probably at least a factor of 1 in 1015-1016 of it. The other factors would then account for 1 in 104-105. These values are somewhat flexible, accommodating the uncertainty in our knowledge of the exact values in the wild. In other words, a decrease in our best estimate of the value of one factor can be conceptually offset relatively easily without affecting the argument by supposing another factor is larger, to arrive at 1 in 1020.

These last three points, although based on inferences from empirical data rather than just pure theory, should also be pretty uncontroversial. Now let's pass on to the dicier stuff.

Any particular adaptive biochemical feature requiring the same mutational complexity as that needed for chloroquine resistance in malaria is forbiddingly unlikely to have arisen by Darwinian processes and fixed in the population of any class of large animals (such as, say, mammals), because of the much lower population sizes and longer generation times compared to that of malaria. (By "the same mutational complexity" I mean requiring 2-3 point mutations where at least one step consists of intermediates that are deleterious, plus a modest selection coefficient of, say, 1 in 103 to 1 in104. Those factors will get you in the neighborhood of 1 in 1020.)

Any adaptive biological feature requiring a mutational pathway of twice that complexity (that is, 4-6 mutations with the intermediate steps being deleterious) is unlikely to have arisen by Darwinian processes during the history of life on Earth.

In the book I then go on to make a general argument that Darwinian processes could not have constructed the molecular foundation of life, but let's leave that aside for now. Let's just concentrate on the last two bullet points here.

Considered in the calmer context of the development of resistance to particular antibiotics (such as, say, a combination of chloroquine plus a second drug that is as difficult to evolve resistance to and works by an independent mechanism) -- rather than in the highly charged context of intelligent design -- even these two statements should seem reasonable to critics of ID. After all, many medical professionals searching for treatments for malaria are trying to do exactly that -- to combine two very improbable mutational steps into an insuperable mutational pathway. If there were a second drug with the efficacy of chloroquine which had always been administered in combination with it (but worked by a different mechanism), resistance to the combination would be expected to arise with a frequency in the neighborhood of 1 in 1040 -- a medical triumph.

Where a critic might demur is on the question of how many ways exist to solve an evolutionary problem of that mutational complexity. I think that's due to a confusion about the need for particular mutations versus nonspecific mutations. While comparing the math of chloroquine resistance to mutations that have occurred in the primate line leading to humans, Professor Moran wrote, "Does he really mean that there can't be any examples of two mutations occurring in the same gene since humans and chimps diverged?" No, of course not. That overlooks the requirement for the great specificity needed to build biochemical systems. For example, to achieve chloroquine resistance malaria must at least acquire the mutations K76T plus either N75E or N326D in PfCRT -- two very particular amino acid positions in a very particular gene -- not just any two amino acids in any gene. That of course makes a huge difference to the probability.

Moran also writes, "He seems to think that whenever we see such mutations they must have been the only possible way to evolve some new function or feature." Well, no, not the "only possible" way, but, yes, one of a very limited number of possibilities. (I wrote about this in my last article, too.)

In fact the number is limited enough that we can conclude with confidence that it won't affect my argument summarized above. For example, suppose there were ten, or a hundred different ways to address a particular biochemical challenge. That would barely move the dial on a log scale that's pointing at 1 in 1020.

What's more, Nicholas White's factor of 1 in 1020 already has built into it all the ways to evolve chloroquine resistance in P. falciparum. In the many malarial cells exposed to chloroquine there have surely occurred all possible single mutations and probably all possible double mutations -- in every malarial gene -- yet only a few mutational combinations in pfcrt are effective. In other words, mutation and selection have already searched all possible solutions of the entire genome whose probability is greater than 1 in 1020, including mutations to other genes. The observational evidence demonstrates that only a handful are effective. There is no justification for arbitrarily inflating probabilistic resources by citing imaginary alternative evolutionary routes.

To summarize, my argument concerns the evolutionary construction of biochemical features of specificity similar to malarial chloroquine resistance. The little-appreciated point I wanted to emphasize is that the likelihood of success decreases enormously if even a single mutational step of a pathway is disfavored. With more such steps, its improbability becomes prohibitive.

On the echo chamber called settled science II

Crowd Effect: Evolution Stays Afloat by Dint of Sociology
David Klinghoffer


It's the crowd effect: Certainties like Darwinian evolution stay afloat by dint of sociology as much as science or anything else. On a new episode of ID the Future with Andrew McDiarmid, protein chemist Douglas Axe talks about his new book Undeniable:  Undeniable: How Biology Confirms Our Intuition That Life Is Designed and the illusion that just because a lot of people say something, that makes it true:

People tend to follow other people. That's the way we are as humans. So there've been lots of ideas through the course of human history, big ideas, that get a big following, that are not true ideas. They turn out not to be correct. They're false. But they'll still have years and years and years, sometimes generations and generations of followers. Whenever you have an idea like that, it generates a huge volume of literature. But the mere fact that there's literature does not prove the idea. It simply proves that lots of people buy into the idea.

A great point to keep in mind and very well articulated. He draws the related distinction between scientific authority and scientific evidence. Support by "authority" for an idea does not mean that the evidence supports it too.

As he notes, Axe reached his own conclusion about intelligent design over the course of 25 years of "hard technical work" in science labs. However he wanted to reach not just other scientists -- but everyone. So Dr. Axe, rather than merely simplifying scientific information, sets out an argument that is "non-technical" by its nature.

The book is one that only those who haven't read it can easily dismiss. It is in part a respectful but forceful argument with atheist philosopher Thomas Nagle, author of Mind & Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False, which we've reflected on here at length in the past. Axe's biggest conclusion? While "Nagle wants there to be an impersonal force within nature that created us," Dr. Axe rejects this: "The knower who made life is not just some disembodied intelligence. This knower has to be a personal creator."

Well those are fighting words. Knee-jerk crowd followers will roll their eyes without weighing the argument Doug Axe makes. The thoughtful will read the book and consider for themselves.

Rise of the machines? III

Butterfly mimicry v. Darwin

Butterfly Mimicry: A "Huge" Problem for Evolutionary Biology
Casey Luskin


Can Darwinian evolution explain the complex coloration patterns found in insects that led to biomimicry? According to an article published late last year in BioScience, Darwinian evolution faces "problems" that are "huge" when trying to account for the origin of biomimicry in butterflies:

The balance of Dazzled and Deceived focuses on the genetics and development of mimetic patterns, as revealed mostly through work with butterflies. The problems here are huge for evolutionary biologists. How does natural selection build a complex organism with all its integrated parts through fixation of random mutations? Butterfly mimicry has been a classic arena in which to tackle this problem precisely because the gambit is so obvious: To be a good mimic of another species requires many pattern elements of bars, lines, colors, and even wing shapes to change at once. Moreover, how can this process produce females that are perfect mimics and males that look nothing of the sort within a single species? These genetic requirements are seemingly at odds with our understanding of gradual evolutionary change and genes of small effect.
(Edmund D. Brodie III, "Butterflies and Battleships," a review of Dazzled and Deceived: Mimicry and Camouflage by Peter Forbes (Yale University Press, 2009)," BioScience, Vol. 60(10):850-851 (November, 2010).)

Perhaps it's appropriate that Brodie states that "dogma can be dangerous." Or maybe not, given that his explanation for the evolutionary origin of mimicry is nothing but vague:
Forbes takes us through the emergence of E. B. Ford's school of ecological genetics and the basement-made butterfly crosses that eventually began to illuminate the problem of linked-gene complexes ("supergenes"), sex-linked inheritance, and modifier genes. The answers to the mimicry paradox, preliminary as they are still, inform modern evolutionary-developmental studies in all species and have launched the current effort to map a number of butterfly genomes. These genomic excursions promise to uncover the genetic architecture of mimetic patterns in a variety of species and in doing so uncover the fundamental basis of adaptation and speciation.

If our understanding of the genetic basis for these mimetic patterns is still "preliminary," then it would seem we're even further away from understanding how they evolved. Apparently these "problems" that are "huge for evolutionary biologists" are not going away anytime soon.

on competing models of human ancestry.

In BIO-Complexity, a New Model for Human Ancestry
Ann Gauger 

In 2012 at a scientific conference I met a Swedish population geneticist named Ola Hössjer. He and I sat down in the lobby of the hotel where we were staying to discuss what kind of population genetics model might be possible to test whether humanity could have come from a single first pair of humans. The motivation for doing so was the repeated challenge from other population geneticists claiming that we humans had to come from a population of thousands, not just two. He and I both knew the assumptions that had to go into the models such population geneticists constructed, and wondered if different starting assumptions would yield different results.

Population genetics is a field that uses math to model how genes and mutations are distributed in populations and how that distribution changes over time. It can be used to model our ancestry, to reconstruct our genetic history as a population as a whole, or as smaller subgroupings such European, Asian, African, etc., or even tribes within a larger grouping. The standard population genetics models that reconstruct ancestral history work backward by a process of coalescence to a starting point where everything is identical -- everything starts out the same, with one set of chromosomes, and diverges from there by the accumulation of mutations, and the processes of recombination, genetic drift, and natural selection.

Back in that hotel lobby, Ola and I quickly came up with a list of variables that would need to be accounted for in any model, things that are unknown aspects of the history of our origin, and we talked about the computational problems of any forward-looking model, one that goes from two individuals at the start to something like the present population. To keep track of all the variables and to trace the possible genetic changes quickly becomes computationally too intense to go very far. I personally thought such a model was intractable and beyond anyone's ability to build. Was I wrong!

A little over a year ago Ola presented a model to our now co-author Colin Reeves and me that took all those variables we had discussed in Copenhagen into account. It is the most comprehensive population genetics model I have seen anywhere -- it's a brilliant piece of work. Ola found a way to solve the problem of the explosive nature of forward-directed models I mentioned above. He uses the same coalescent technique of the standard models to reconstruct an ancestral tree from a few thousand individuals in the present time, going backward to a starting point of two. His model then reverses the process by going forward in time, using the tree as a framework to keep track of genetic changes.

The model is general enough that it can be of use to any geneticist to test the effects on genetic diversity of processes such as migration, age structure, mating behavior, and other aspects of population dynamics and demography.

The key assumption that distinguishes our model from the standard ones is that we assume that the first pair started out with heterogeneous chromosomes -- four distinct sets, two sets for each individual. The standard population genetics models work backward assuming everything starts from a single point. We are proposing that things started out different, not the same, with diversity present from the beginning in the genomes of the starting first pair.

We still need to code this model, which is a work in progress being done by Colin Reeves, and we hope others as well, as it is a massive project, and will require time and resources. But when it's completed, we will be able to test the hypothesis that we can recreate modern genetic diversity starting from an original pair with original genetic diversity. Should we be able to demonstrate this, there will be two competing models for human origins, one that says we came from a population of thousands, and ours that says we came from a population of two. We will see which best fits the available data and yields the most insight.


The model has now been published in the journal BIO-Complexity, in two parts, the first being a general introduction to population genetics and the rationale for the model, and the second being the model itself. My hope is that this model will be the catalyst for much research and discussion, on both sides.

The making of an antidarwinian bomb thrower.

Behe -- The Makings of a Revolutionary
David Klinghoffer





It's a pleasing coincidence that in the new documentary Revolutionary we look back to the origins of Michael Behe's insights on irreducible complexity, published twenty years ago in Darwin's Black Box, just as we look forward to the results of the potentially historic Royal Society meeting in London, underway at this moment.

No one scheduled to speak there is an advocate of intelligent design, but the scientific critique of Darwinism that Dr. Behe was crucial in launching has that meeting, at least in part, as its fruit.

Would such a conference, raising basic questions about the adequacy of neo-Darwinism, be happening now if it weren't for Behe, and before him Denton and Johnson? There's reason to wonder.

In a new brief video, above, Behe discusses the roots of his thinking, including a Science article that warned professors to warn their students against Phil Johnson's book Darwin on Trial, prompting a stinging missive from Behe that Science published in a subsequent issue.


Stephen Meyer and Paul Nelson recall their responses to meeting and working with Behe back in the early Nineties, as the revolution was just getting under way. Not that long ago, but how things have changed! Get your copy of Revolutionary, on DVD or Blu-ray, today.

File under "Well said" XLI

The end of life is to be like God, and the soul following God will be like Him. Socrates

A clash of Titans XXXVI.

Is big pharma why you can't afford quality care?:Pros and cons

For undocumented aliens the open hand or the boot?:Pros and cons

Just enough religion to make us hate? II

The state's all seeing eye?

Will Justice finally come to Jehovah's servants in South Korea?

South Korea Appellate Court Finds Conscientious Objectors Not Guilty

On October 18, 2016, the appellate division of Gwangju District Court held that conscientious objectors Hye-min Kim, Lak-hoon Cho, and Hyeong-geun Kim are not guilty of evading military service. These three men, all of whom are Jehovah’s Witnesses, are the first to receive a not-guilty decision on this issue at the appellate court level in South Korea.

Judge Young-sik Kim explained: “The Court believes that they refuse to perform military duty because of their religious faith and conscience. Freedom of religion and conscience are constitutional rights, which are not subject to restriction by punishment.”


If the prosecutor appeals against this ruling, the case will go before the Supreme Court for review. Over 40 cases are already pending before the Supreme Court, involving men who have been declared guilty on this issue. Philip Brumley, General Counsel of Jehovah’s Witnesses, stated: “Even though South Korea’s Supreme Court and Constitutional Court have until now refused to recognize the right to conscientious objection, the appellate court has applied the international standard recognizing the right. This recognition has been confirmed in over 500 rulings by the UN Human Rights Committee.”

Just being good neighbours.

Witnesses Repair 60-Year-Old Dam in Warwick

NEW YORK—Jehovah’s Witnesses finished the construction of their new world headquarters in Warwick, New York, in August 2016. In conjunction with the construction plan, the Witnesses have also completed the rehabilitation of the Blue Lake Dam, with the assistance of SUEZ Water New York Inc.


Soon after purchasing the property in 2009, the Witnesses made plans to upgrade the severely deteriorated Blue Lake Dam. The dam (pictured above, in foreground) is adjacent to the Witnesses’ new world headquarters and impounds Blue Lake (also known as Sterling Forest Lake). A subsequent inspection by the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) confirmed that the dam was leaking water and the gate valve was inoperable. With the 195 homes of The Woodlands at Tuxedo subdivision less than a mile from Blue Lake, the DEC classified the dam as high-hazard.



The Witnesses’ new world headquarters (bottom left) is adjacent to Blue Lake Dam (center right).

“The dam was clearly leaking,” explains Jeffrey Hutchinson, park manager of Sterling Forest State Park at the time, “and if it decided to go, there could have been some serious consequences. All of the homes down at the Woodlands subdivision, or a majority of them, could have been wiped out.”

Robert R. Werner, president of The Woodlands at Tuxedo Homeowners Association, states: “It is clear to me that had Jehovah’s Witnesses not stepped up, this project would not have been done until a failure of the structure had occurred. If that had happened, we would have had potential loss of life and property.”


The Woodlands at Tuxedo subdivision (top left) is less than a mile from the world headquarters of Jehovah’s Witnesses (bottom right) and Blue Lake Dam.
“In 2011, the Echo Lake Dam, located less than 30 miles from Blue Lake, failed and wiped out portions of the East Village in Tuxedo, New York,” comments Mr. Hutchinson. Town engineers estimated that 100 million gallons of water rushed down Ramapo River when the Echo Lake Dam gave way. Echo Lake has a surface area of 13 acres (5.2 ha)—less than one eighth the 115-acre (46.5 ha) surface area of Blue Lake.

The Blue Lake Dam, created in 1956, is located on the eastern side of the lake and originally comprised two parts: a main earth dam and a primary concrete spillway. A safety valve, used to lower the water level in the event of an emergency, was also installed at the bottom of the lake.

Richard Devine, chairman of the Witnesses’ Warwick Construction Project Committee, explains: “We are happy that the dam rehabilitation project was successful, and we certainly appreciated the assistance from SUEZ Water. Our construction team shored up the dam, replaced the old, broken valve, added an auxiliary spillway, and raised and fortified the primary concrete spillway. The completion of the project ensures that the dam now meets the codes and industry standards for safety.”

Mr. Hutchinson sums up his overall view of the Witnesses and their work on the project: “You people do a lot of good for the local communities and help out where you can. Your construction quality is first-rate and environmentally conscious.”

Media Contact:


David A. Semonian, Office of Public Information, 1-718-560-5000