The design inference defined and refined

Are Hexagons Natural?

Evolution News & Views October 27, 2015 3:38 AM 

Hexagons (at least macroscopic ones) are relatively rare in nature. The most common place we see them is in beehives. It could be argued that if bees are intelligently designed, for which there is ample independent evidence, then the structures they create are also intelligently designed. We might argue that hexagons are the most efficient packing spaces for the least amount of material. We might point out that the design also provides more robust protection against stress than square-shaped cells. We can see that the structural design performs a function.

Our propensity to infer design, though, has to face up to other examples of hexagons in the non-living world. Some have been difficult to explain by natural law.

Columnar Basalt

When lava cools, it often forms polygonal-shaped columns, and hexagons are the most common shape. Many physicists have tried to understand how this occurs. There have been partial solutions, but nothing fully satisfying. Now, a paper in Physical Review Lettersreproduces the hexagonal columns with a mathematical model. The basic idea is summarized in a news release at APS Physics, along with a stunning photo of a pyramid of hexagonal basalt columns at the Giant's Causeway in Ireland. It sure looks designed. How do we make a proper inference?

The surface of cooling lava contracts more quickly than the still-warm liquid underneath, creating a stress that is relievedby the formation of cracks. Martin Hofmann from the Dresden University of Technology, Germany, and colleagues considered a uniform lava layer and calculated the energy released from different crack patterns. They found that, in the initial stages of cooling, when the cracks start to appear atrandom places on the surface, the energy release is greatest if the cracks intersect at 90-degree angles. But as the lava continues to cool and shrink, and the cracks collectively start to penetrate into the bulk, more energy is released per crack if they intersect at 120-degree angles. This transition fromindividual to collective growth of the cracks drives the pattern from rectangular to hexagonal. The hexagonal pattern is then maintained as the lava cools further, eventually leading to an array of hexagonal columns, similar to those seen in nature.

One can find columnar basalt in many locations: in the Grand Canyon, in Yellowstone Canyon, in Utah's Zion National Park, in the Rocky Mountains, at Devil's Postpile in the Sierra Nevada, and of course at the Giant's Causeway, along with other places around the world. The uniformity of the columns can be impressive, but they are rarely perfect. Many times other polygons are mixed in with the hexagons.

Saturn's North Pole Hexagon

A giant hexagon made up of clouds has persisted for decades on Saturn's north pole. This formation has baffled scientists since it was first discovered by the Voyager spacecraft in 1981. It appears to be unique in the Solar System, and it's huge: 20,000 miles across and 60 miles deep. Saturn's south pole also has a giant vortex, but not this polygonal shape. Space.com describes attempts to explain the feature:

Scientists have bandied about a number of explanations for the hexagon's origin. For instance, water swirling inside a bucket can generate whirlpools possessing holes with geometric shapes. However, there is of course no giant bucket on Saturn holding this gargantuan hexagon.

Voyager and Cassini did identify many features of this strange hexagon that could help explain how it formed. For example, the points of the hexagon rotate around its center atalmost exactly the same rate Saturn rotates on its axis. Moreover, a jet stream air current, much like the ones seen on Earth, flows eastward at up to about 220 mph (360 km/h) on Saturn, on a path that appears to follow the hexagon's outline.

We know that standing waves can maintain nodes that are stationary with respect to their reference frame. Something like that appears to be at work in Saturn's polar winds. The article says that the "bizarre giant hexagon on Saturn may finally be explained." A new model by a planetary scientist from New Mexico reproduces many of the observed properties of the hexagon.

The scientists ran computer simulations of an eastward jet flowing in a curving path near Saturn's north pole. Small perturbations in the jet -- the kind one might expect from jostling with other air currents -- made it meander into a hexagonal shape. Moreover, this simulated hexagon spun around its center at speeds close to that of the real one.

The scenario that best fits Saturn's hexagon involves shallow jets at the cloud level, study team members said. Winds below the cloud level apparently help keep the shape of the hexagon sharp and control the rate at which the hexagon drifts.

This hexagon may not be permanent, since it is subject to perturbations by processes that have no particular reason to maintain it. A simpler case is seen in Jupiter's Great Red Spot that appears to be shrinkingafter three hundred years since it was first observed.

Tiny Non-Living Hexagons

Snowflakes are classic examples of orderly structures with a hexagonal shape. Other non-living hexagons include the ring structures of many organic molecules (at least the way they are diagrammed by chemists). Some minerals also display hexagonal packing. Most of us have seen soap bubbles form hexagonal interfaces when they are packed together. An occasional hexagon can be found in mud cracks on a dry creek bed.

Life-Produced Hexagons

Bees are not the only hexagon-makers in the living world. We find hexagons on tortoise shells and in the ommatidia of insects' compound eyes. Some diatom species form free-standing hexagons in addition to the more common circles, triangles, squares, and pentagons. We humans, of course, are great hexagon-makers. Understanding their ideal packing geometry, we make them in telescope mirrors, geodesic domes, and soccer ball covers. Sometimes we create them just for their artistic value.

Proper Inferences

If humans create hexagons by intelligent design, is that true for other living things that make them? And how should we distinguish the design inference in life from the natural hexagons on Saturn or in columnar basalt? These questions provide an opportunity to understand William Dembski's Design Filter.

It's not enough that something be orderly. Casey Luskin discussed columnar basalt in 2010, answering ID critics' accusations that the Design Filter would generate a false positive. We also explained last year why snowflakes do not pass the design filter, despite their elegance and beauty. It's not enough, further, that something be rare or unique, like the Saturn hexagon. The Design Filter prefers a natural-law explanation if one can be found, or if the probability of the phenomenon's occurrence by chance is sufficiently high.

But do we wait forever for a natural explanation? Planetary scientists struggled for 35 years to explain Saturn's hexagon. Shouldn't we wait to explain beehives and compound eyes without reference to intelligent design? Isn't natural selection a natural law? (Actually, it's more like magic than a law of nature, but we'll entertain the question for the sake of argument.)

Intelligent design is not a gaps argument. It's a positive argument based on uniform experience. We have experience watching melting lava or drying mud forming geometric patterns. We have no other experience with hexagons forming on gas giants like Saturn, though. What do we do?

The Information Enigma

The short answer involves information. The hexagon on Saturn performs no function. Columnar basalt doesn't say anything. Snowflakes don't carry a message. They are mere emergent phenomena that are not that improbable, given laws of nature with which we are familiar. The Design Filter works properly by rejecting a design inference for these on the basis of probability and natural law.

All the living examples of hexagons, by contrast, are produced by codes. Beeswax will not form into hexagon cells on its own, nor will silica arrange itself into the geometric shells of diatoms. A digital code made of DNA dictates the placement of ommatidia in the insect eye and patterns in the turtle shell. Each of these structures performs a function and is the outcome of processes directed by a code.

The coded information makes use of natural laws, to be sure, but it arranges the parts into hexagons for a functional purpose. In our uniform experience, we know of one cause that can generate codes or instructions that lead to functional geometries -- intelligence.

There is one sense, though, in which we could make a design inference for the nonliving hexagons like snowflakes, basalt columns, and planetary atmospheres. Certain features of the universe are so finely tuned that without them, water, atoms, stars, and planets would not exist. It takes a higher-order design to have a universe at all.

You might even say that the elegant mathematics that allows us to describe hexagons is conceptual, not material, as are the aesthetic values that allow us to appreciate them. So even if the Design Filter rejects a design inference for some of the hexagons at one level, the mere existence of atoms, natural laws, and beauty warrants a design inference in a broader context for all of them. Without minds, we wouldn't even be debating these questions.

Darwinism Vs. Arithmetic yet again.

Proteins by Accident? Replying to a Critic of The Information Enigma

Douglas Axe October 27, 2015 9:51 AM 

Stephen Meyer and I appear in a new video from Discovery Institute, The Information Enigma, that shows how the information in DNA and proteins provides strong evidence for intelligent design. At the YouTube channel for the Center for Science & Culture, the video has generated somespirited discussion, which is good.

One commenter, who goes by the name ExtantFrodo2, has risen to the defense of Darwinism by enlisting several familiar Darwinian arguments, all of which make the evolutionary invention of new functional proteins sound much easier than it really is. The heavy use of arguments along these lines makes a response worthwhile, I think.

This excerpt from one of ExtantFrodo2's comments expresses the evolutionary thinking well:

The proteins are simply shapes. Mutation makes the shapes different. Different shapes are new tools. Some are bad & cause death to the organism. Others have no affect. Very rarely one shape turns out to be useful somewhere in the cell. It's only a metaphor to call it 'information'. DNA is a mutable template (or jig) that is cast into protein. Change the template & you change the protein. The protein may be more effective, less effective, or even completely changed (frame-shift and/or critical linkage points like di-sulfide bonds). Furthermore mutations often occur on copies or duplicates of a gene, so no former functionality (protein production) need be lost at all. As the jig or mold is transformed by mutation it produces different proteins that interact with the environment (and the cell) in new & different ways.

The first misconception here has to do with protein shapes. Since proteins are long flexible chains of linked amino acids, it's somewhat surprising that they can have fixed three-dimensional shapes at all. A strand of beads, for example, has no fixed shape. Why would a strand of amino acids be different?

In fact, the vast majority of possible protein chains are like strands of beads -- lacking any fixed shape. Life, however, makes critical use of a very special subset of the possibilities. These special proteins are coaxed into forming precise shapes by the sequence of amino acids along their chains. The process triggered by this coaxing, where a floppy protein chain rapidly acquires a well-formed structure, is known asfolding.

To give you an idea of how special these folding sequences are, theJournal of Molecular Biology paper referred to in the video estimates the proportion of chains that fold to be in the range of one in 10⁵⁰ to one in 10⁷⁴, depending on the complexity of the fold.

Even for simple folds, this means fewer than one in a trillion trillion trillion trillion amino acid sequences forms any well-defined shape at all. So the idea that every protein sequence has a shape is not at all accurate.

Secondly, the related idea that mutations merely change the shapes of proteins is equally inaccurate. The highly cooperative nature of protein folding means that it tends to be all-or-nothing. A particular protein sequence either forms structure A or it doesn't, and likewise for structure B. So for a series of mutations to convert a protein from forming structure A to forming structure B, they would first have to undothe A structure (producing a chain with no well-defined structure) and then stabilize the B structure.

In other words, changing the structure of a protein isn't nearly as easy as changing the shape of a lump of clay. The clay always has a shape, and with a little imagination we can even say the shape always represents something (which is all we ask of a lump of clay).

Proteins are different. Only highly exceptional proteins even have a shape, and these shapes are therefore fragile. Mutations are tolerated to a modest extent, after which all shape is lost.

Finally, the idea that it isn't hard to stumble upon things that are good for something, while very popular in evolutionary circles, doesn't explain the origin of exquisite things. Sure, the blobs of solder and scraps of metal or plastic you find on the floor of a workshop can be used for something -- this one a straight edge (in a pinch), that one a makeshift coaster, maybe a paperweight over there. But this make-do approach clearly doesn't work for impressive things -- not for the things we humans set out to make, and still less for the far more exquisite things we see in life.

Such things never happen by accident.

Grabbing some more of that suboptimal design I see.

To convergent evolution be the glory?

Squaring the circle?

Is Evolution Random? Answering a Common Challenge
Ann Gauger October 26, 2015 12:45 PM 

Evolutionists often challenge us for referring to Darwinian evolution as "random." They point to the fact that natural selection, the force that supposedly drives the train, always selects more "fit" organisms, and so is not random. That is only part of the story, though, and to understand why evolution can indeed be called random, the rest needs to be told.

Evolution can be considered to be composed of four parts. The first part, the grist for the mill, is the process by which mutations are generated. Generally this is thought to be a random process, with some qualifications. Single base changes occur more or less randomly, but there is some skewing as to which bases are substituted for which. Other kinds of mutations, like deletions or rearrangements or recombinations (where DNA is exchanged between chromosomes), often occur in hotspots, but not always. The net effect is that mutations occur without regard for what the organism requires, but higgledy-piggledy. In that sense mutation is random

The next part, random drift, is like a roll of the dice that decides which changes are preserved and which are lost. As the name implies, this process is also random, the result of accidental events, and without regard for the benefit of the organism. Most mutations get lost in the mix, especially when newly emerging, just because their host organisms fail to reproduce, or die from causes unrelated to genetics. It can also happen that new mutations are combined with other mutations that are harmful, and so get eliminated.

The random effects of drift are large enough to overwhelm natural selection in organisms with small breeding populations, less than a million, say. New mutations are not born fast enough to escape loss due to drift. There is a fractional threshold in the population that must be crossed before a new mutation can become "fixed," that is, universally present in every individual. A new mutation generally is lost to drift before that population threshold is crossed.

The third part, natural selection, is not random. It acts to preserve beneficial change and eliminate harmful ones. It can be said to be directional. But there are several caveats. Beneficial mutations are rare, and usually only weakly beneficial, so the effects of natural selection are not usually all that strong. Most changes provide only a slight advantage.

In addition, it can happen, and often does, that a "beneficial" mutation involves breaking something, meaning a loss of information, and a loss of potential improvement. This breaking can be irreversible for all intents and purposes. The premiere example in human evolution is that of sickle cell disease. Sickle cell disease is caused by a mutation to the hemoglobin gene that makes red blood cells resistant to the malarial parasite. In one copy the broken gene is beneficial (it increases resistance to malaria), but when two copies are present (both chromosomes carry the mutation), the red blood cells are deformed and cause painful debilitation. The broken gene is actually functionally worse than its normal version, except where malaria is present.

This brings out an important point. Natural selection does not always select the same mutations. The environment determines which mutations are favored. For example, natural selection acts to favor individuals carrying one copy of the sickle cell trait where malaria is present, but acts against the sickle cell gene where malaria is absent. So in this context, selection meanders over a fluctuating landscape of varying criteria for what is beneficial and what is not. Now it is beneficial to carry the sickle cell trait, now it is not. Different populations get favored at different times. In this sense one might say selection has a random component too, because only rarely is selection strong and unidirectional, always favoring the same mutation.

We see this variation in selection with another example, the evolution of finch beaks on the Galápagos Islands. In drought, large beaks are favored, in wet years, small beaks. The weather fluctuates, and so do the beak sizes.

Subpopulations may acquire traits, but because of environmental variation the traits do not become universal. For example, lactose intolerance -- we do not all carry the version of the gene that allows us to digest lactose as adults. Unless suddenly everyone in the world has to eat cheese as a major part of their diet, lactose intolerance won't disappear from our population.

There is a special way evolution can occur -- a sudden bottleneck in the population will tend to fix the traits that predominate in that population. Suppose a nuclear holocaust wiped out everyone except Swedes. The lactose-digesting gene would almost certainly become fixed, as would blond hair, blue eyes, and other Scandinavian traits, provided they ate cheese and lived at high latitudes. Until new mutations in new environments occurred, that would remain the case.

Now you know more about the population genetics of evolution than you imagined could be true. The sum of all these factors is what is responsible for evolution, or change over time. Mutation, drift, selection, and environmental change all play a role. Three out of these four forces are random, without regard for the needs of the organism. Even selection can be random in its direction, depending on the environment.


So tell me. Is evolution random? Most of the processes at work definitely are. Certainly evolution won't make steady progress in one direction without some other factor at work. What that factor might be remains to be seen. I personally do not think a material explanation will be found, because any process to guide evolution in a purposeful way will require a purposeful designer to create it.

Why some just say no to Halloween.:The Watchtower Society's commentary

The Origins of Halloween—What Does the Bible Say About Them?:

The Bible’s answer:

The Bible does not mention Halloween. However, both the ancient origins of Halloween and its modern customs show it to be a celebration based on false beliefs about the dead and invisible spirits, or demons.—See  “Halloween history and customs.”


The Bible warns: “There must never be anyone among you who . . . consults ghosts or spirits, or calls up the dead.” (Deuteronomy 18:10-12, The Jerusalem Bible) While some view Halloween as harmless fun, the Bible indicates that the practices associated with it are not. At 1 Corinthians 10:20, 21, the Bible says: “I do not want you to be participants with demons. You cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons too.”—New International Version.

Halloween history and customs:

Samhain: The origin of Halloween can be traced to this “ancient pagan festival celebrated by Celtic people over 2,000 years ago,” states The World Book Encyclopedia. “The Celts believed that the dead could walk among the living at this time. During Samhain, the living could visit with the dead.” However, the Bible clearly teaches that the dead “are conscious of nothing at all.” (Ecclesiastes 9:5) Thus, they cannot contact the living.
Halloween costumes, candy, and trick or treat: According to the book Halloween—An American Holiday, An American History, some of the Celts wore ghoulish costumes so that wandering spirits would mistake them for one of their own and leave them alone. Others offered sweets to the spirits to appease them. In medieval Europe, the Catholic clergy adopted local pagan customs and had their adherents go from house to house wearing costumes and requesting small gifts. The Bible, on the other hand, does not permit merging false religious practices with the worship of God.—2 Corinthians 6:17.
Ghosts, vampires, werewolves, witches, and zombies: These have long been associated with the evil spirit world. (Halloween Trivia) The Bible clearly states that we should oppose wicked spirit forces, not celebrate with them.—Ephesians 6:12.

Halloween pumpkins, or jack-o’-lanterns: In medieval Britain, “supplicants moved from door to door asking for food in return for a prayer for the dead,” and they would carry “hollowed-out turnip lanterns, whose candle connoted a soul trapped in purgatory.” (Halloween—From Pagan Ritual to Party Night) Others say that the lanterns were used to ward off evil spirits. During the 1800’s in North America, pumpkins replaced turnips because they were plentiful as well as easy to hollow out and carve. The beliefs behind this custom—the immortality of the soul, purgatory, and prayers for the dead—are not based on the Bible.—Ezekiel 18:4.

The scriptures as a trustworthy informant:The Watchtower Society's Commentary.

The Watchtower Society's Commentary on the Gentile Times.

APPOINTED TIMES OF THE NATIONS:

After discussing the destruction due to come upon the city of Jerusalem, Jesus made the statement: “And Jerusalem will be trampled on by the nations, until the appointed times of the nations [“times of the Gentiles,” KJ, RS] are fulfilled.” (Lu 21:24) The period indicated by the expression “appointed times of the nations [Gr., kai·roiʹ e·thnonʹ]” has occasioned considerable discussion as to its meaning and implication.

Meaning of “Appointed Times.” The expression “appointed times” here comes from the Greek word kai·rosʹ (plural, kai·roiʹ), which, according to Vine’s Expository Dictionary of Old and New Testament Words (1981, Vol. 4, p. 138), “signified a fixed or definite period, a season, sometimes an opportune or seasonable time.” Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon (1968, p. 859) gives the further definition of “exact or critical time.” Thus, kai·rosʹ is used to refer to the harvest “season,” “the season” of the fruits, and “the season” of figs (Mt 13:30; 21:34; Mr 11:13); “the proper time” for dispensing food (Mt 24:45; Lu 12:42); “the appointed time” for Jesus’ ministry to begin and the period of opportunity it brought (Mr 1:15; Mt 16:3; Lu 12:56; 19:44); and the “appointed time” of his death. (Mt 26:18) The demons, about to be cast out of certain men, screamed at Jesus: “Did you come here to torment us before the appointed time?”—Mt 8:29.

Kai·rosʹ is also used with reference to future times or occasions within God’s arrangement or timetable, particularly in relation to Christ’s presence and his Kingdom. (Ac 1:7; 3:19; 1Th 5:1) Thus, the apostle Paul speaks of “the sacred secret” revealed by God “for an administration at the full limit of the appointed times [kai·ronʹ], namely, to gather all things together again in the Christ, the things in the heavens and the things on the earth.” (Eph 1:9, 10) In view of the meaning of the word kai·rosʹ as used in the Bible text, it can properly be expected that the expression “appointed times of the nations” refers, not to something vague or indefinite, but, rather, to a “fixed or definite period,” an “exact or critical time,” one having a definite beginning and a definite end.

“The Nations” and “Jerusalem.” The significance of Jesus’ statement is necessarily bound up in his reference to the ‘trampling on Jerusalem,’ which he stated would continue until the fulfillment of “the appointed times of the nations.” The term “nations” or “Gentiles” translates the Greek word eʹthne, which means “nations” and was used by the Bible writers to refer specifically to the non-Jewish nations. On this basis some have considered the prophecy to apply to the period of time during which the geographic site of the ancient city of Jerusalem would be under Gentile domination and control.

While the literal city of Jerusalem is obviously referred to in Jesus’ description of the destruction that was to come and did come upon that city in the year 70 C.E. when the Romans demolished Jerusalem, the statement concerning “the appointed times of the nations” carries the prophecy far beyond that point, as many commentators have noted. Thus, the well-known Commentary by F. C. Cook says of Luke 21:24: “It serves to separate the strictly eschatological portion [that is, the portion relating to the last days] of the great prophecy, from the part belonging properly to the destruction of Jerusalem.” So, it becomes essential to determine what significance the inspired Scriptures attach to “Jerusalem” in order to ascertain whether “the appointed times of the nations” relate only to the literal city of Jerusalem or to something additional and greater.

Jerusalem was the capital of the nation of Israel, whose kings of the line of David were said to “sit upon Jehovah’s throne.” (1Ch 29:23) As such, it represented the seat of the divinely constituted government or typical kingdom of God operating through the house of David. With its Mount Zion, it was “the town of the grand King.” (Ps 48:1, 2) Hence, Jerusalem came to stand for the kingdom of the dynasty of King David, much as Washington, London, Paris, and Moscow represent the ruling powers of present-day nations and are so referred to in news communiqués. After Jerusalem was trampled on by the Babylonians, its king being taken into exile and the land laid desolate, no member of the Davidic dynasty again ruled from earthly Jerusalem. But the Scriptures show that Jesus, the Messiah, who was born in the line of David, would rule from heavenly Mount Zion, from heavenly Jerusalem.—Ps 2:6, 7; Heb 5:5; Re 14:1, 3.

Beginning of ‘trampling.’ The ‘trampling’ on that kingdom of the dynasty of Davidic rulers did not begin with the Roman devastation of the city of Jerusalem in 70 C.E. It began centuries earlier with the Babylonian overthrow of that dynasty in 607 B.C.E. when Nebuchadnezzar destroyed Jerusalem and took captive the dethroned king Zedekiah and the land was left desolate. (2Ki 25:1-26; see CHRONOLOGY.) This accorded with the prophetic words directed to Zedekiah at Ezekiel 21:25-27, namely: “Remove the turban, and lift off the crown. This will not be the same. . . . A ruin, a ruin, a ruin I shall make it. As for this also, it will certainly become no one’s until he comes who has the legal right, and I must give it to him.” The one who has “the legal right” to the Davidic crown lost by Zedekiah is demonstrated in the Christian Greek Scriptures to be Christ Jesus, of whom the angel, announcing his future birth, said: “Jehovah God will give him the throne of David his father, and he will rule as king over the house of Jacob forever, and there will be no end of his kingdom.”—Lu 1:32, 33.

With Jerusalem’s fall in 607 B.C.E. the Gentile powers exercised domination over the entire earth. The Davidic dynasty and rule suffered interruption, and so Jerusalem, or what it stood for, would continue to be “trampled on” as long as God’s kingdom, as functioning through David’s house, was kept in a low, inoperative condition under the Gentile powers. Observing this connection with rulership Unger’s Bible Dictionary (1965, p. 398) comments: “Consequently Gentiles move on as ‘the nations’ to the end of their stewardship as earth rulers. The termination of this period will be the end of the ‘times of the Gentiles’ (Luke 21:24; Dan. 2:36-44).”—Compare Eze 17:12-21; also the description of Medo-Persia’s fall at Da 8:7, 20.

Relation to Daniel’s Prophecies. At least twice in this prophecy concerning the time of the end, Jesus referred to the contents of the book of the prophet Daniel. (Compare Mt 24:15, 21 with Da 11:31; 12:1.) In the book of Daniel we find a picture drawn of the domination of the earth by the Gentile powers during their “appointed times.” The second chapter of Daniel contains the prophetic vision (received by King Nebuchadnezzar) of the great image that Daniel by inspiration showed to represent the march of Gentile world powers, ending with their destruction by the Kingdom set up by “the God of heaven,” which Kingdom then rules earth wide. (Da 2:31-45) It is of note that the image begins with the Babylonian Empire, the first world power to ‘trample Jerusalem’ by overthrowing the Davidic dynasty and leaving “Jehovah’s throne” in Jerusalem vacant. This also confirms the start of “the appointed times of the nations” in the year of Jerusalem’s destruction, 607 B.C.E.

Dream vision of tree in Daniel chapter 4. Again in the book of Daniel we find a close parallel to Jesus’ use of the word “times” with regard to “the nations,” or Gentile powers. And again it is Nebuchadnezzar, the dethroner of David’s descendant Zedekiah, who was given another vision interpreted by Daniel as relating to divinely appointed kingship. The symbolic vision was of an immense tree; an angel from heaven commanded that it be chopped down. Its stump was then banded with iron and copper and had to stay that way among the grass of the field until “seven times” passed over it. “Let its heart be changed from that of mankind, and let the heart of a beast be given to it, and let seven times pass over it . . . to the intent that people living may know that the Most High is Ruler in the kingdom of mankind and that to the one whom he wants to, he gives it and he sets up over it even the lowliest one of mankind.”—Da 4:10-17; see 4:16, ftn.

Related to “appointed times of the nations.” The vision definitely had a fulfillment in Nebuchadnezzar himself. (See Da 4:31-35.) Therefore, some view it as having direct prophetic application only to him and see in this vision merely the presentation of the eternal verity of ‘God’s supremacy over all other powers—human or supposedly divine.’ They acknowledge the application of that truth or principle beyond Nebuchadnezzar’s own case but do not see it as relating to any specific time period or divine schedule. Yet, an examination of the entire book of Daniel reveals that the element of time is everywhere prominent in the visions and prophecies it presents; and the world powers and events described in each such vision are shown, not as isolated or as occurring at random with the time element left ambiguous, but, rather, as fitting into a historical setting or time sequence. (Compare Da 2:36-45; 7:3-12, 17-26; 8:3-14, 20-25; 9:2, 24-27; 11:2-45; 12:7-13.) Additionally, the book repeatedly points toward the conclusion that forms the theme of its prophecies: the establishment of a universal and eternal Kingdom of God exercised through the rulership of the “son of man.” (Da 2:35, 44, 45; 4:17, 25, 32; 7:9-14, 18, 22, 27; 12:1) The book is also distinctive in the Hebrew Scriptures for its references to “the time of the end.”—Da 8:19; 11:35, 40; 12:4, 9.

In view of the above, it does not seem logical to evaluate the vision of the symbolic “tree” and its reference to “seven times” as having no other application than to the seven years of madness and subsequent recovery and return to power experienced by one Babylonian ruler, particularly so in the light of Jesus’ own prophetic reference to “the appointed times of the nations.” The time at which the vision was given: at the critical point in history when God, the Universal Sovereign, had allowed the very kingdom that he had established among his covenant people to be overthrown; the person to whom the vision was revealed: the very ruler who served as the divine instrument in such overthrow and who thereby became the recipient of world domination by divine permission, that is, without interference by any representative kingdom of Jehovah God; and the whole theme of the vision, namely: “that people living may know that the Most High is Ruler in the kingdom of mankind and that to the one whom he wants to, he gives it and he sets up over it even the lowliest one of mankind” (Da 4:17)—all of this gives strong reason for believing that the lengthy vision and its interpretation were included in the book of Daniel because of their revealing the duration of “the appointed times of the nations” and the time for the establishment of God’s Kingdom by his Christ.

The tree symbolism and God’s sovereignty. The symbolisms used in this prophetic vision are by no means unique. Trees are elsewhere used to represent ruling powers, including that of God’s typical kingdom at Jerusalem. (Compare Jg 9:6-15; Eze 17:1-24; 31:2-18.) A stump’s being caused to sprout and the symbol of “a twig” or “sprout” are found a number of times as representing the renewal of rulership in a certain stock or line, particularly in the Messianic prophecies. (Isa 10:33–11:10; 53:2-7; Jer 23:5; Eze 17:22-24; Zec 6:12, 13; compare Job 14:7-9.) Jesus spoke of himself as both “the root and the offspring of David.”—Re 5:5; 22:16.

The fact is evident that the key point of the vision is Jehovah God’s exercise of irresistible sovereignty in “the kingdom of mankind,” and this provides the guide to the full meaning of the vision. The tree is shown to have an application to Nebuchadnezzar, who at that point in history was the head of the dominant World Power, Babylon. Yet, prior to Nebuchadnezzar’s conquest of Jerusalem, the typical kingdom of God ruling out of that city was the agency by which Jehovah expressed his rightful sovereignty toward the earth. It thus constituted a divine block or impediment for Nebuchadnezzar in attaining his goal of world domination. By allowing that typical kingdom at Jerusalem to be overthrown, Jehovah permitted his own visible expression of sovereignty through the Davidic dynasty of kings to be cut down. The expression and exercise of world domination in “the kingdom of mankind,” unhindered by any representative kingdom of God, now passed into the hands of the Gentile nations. (La 1:5; 2:2, 16, 17) In the light of these facts “the tree” is seen to represent, beyond and above its application to Nebuchadnezzar, world sovereignty or domination by God’s arrangement.

Renewal of world domination. God, however, here makes clear that he has not forever delivered up such world domination to the Gentile powers. The vision shows that God’s self-restraint (represented by the bands of iron and of copper around the stump of the tree) would continue until “seven times pass over it.” (Da 4:16, 23, 25) Then, since “the Most High is Ruler in the kingdom of mankind,” God would give world domination “to the one whom he wants to.” (Da 4:17) The prophetic book of Daniel itself shows that one to be the “son of man” to whom are given “rulership and dignity and kingdom, that the peoples, national groups and languages should all serve even him.” (Da 7:13, 14) Jesus’ own prophecy, in which the reference to “the appointed times of the nations” occurs, points definitely toward Christ Jesus’ exercise of such world domination as God’s chosen King, the heir of the Davidic dynasty. (Mt 24:30, 31; Lu 21:27-31, 36) Thus, the symbolic stump, representing God’s retention of the sovereign right to exercise world domination in “the kingdom of mankind,” was due to sprout again in his Son’s Kingdom.—Ps 89:27, 35-37.

Seven Symbolic Times. In Nebuchadnezzar’s personal experience of the vision’s fulfillment the “seven times” were evidently seven years, during which he became mad, with symptoms like those of lycanthropy, abandoning his throne to eat grass like a beast in the field. (Da 4:31-36) Notably, the Biblical description of the exercise of world domination by the Gentile powers is presented through the figure of beasts in opposition to the holy people of God and their “Prince of princes.” (Compare Da 7:2-8, 12, 17-26; 8:3-12, 20-25; Re 11:7; 13:1-11; 17:7-14.) Concerning the word “times” (from Aramaic ʽid·danʹ), as used in Daniel’s prophecy, lexicographers show it here to mean “years.” (See Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libros, by L. Koehler and W. Baumgartner, Leiden, 1958, p. 1106; A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, by Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 1980, p. 1105; Lexicon Linguae Aramaicae Veteris Testamenti, edited by E. Vogt, Rome, 1971, p. 124.) The duration of a year as so used is indicated to be 360 days, inasmuch as three and a half times are shown to equal “a thousand two hundred and sixty days” at Revelation 12:6, 14. (Compare also Re 11:2, 3.) “Seven times,” according to this count, would equal 2,520 days. That a specific number of days may be used in the Bible record to represent prophetically an equivalent number of years can be seen by reading the accounts at Numbers 14:34 and Ezekiel 4:6. Only by applying the formula there expressed of “a day for a year” to the “seven times” of this prophecy can the vision of Daniel chapter 4 have significant fulfillment beyond the day of now extinct Nebuchadnezzar, as the evidence thus far presented gives reason to expect. They therefore represent 2,520 years.

It is a historical fact worth noting that, on the basis of the points and evidence above presented, the March 1880 edition of the Watch Tower magazine identified the year 1914 as the time for the close of “the appointed times of the nations” (and the end of the lease of power granted the Gentile rulers). This was some 34 years before the arrival of that year and the momentous events it initiated. In the August 30, 1914, edition of The World, a leading New York newspaper at that time, a feature article in the paper’s Sunday magazine section commented on this as follows: “The terrific war outbreak in Europe has fulfilled an extraordinary prophecy. For a quarter of a century past, through preachers and through press, the ‘International Bible Students’ . . . have been proclaiming to the world that the Day of Wrath prophesied in the Bible would dawn in 1914.”


The events that took place from and after the year 1914 C.E. are well-known history to all, beginning with the great war that erupted, the first world war in mankind’s history and the first to be fought over the issue, not of the domination of Europe alone, nor of Africa, nor of Asia, but of the domination of the world.—Lu 21:7-24, 29-33; Re 11:15-18;

Matter over mind? II

Dennett on Competence without Comprehension
William A. Dembski June 28, 2012 2:10 PM

Daniel Dennett has published a piece in the Atlantic focused on Alan Turing's contribution to computer science, a contribution that Dennett treats as proof that a reductionist, materialist understanding of life and cognition is well in hand. He closes his piece with the extraordinary claim,

If the history of resistance to Darwinian thinking is a good measure, we can expect that long into the future, long after every triumph of human thought has been matched or surpassed by "mere machines," there will still be thinkers who insist that the human mind works in mysterious ways that no science can comprehend.
This inflated claim forms the logical conclusion of Dennett's essay, so let's begin by examining how he got there.
Dennett's watchword throughout his essay is that competence can be achieved without comprehension. Dennett here uses competence in the functionalist sense of a system achieving a level of performance that in human contexts would be ascribed to comprehension (i.e., intelligence). Accordingly, as an atheistic materialist, he sees life as emerging by an evolutionary process that did not comprehend what it was doing and likewise he regards cognition as emerging from computational modules that know nothing about their interaction or purpose.

Dennett's target throughout his essay is intelligent design, which he disparages as "the trickle-down theory of intelligence." According to him, this theory mistakenly holds that things exhibiting competence (such as life and cognition) do so because they are the product of comprehension (aka intention, purpose, intelligence). Dennett needs to reverse this order, making comprehension a product of mindless material forces and thus placing comprehension logically downstream from competence. (For him, the world does not begin with mind; mind is something that emerges out of it via a mindless process.)

At such a general level of description, there's nothing new or surprising here. Atheistic materialism admits a very limited set of answers to how life and cognition could have emerged and may properly be explained. Where this position becomes interesting, if at all, is in the precise character of its proposals. The devil, as always, is in the details. Dennett claims to fill in these details with the results of modern science. But, in fact, the science that he cites cannot do the heavy lifting that he demands of it.

Dennett thinks that Alan Turing provides support for his brand of atheism. Turing himself was an atheist, though Dennett makes nothing of this, turning instead to Turing's work. In 1936 Turing proposed a universal mechanism for performing any and all computations, since dubbed a Turing machine. In the last seventy-plus years, many other formal systems have been proposed for performing any and all computations (cellular automata, neural nets, unlimited register machines, etc.), and they've all been shown to perform the same -- no less and no more -- computations as Turing's originally proposed machine.

Now at first blush one would think that because Turing had "invented" a "machine," this might give even Dennett pause and lead him to take a second look at his claim that competence precedes comprehension. For any competence exhibited by a Turing machine would, on its face, presuppose comprehension by, in this case, a mathematician named Turing, who understood the nature of computability and invented a machine (albeit an abstract one) that could perform any and all computations. And one would be wrong -- atheists like Dennett have a knack for turning even the most damning evidence against their position into decisive confirmation of it. A failed Wall Street banker following his example would look not merely for a government bailout but would insist on taking over both the Fed and Treasury.

It's important here to distinguish the implications that Dennett draws from Turing's work from the actual substance of that work. According to Dennett, "Alan Turing created a new world of science and technology, setting the stage for solving one of the most baffling puzzles remaining to science, the mind-body problem." Okay, that's the implication, and the solution that Dennett envisions is one that reduces mind to computation. He continues to be an advocate of what has come to be known as "strong artificial intelligence," and it's the case that Turing held to this position as well.

What about the actual substance of Turing's work? Dennett quotes Turing's famous 1936 paper on computability: "It is possible to invent a single machine which can be used to compute any computable sequence." Dennett elaborates:

Turing didn't just intuit that this remarkable feat was possible; he showed exactly how to make such a machine. With that demonstration the computer age was born. It is important to remember that there were entities called computers before Turing came up with his idea, but they were people, clerical workers with enough mathematical skill, patience, and pride in their work to generate reliable results of hours and hours of computation, day in and day out.
Dennett's account of Turing's work misrepresents the reality at a number of levels. Dennett gets the history wrong: Turing was not the first to invent a general system of computation. Turing's advisor at Princeton, Alonzo Church, had in 1932 published a paper in which he introduced the lambda calculus, which proved to be logically equivalent to a Turing machine. And a hundred years earlier, Charles Babbage had invented an analytical engine (first described in 1837, though never implemented because of technological and cost constraints) that was also logically equivalent to the Turing machine.
Nor is it the case that prior to Turing, computers were people. Granted, Babbage's difference and analytical engines were never built. But abacuses have been around for a long time. Blaise Pascal invented a mechanical calculator in 1642. Commercially successful mechanical calculators were available by the 1850s (cf. Thomas de Colmar's arithmometer). In addition, people have for long envisioned computational devices capable of performing the tasks performed by people. Automated chess playing programs were envisioned during the Enlightenment. Mathematician and philosopher Gottfried Leibniz (co-inventor with Isaac Newton of the calculus) in the 1600s outlined an Ars Combinatoria, which took inspiration from the 13th-century philosopher and logician Raymond Lully, who had proposed an Ars Generalis Ultima, a general method (or machine, as Dennett might call it) for resolving all important questions. All of these computational forerunners of Turing, by the way, were Christians and didn't see computation as somehow posing a challenge to human exceptionalism or inviting a reduction of the human mind to computation.

Dennett's problems with portraying Turing's work (to say nothing of the implications he draws from that work) don't just end with history. He also misrepresents the nature of computation. It helps, in his misrepresentation, that Dennett never explains what computation actually is, so let me lay it out here. At the heart of computation is the idea of an algorithm. An algorithm is a finite, step-by-step procedure that at each step tells you precisely what to do and what step to take next. Take, for instance, the algorithm you learned in grade school for doing long division. Given a number that needs to be divided by another, this algorithm gives a finite sequence of steps for determining the quotient and the remainder. If you are given a problem, it is computable provided you can find an algorithm that resolves it. As it turns out, there are problems in mathematics that can be proved to be beyond resolution by any algorithm (e.g., the halting problem).

How, then, does Dennett misrepresent Turing's actual work? Turing proposed a machine that can be used to perform any computation. According to Dennett, Turing

showed exactly how to make such a machine ... The Pre-Turing world was one in which computers were people, who had to understand mathematics in order to do their jobs. Turing realized that this was just not necessary: you could take the tasks they performed and squeeze out the last tiny smidgens of understanding, leaving nothing but brute, mechanical actions.
The reason I say Dennett has misrepresented the substance of Turing's work is that he gives the impression that the Turing machine renders people unnecessary to the task of computation. But nothing could be further from the truth. The Turing machine, as characterized in 1936 by Alan Turing, was a general computational framework in which any particular computation could be realized. Yet to resolve any particular computational problem requires programming a Turing machine to solve it.
It is convenient for Dennett that just as he didn't define computation, he also didn't define a Turing machine, so let me define it briefly. Something is a Turing machine if it has a "tape" that extends infinitely in both directions, with the tape subdivided into identical adjacent squares, each of which can have written on it one of a finite alphabet of symbols (usually just zero and one). In addition, a Turing machine has a "tape head," that can move to the left or right on the tape and erase and rewrite the symbol that's on a current square. Finally, what guides the tape head is a finite set of "states" that, given one state, looks at the current symbol, keeps or changes it, moves the tape head right or left, and then, on the basis of the symbol that was there, makes active another state. In modern terms, the states constitute the program and the symbols on the tape constitute data.

From this it's obvious that a Turing machine can do nothing unless it is properly programmed to do so. Nor does it help to invoke a universal Turing machine. Basically, what a universal Turing machine does is cash in on the equivalence between programs and data, and allow a very simple fixed set of states to be used to perform any computation whatsoever provided that the initial data on the tape is suitably programmed to resolve the computation. Universal Turing machines can be quite simple. In the 1960s, MIT's Marvin Minsky came up with a 7-state, 4-symbol Turing Machine. Steve Wolfram currently touts a 2-state, 3-symbol Turing machine as the simplest.

How could universal Turing machines be so simple and still be universal in the sense of being able to solve any computational problem? It's because universal machines are not programmed to solve any problem in particular. You just have to load the program on the tape. A universal Turing machine reads through the tape, interpreting the data as a program, and then executing the steps of the program. Essentially, all a universal Turing machine does is: read instruction, execute it, read instruction, execute it, read instruction, execute it, etc. The challenge is to have the right set of instructions to execute. This is an inconvenient point that Dennett, in the interest of pushing his agenda, understandably wants to ignore.

I need here to say something about the concept of a material mechanism, which figures so prominently in Dennett's essay. Darwinian natural selection acting on random variations is, for Dennett, a material mechanism. Likewise, a Turing machine is for him a material mechanism. But there is an ambiguity in his use of the term mechanism that bears scrutiny, and which Michael Polanyi, writing specifically in reference to biology, clarified back in the 1960s:

Up to this day one speaks of the mechanistic conception of life both to designate an explanation of life in terms of physics and chemistry, and an explanation of living functions as machineries -- though the latter excludes the former. The term "mechanistic" is in fact so well established for referring to these two mutually exclusive conceptions, that I am at a loss to find two different words that will distinguish between them.
For Polanyi mechanisms, conceived as causal processes operating in nature, could not account for the origin of mechanisms, conceived as "machines or machinelike features of organisms." (See his article "Life Transcending Physics and Chemistry" in the August 1967 issue of Chemical and Engineering News.)
Dennett conveniently conflates these two uses of mechanism. Once a Turing machine is properly programmed, it will produce the solution to any computational problem. But humans -- read "intelligent designers" -- invariably do the programming. Turing, far from having obviated the "trickle-down theory of intelligence," actually underscores its preeminent role in the field of computation.

A running theme in Dennett's article is how Turing's achievement for computation parallels Darwin's for evolutionary biology. Turing supposedly gives us a mechanism that shows how mind may be reduced to computational processes. Likewise Darwin supposedly gives us a mechanism that shows how life may be reduced to evolutionary processes. Interestingly, just as his reduction of mind to computation fails (Dennett's reductionism fails to factor in the programmer), so does his reduction of life to purposeless evolutionary processes. The best evidence these days suggests that evolution, insofar as it operates at all, is teleological.

Here I need not refer solely to the ID literature. Molecular biologist James Shapiro sees evolution as proceeding not by natural selection but by natural genetic engineering, in which organisms guide their own evolution (see his book Evolution: A View from the 21st Century as well as his exchange with me here at ENV). Moreover, recent work at the Evolutionary Informatics Lab (see the publications page at www.evoinfo.org, especially the article "Life's Conservation Law") shows that Darwinian processes, if they are going to accomplish anything of consequence for the evolution of life, need to be "programmed" with an appropriate fitness landscape that is far from self-explanatory and, in fact, demonstrates that Darwinian processes are themselves deeply teleological (despite constant advertisements to the contrary by thinkers such as Dennett and Dawkins).

So what are we to make of Dennett's conclusion to his essay?

If the history of resistance to Darwinian thinking is a good measure, we can expect that long into the future, long after every triumph of human thought has been matched or surpassed by "mere machines," there will still be thinkers who insist that the human mind works in mysterious ways that no science can comprehend.
Dennett makes up in bluster what he lacks in evidence. Resistance to Darwinian thinking is on the rise because our best science is demonstrating its inadequacies. And the claim that the human mind is about to be equaled or surpassed by machines remains the stuff of science fiction (chess and jeopardy playing programs notwithstanding).
But I would close this response to Dennett with a question. Throughout his essay, he tries to minimize comprehension at the expense of competence. And yet the very last word of his essay is the word "comprehend." In his concluding sentence, he faults those, like me, who would question that science can comprehend the way the mind works (with science here conceived as a reductionist science that reduces everything ultimately to the interaction of material forces). But according to Dennett, the mind doesn't work by comprehending things, at least not really. It works simply by running various computational modules. Comprehension or understanding by humans is, as he puts it, just sorta comprehension or sorta understanding.


So my question for Dennett is this: In precisely what sense does he comprehend what he wrote in his essay and how does that comprehension justify his sneering contempt for those who disagree with him on his biological and computational reductionism?

Going off the deep end.

1Corithians3:19NIV "For the wisdom of this world is foolishness ..."


Truth Confronts Error

October 23, 2015 Posted by Barry Arrington under Intelligent Design

Today I ran across one of my favorite Francis Schaeffer aphorisms: “Truth demands confrontation”

I was thinking about this later today when I read that Caitlyn Jenner has been proclaimed “woman of the year” by Glamour magazine.

Now Bruce Jenner can certainly change his name to Caitlyn Jenner.  But he cannot change himself into a woman.  He can no more be woman of the year than my left shoe can.

Well, that’s just narrow minded and bigoted, Barry.  Nope.  If you say 2+2=5,203, you have erred.  And when I say “Nope, it’s 4,” I am confronting your error with the truth, but I am not being narrow minded and bigoted.  No matter how much you sincerely wish that 2+2 equaled 5,203, it does not and it never will.  I do you no favors by allowing you to pretend error is truth.

No matter how much Caitlyn Jenner believes he is a woman, he is not.  Which reminds me of another useful aphorism, this one from George Orwell:  “We have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the obvious is the first duty of intelligent men.”

UPDATE:

Seversky writes in the comments below, what’s wrong with all of this if it makes Jenner happy?

And WJM has an apt reply:

The issue that Mr. Arrington brought up was not about Jenner calling himself a woman, but that Glamour magazine (and other progressive outlets) glamourizes, validates and entrenches this falsehood to the point where it is considered bigotry to point out the lie and assert the truth.  Is it your opinion that we must all abide lies people tell because those lies make them happy?

To WJM’s word I would add that of Alexander Solzhenitsyn in his earth-shattering 1974 article (written on the eve of his arrest), Live Not By Lies:

And the simplest and most accessible key to our self-neglected liberation lies right here: Personal non-participation in lies. Though lies conceal everything, though lies embrace everything, we will be obstinate in this smallest of matters: Let them embrace everything, but not with any help from me . . . It’s dangerous.* But let us refuse to say that which we do not think . . . Our path is not to give conscious support to lies about anything whatsoever!

And this, I think, would be Solzhenitsyn’s special reply to Seversky:

And he who is not sufficiently courageous even to defend his soul — don’t let him be proud of his “progressive” views, and don’t let him boast that he is an academician or a people’s artist, a merited figure, or a general — let him say to himself: I am in the herd, and a coward. It’s all the same to me as long as I’m fed and warm.

Refuse to live the collective lie Solzhenitsyn says, for tyranny depends for its very existence on a people willing to bow down before falsehood for fear of the consequences of dissent.  For freedom to exist truth must confront error and face it down.  The danger of failing to do so is that we become a people conditioned to servitude to the lies of tyrants.  And if we do fail to confront the lies with truth?  Solzhenitsyn again:

And if we get cold feet, even taking this step, then we are worthless and hopeless, and the scorn of Pushkin should be directed to us:

“Why should cattle have the gifts of freedom?


“Their heritage from generation to generation is the belled yoke and the lash.”

Pleading with the stormwind.

Time to back away from the abyss?

Cow Cloning Disaster Is a Warning Against Human Cloning
Wesley J. Smith October 24, 2015 4:29 AM

Dolly the sheep was manufactured in 1996 to open the way for cloned "transgenic" animal herds -- that is, cloned sheep containing a few human genes so they exude useful medical substances in their milk.

Dolly died young, perhaps because she was cloned. But the approach continued.

Now, in New Zealand, the manufacture of cloned transgenic cows has proved a disaster. From the Radio New Zealand story:

[The study] authored by Claire Bleakley, president of GE Free New Zealand, who told Morning Report that the animals were suffering inordinately from chronic illness, unexplained deaths and severe deformities as a result of the foreign DNA inserted into the embryos...

Of the 60 cows, 14 are still alive. GE Free said the deformities have included animals born with no bladder, club feet and fused necks, many of whom lived for only a few hours.

The group said it got the details through Official Information Act requests to AgResearch and from the Crown institute's own reports.

Dr David Wells, a principal scientist in the reproductive team at AgResearch, said that there were issues, but that the work was promising. "We acknowledged that there are animal welfare concerns with the current technology -- rather the methods we've used to generate those embryos. Many of the deformities that have incurred [are due to] incorrect programming. "Through cloning, they are occurring at a higher incidence," he told Morning Report.

The (often, but not always) bad results with animal cloning and transgenic methods raise very important questions of animal welfare. The need for manufacturing these animals would not seem to justify the suffering apparently being caused.

But the transgenic cow cloning disaster is also a warning to not clone human beings -- which hasn't yet advanced beyond the manufacture of a few early embryos. The time to outlaw human cloning is now. It is wrong to make human life through manufacturing means.

As for the need for research: Scientists have discovered ethical ways for obtaining person-specific, tailor-made pluripotent stem cells that can be used in experiments and in creating organ tissues for important uses like drug testing -- making the once-touted "need" for therapeutic cloning (as it is sometimes called) less than acute.


If we don't stop cloning now, it will eventually become more feasible, hastening the coming of Brave New World. That includes the transgenic manipulation of genomes desired by transhumanists to allow them to become "post-human."

Why the crusade of the above writer and his ilk is doomed.In a word 'Fear' the argument from fear has always been beguiling and as our civilisation becomes more materialistic/scientististic will only become more so,and it's already begun,the whispers of 'if we don't someone else will' and therefore reap the scientific/commercial/military?advantages that we forfeit.What chance does an appeal to human exceptionalism have against that.

Playing God?: Pros and Cons

On the rules of the game

Naturalism Under the Microscope
Paul Nelson April 30, 2012 4:18 PM 


Two recent lectures in Chicago highlighted the centrality of "naturalism" to the ID debate. The first, on Wednesday, April 11, by University of Minnesota philosopher of biology Alan Love, focused on methodological naturalism (MN), and asked whether -- as MN's advocates argue -- the principle is necessary for scientific practice.

The second lecture, on Friday, April 13, was given by University of Wisconsin philosopher of biology Elliott Sober. He asked if the "unguided" mutations posited by current evolutionary theory entail that God was not involved in the history of life on Earth. What follows is part 1 of a report on the main lines of argument in both lectures, concluding with some commentary in response. I'll cover Alan Love's talk today, and hope to write on Elliott Sober's, in part 2, subsequently.

Alan Love, Wheaton College, April 11: "Methodological Naturalism Reconceived (or Elided)?"

AlanLoveImage.gifMethodological naturalism (MN) -- the philosophical doctrine that scientific explanations must refer only to natural causes -- is the central and most controversial concept in all discussions of evolution, creationism, and intelligent design, Love said. MN must "wear a lot of hats," however. The principle has functioned as (1) an epistemological ground rule about scientific explanation, (2) an historical account concerning the emergence of professional science, (3) a fence demarcating science from theology and philosophy, and (4) a mediating concept facilitating dialogue between science and faith.

Yet MN, Love continued, represents "a paradox." While claimed by its advocates to be essential to science, MN is rarely mentioned by scientists themselves in their primary publications, or in philosophical analyses of particular sciences. "If you don't mention MN" as a practicing scientist, Love said, "no one notices." Furthermore, if one inspects leading philosophy of science journals, such as the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, or Philosophy of Science, one finds only a handful of references to MN, almost always in the context of the ID debate.

A "quick resolution" of the paradox, Love said, would hold either that MN is not essential to science (hence, MN doesn't show up where one might expect to see it), or, more plausibly, that MN is a tacit but nonetheless widely accepted rule, so ubiquitous that -- except for unusual contexts, such as the ID debate -- it doesn't need mentioning out loud.

But these quick resolutions don't work, said Love. Something akin to MN does appear to be central to modern science (see below), so we can't just wave MN off as irrelevant. On the other hand, it would be exceedingly odd if MN, claimed to be a central principle of scientific method, could function wholly out of sight, as a "subterranean" rule. How does an entirely tacit rule differ from no rule at all?

Getting Past the MN Paradox

The resolution of the paradox, Love argued, begins with realizing that MN is not a "global" ground rule demarcating science from other disciplines or practices. Such claims "are overstated," as global rules for what counts as science do not in fact exist. Scientists rarely mention MN in their publications or discussions, because their concerns are actually much more "local," turning on matters specific to, or arising within, particular sciences. Taking his lead from University of Pittsburgh philosopher of science John Norton's 2003 paper, "A Material Theory of Induction," Love suggested that trying for universally valid accounts of scientific inference, and rules like MN to demarcate such inferences, are enterprises doomed to frustration. (See also Norton's 2010 development of his critique of universal theories of induction.) Rather, material inferences in any science "are licensed by their empirical content," and this is a matter of degree, because content varies, and is not an all-or-nothing proposition.

Thus, Love said, if one is looking for something playing the role of MN in any particular science, one should focus on what he called "material inferential capacities," abbreviated as MICs. MICs, rather than general formulae about induction (e.g., the so-called "scientific method"), are what scientists learn in their training, actually employ in explanation, and recognize as grounding legitimate inferences. Viewing scientific practice "close up," rather than from the abstract distance of MN "at 30,000 feet," reveals the role of discipline-specific MICs, where scientists "learn by doing" in "particular communities." These are the tools (and rules) that scientists actually recognize as relevant, and thus MICs are highly localized, not global, in form and content.

While this "local MIC" perspective surrenders any global rule of MN, Love said, it nevertheless "offers no solace to ID proponents." The latter, he said, fail to "recognize the relevant MICs of evolutionary biology," and therefore their criticisms of evolutionary theory are seen by most biologists as wrong or missing the point. The "increased precision" afforded by the MIC perspective "makes sense of scientific practice" in a way that MN does not, and moreover "circumvents worries that global MN pre-stipulates" the shape of reality.

Paul's Response: The Whole Point of MN Is to Be an All-Purpose Defeater (Global Rule of Science)

Material inferential capacities (MICs) make perfect sense to me, as descriptions of the actual content of any particular (or special) science. Learn a science, and one learns a set of specific MICs -- not "the scientific method," or the rules of science, or some other collection of abstract formulae governing proper induction.

But what MICs cannot do, in principle, is the exclusionary work of methodological naturalism (MN). That is precisely what the defenders of MN, however, intend for the principle to do: keep the bad guys, and their ideas, out of science, come what may. MN is not a neutral canon of method, which makes no claims about the true state of the world, but allows the evidence to speak for, or against, such possibilities as intelligent design. Rather, MN -- if it is going to play the role of the "fence" or "ground rule" its advocates (e.g., Pennock 2011) desire -- must make global claims about the shape of reality. This is the way the universe is; therefore, science must follow.

And MN does just that. Here's how Pennock (2011, 184) expresses the principle:

MN holds that as a principle of research we should regard the universe as a structured place that is ordered by uniform natural processes, and that scientists may not appeal to miracles or other supernatural interventions that break this presumed order.
Now, Pennock himself is quite certain that the universe indeed exists as MN describes it -- "a structured place ordered by uniform natural processes" -- so science can hardly go wrong by following MN. But, for any curious person who wonders if the universe should have a chance to speak for itself, before principles like MN exclude empirical possibilities a priori, MN can only block open inquiry. What if "uniform natural processes" did not actually cause (for instance) the origin of life? Could we discover that to be the case, if we assume MN?

Because Love's MIC perspective surrenders the global scope of MN, which is necessary to MN's role as a philosophical fence, it will allow all sorts of questions and possibilities that MN would automatically exclude. Nothing in the content of any science -- no actual MIC -- tells the investigator that the content is complete or sufficient, or what that science may stumble upon tomorrow. So, if someone asked, "Hey, in the light of these new data, may I try the idea of intelligent design?" no MIC could rule against that investigator. MICs are always based on what a science has done in its past, not what the science may try in the future.

Pennock's formulation of MN, by contrast, defines the shape of empirical reality: uniform natural processes. As such, his version of MN really does rule out ID, which of course explains why the ACLU used it at the Dover trial. Love doesn't want to legislate reality by global stipulations, but in surrendering that goal, he gives up the very reason Pennock and others push MN. In opting for the descriptive accuracy of MICs, Love yields the proscriptive role of MN that Pennock and others want.

Conclusion

Most defenders of MN say the principle is modest and neutral, shying away from the universal assertions of philosophical naturalism (PN). But is that true? A few years ago (2006, p. 344), Marcus Ross and I wrote the following:

Ask oneself a simple question. Suppose life actually were designed by a nonhuman intelligence -- would MN allow us to discover that? If the answer is no, then MN hinders scientific discovery and dictates the shape of reality as thoroughly as PN. If the answer is yes, then MN is superfluous and says nothing more than science should be empirical and testable.
MN is a rule without a decent justification. Love knows that, I think, but his MIC perspective, while illuminating, cannot take the place of MN. And thank goodness for that.

References

Pennock, Robert. 2011. Can't philosophers tell the difference between science and religion?: Demarcation revisited. Synthese 178:177-206


Ross, Marcus and Nelson, Paul. 2006. A Taxonomy of Teleology. In W. Dembski, ed., Darwin's Nemesis (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press)