On Christendom's messiah complex.

 The Lord JEHOVAH has raised up but one savior i.e the Lord Jesus Christ. He is the savior not of the present civilization or any nation thereof ,but of repentant individuals.

Acts4:12BSB"Salvation exists in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given to men by which we must be saved.”

There is no obligation/expectation placed upon Christians to attempt redeem the present civilization or any part thereof

John15:18,19KJV"“If the world hates you, keep in mind that it hated me first. 19If you belonged to the world, it would love you as its own. As it is, you do not belong to the world, but I have chosen you out of the world. That is why the world hates you. "

Our Lord could not save even his own nation from the judgement of his God and Father despite his powerful testimony.

John1:11KJV"He came unto his own, and his own received him not."

That is why the political meddling of Post Millennialists in the affairs of unbelievers is doomed to backfire.

1Peter4:15ASV"For let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or an evil-doer, or as a MEDDLER IN OTHER MEN'S MATTERS: 16but if a man suffer as a Christian, let him not be ashamed; but let him glorify God in this name."

Those who suffer on account of interfering in the personal decisions of others are not suffering for the sake of Christ and his God and ought not to expect their help unless they repent from this antiChristian conduct.

Revelation17:15-17ASV"And he saith unto me, The waters which thou sawest, where the harlot sitteth, are peoples, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues. 16And the ten horns which thou sawest, and the beast, these shall hate the harlot, and shall make her desolate and naked, and shall eat her flesh, and shall burn her utterly with fire. 17For God did put in their hearts to do his mind, and to come to one mind, and to give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God should be accomplished. "

A warning from the Lord JEHOVAH through his apostle Jesus Christ of what is going to be the result of not only Christendom's political meddling but all political theists.

Darwinism as secular creation myth.

 Darwin’s Goddess: Natural Selection as “Divine Surrogate”

Neil Thomas

On the face of it, Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species might seem to be an unlikely quarry for the attentions of literary critics. Its author with his habitual honesty was commendably frank about his linguistic infelicities and the multiple difficulties he and wife Emma had to face in order to knock the unwieldy volume into publishable shape. There must even have been some doubt whether the book would have appeared at all by late 1859 had it not been for the help provided not only by his unstinting wife but by Emma’s friend, Georgina Tollet, both of whom found their work cut out for them to ensure that spelling, grammar, and overall comprehensibility all passed muster.

At a time when professional proof-readers were not routinely employed by publishing houses, vetting and editing prior to publication was typically done by wives, sisters, daughters, and nieces, so that Janet Browne could once observe that “the Origin of Species was much more of a collaborative effort than has ever been suspected.”1 This is not of course to say that the Origin should not be studied in depth or indeed analyzed in terms of its literary merits. Copy-editing as an ancillary back-up service is one thing but writing itself quite another. The eminent historian of ideas Basil Willey once remarked that Darwin was “possessed” by the mysteries of evolution and something of the wonder Darwin felt when presenting his findings and expounding his ideas can be caught in a host of metaphors and rhetorical purple passages, many of which also suggest some rather arresting subtextual meanings. Those latent implications are what I wish to foreground here. 

The Origin of Species as Literature

There may well be differing opinions about the overall writing quality of the Origin but literary specialist Gillian Beer once made the surely uncontroversial point that any important text is best submitted to close reading (rather than remaining something people know a smattering about from others’ summaries of it). She wrote, “One’s relationship to ideas depends significantly on whether one has read the works which formulate them. Ideas pass more rapidly into the state of assumptions when they are unread. Reading is an essentially question-raising procedure.”2 Beer’s recommendation of best practice here was enthusiastically taken up in a more recent volume by critic George Levine in which, although he tends sometimes to overdo the ascription of literary virtuosity to Darwin’s generally unadorned writing style,3 nevertheless has some interesting insights into Darwinian conceptions springing from his vigilant response to the author’s verbal and stylistic choices. Levine fully concurs with Beer that “coming to terms with what Darwin really said entails coming to terms with the way he developed his ideas and the language he found to express them.”4 In that regard Levine’s discussion of Darwin’s central metaphor, natural selection, is particularly fruitful. 

Thinking in Metaphors

When questioned by colleagues Darwin was sometimes inclined to dispute or pooh-pooh the implications of his own metaphors, but Levine’s precise analysis of the verbal texture of Darwin’s argument disallows such evasions. Metaphors are not to be “skimmed off” for they play an important role in conveying the totality of the message any given author wishes to convey. The late Stephen Jay Gould (no mean English stylist in his own right) once observed that “our mind works largely by metaphor and comparison, not always (or often) by relentless logic.”5

Prior to Darwin, breeders had used the term “natural selection” to refer to the wholly inscrutable and unpredictable ways in which nature worked, processes into which breeders had no insight and over which they would readily admit they had no control. Darwin told his friends and colleagues that he had chosen to give a new spin to the old term because he saw a close analogy between what he imagined to be nature’s selective processes and those of domestic breeding. This was, however, anything but a matter of giving a small semantic tweak to the traditional phrase since he was in reality turning the traditional meaning of natural selection on its head. According to Darwin it was after allpossible to gain insight into nature’s ways — pace generations of breeders and agriculturalists. His closest peers, on the other hand, still professed themselves unable to construe nature’s operations so easily and continued to view natural processes as very largely opaque and unintelligible. Eventually Darwin came to be persuaded by Alfred Russel Wallace and others that natural preservation might be a more accurate term to use since artificial and natural breeding were simply not comparable. Wallace had pointed out that nature simply does not select in a way comparable to the intelligent methods employed by livestock breeders so much as passively “allow” the unfit to wither on the vine.

A Benign Effect

Darwin’s albeit tardy acquiescence in the formulation “natural preservation” nevertheless had a benign effect rhetorically since it facilitated a partial reframing and modification of his conception of nature to direct attention now to nature’s role not as an exterminator but as a nurturing facilitator of those forms of life which had any chance at all of surviving — which were “worth saving,” so to speak. Underscoring this positive function of nature’s ways had the welcome effect of making the central metaphor of Origin more maternal than military, the emphasis falling now on fostering rather than culling. Hence, we encounter Darwinian locutions such as natural selection “tending” to “her” innumerable charges, or, referencing one of Darwin’s more purple passages, “daily and hourly scrutinizing” (as one does with human babies and the young in general) in order to foster healthy developmental outcomes in the human and animal world. 

For these reasons it is tempting to side with Levine in his somewhat startling contention that Darwin in the back of his mind conceived of natural selection not as an indifferent process — what Daniel Dennett has reductively termed an algorithm — but as “a woman, perhaps a goddess”6 whose operations have every appearance of working teleologically. Her sway seems in fact to be so positive, even providential, that Robert J. Richards was once moved to term Darwin’s conception of natural selection a form of “divine surrogate.”7 In fact, when parsed carefully, the lexical and metaphorical structure of Darwin’s argumentation emerges as little less than a periphrastic description of the goddess Natura (or Gaia) newly rehabilitated for the second half of the 19th century in a manner reassuringly replete with the latest scientific terminology. Given such a veiled subtext, it is no wonder that Darwin held out so long against Wallace’s argument that natural selection and human breeding methods were about as comparable as chalk and cheese. For the metaphorical and not fully acknowledged subtext of his presentation of natural selection (never spelled out in express terms) is that “she” came close in his mind to becoming a de facto goddess. This would explain his enormous faith in what he hinted were the essentially directive powers of a process which others could see only as being imponderable. I will say more on this tomorrow.

Next, “Nature Divinized: Darwin’s Goddess for All Seasons.”

Notes

Charles Darwin: The Power of Place, Volume 2 of a Biography (London: Pimlico, 2002), p. 77.

Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-century Fiction (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 6.

Although Levine does make the fair point that Darwin “had no pretensions to high literary style and no concern to produce a book that would be beautiful or moving — as, in fact, it sometimes is. He might even have been alarmed if he were to have found himself in this book juxtaposed to Dickens and George Eliot instead of to Cuvier, say, or Lyell.” Darwin the Writer (Oxford: OUP, 2011), pp. 15-16.

Darwin the Writer, p. 88.

Gould, Bully for Brontosaurus (NY: Norton, 1991), p. 264; cited by Michael Ruse, The Gaia Hypothesis: Science on a Pagan Planet (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2013), p.34.

Darwin the Writer, p. 87.

The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2002), p. 537.

and still yet more on why I.D is already mainstream.

 Carl Sagan’s Love/Hate Relationship with Intelligent Design

Evolution News @DiscoveryCSC

On a new episode of ID the Future, philosopher of science Paul Nelson explores an intriguing tension in the thinking of famous scientist and science popularizer Carl Sagan concerning his agnosticism, shading into atheism on the one hand, but on the other hand his embrace of certain ideas consistent with the theory of intelligent design. As Nelson is quick to clarify, if Sagan had lived to see the rise of the contemporary intelligent design movement, he probably would have rejected it, particularly its theistic implications. And yet, Nelson says, Sagan’s thinking and arguments laid out in his Gifford lectures and in his science fiction novel Contact strongly support the idea that intelligent design can be detected.

Nelson goes further, saying that if we take the methods Sagan laid out for detecting intelligently designed radio signals from extra-terrestrial intelligence, and apply them to patterns in nature that ID theorists have pointed to (such as DNA), it’s hard not to see his methodology triggering a design inference. Tune in to hear Nelson’s reflections on this important tension in Sagan’s thinking, and what, according to Nelson, prevented Sagan from fully resolving it. Download the podcast or listen to it here.

yet more primeval tech v. Darwinism.

 Scientists Reveal Bacterial T4SS “Biogenesis Machinery”

David Coppedge

Bacteria have at least seven types of secretion systems that can inject material outside the cell. Many in the ID community have heard about the Type III Secretion System (T3SS) that some evolutionists unsuccessfully portrayed as a stepping stone to the bacterial flagellum. That turned out to be false, because it now appears that the T3SS is a descendant of the flagellum at best, and most likely an independent structure entirely. 

A number of years ago I wrote here about the Type IV Secretion System (T4SS). I reported how scientists including Gabriel Waksman from Birkbeck College and University College London were surprised to see how different it was from the T3SS. The T4SS is a large molecular machine (3 megadaltons) with 12 protein types, 92 proteins in all, arranged with multiple functional domains. Unlike some secretion systems that inject toxins into other cells, the T4SS is used by bacteria primarily for conjugation — the sharing of genetic information. The T4SS manufactures a pilus (thin, hairlike filament) through which proteins and genes can pass from one bacterium to another. 

The Return of Waksman

Now in new work by Mace et al., Waksman returns with colleagues to share their latest images of the T4SS at near-atomic resolution, using cryo-electron microscopy (see my report on “The Resolution Revolution”). The photos in Nature’s open-access paper, “Cryo-EM structure of a type IV secretion system,” are stunning. They sure look designed.

Bacterial conjugation is the fundamental process of unidirectional transfer of DNAs, often plasmid DNAs, from a donor cell to a recipient cell. It is the primary means by which antibiotic resistance genes spread among bacterial populations. In Gram-negative bacteria, conjugation is mediated by a large transport apparatus — the conjugative type IV secretion system (T4SS) — produced by the donor cell and embedded in both its outer and inner membranes. The T4SS also elaborates a long extracellular filament — the conjugative pilus — that is essential for DNA transfer. [Emphasis added.]

The T4SS, they say, “functions as a pilus biogenesis machinery,” building the conjugation tube from the base. Elements of the machine are named VirBx, numbered from 1 upwards. The central stalk in cross section has a pentameric symmetry; elements of VirB5 and VirB6 look like little stars stacked on top of each other into a stalk with a hole down the center. The pilus is constructed of VirB2 units that assemble in the inner membrane at binding sites. Then, they are “levered up” through the shaft to grow the pilus at the tip, spending ATP for energy in the process. The mechanism is somewhat reminiscent of cilium and flagellum assembly from the base to the tip, but these functional units are unique to pili.

How the Machine Works

The near-atomic images of the components allowed the authors to suggest a model of how the machine operates:

The data presented here suggest a model for pilus biogenesis by T4SS whereby five VirB2 subunits bound to five VirB6 subunits (Fig. 4f) are levered up to the assembly site, while five more are recruited to the vacated binding sites…. The previously described VirB2 dislocation function of VirB433 could comprise levering up VirB2 subunits from the recruitment site to the assembly site. The identities of the regions of VirB4 that act as a lever remain unclear. However, potential triggers may include binding of VirB1135 as well as ATP binding and/or hydrolysis. As layers of pentameric VirB2 are added, the pilus grows from the bottom, pushing the VirB5 pentamer out, passing through the arches, the I-layer (no conformational changes are needed (Extended Data Fig. 10k,l)), and finally through the O-layer channel, which is known to be flexible enough to open up(Extended Data Fig. 10k,l).

Thus, the near-atomic structure of a conjugative T4SSs presented here provides the structural basis for a plausible model for conjugative pilus biogenesis by T4SSs.

Only a Beginning

This sneak peak of how machines “capable of orchestrating pilus biogenesis” operate is only a beginning, since the authors note that the functions of several parts remain unclear. It’s clear enough, though, to arouse our wonder and awe. Could early microscopists watching pili form from one bacterium to another have ever imagined what really goes on? Literal molecular machines with moving parts like levers energized by ATP, using just-in-time assembly and quality control, are involved. That’s amazing.

The authors make a big deal about how all the parts for the machine are assembled into a working device:

This structure describes the exceptionally large protein–protein interaction network required to assemble the many components that constitute a T4SS and provides insights on the unique mechanism by which they elaborate pili.

It’s exciting to see molecular machines come into sharper focus. And the closer we look, the more elegantly engineered they appear. The authors have little to say about Darwinian evolution. They do speak of “co-evolution” of functional parts of the T4SS, but they are not referring to natural selection. Rather, they refer to how the components interact and fit together. One brief speculation about “evolutionary pressure” hardly adds to the research.

Today, bacteria evade our antibiotics by sharing resistance genes through conjugation, using their T4SS devices. The authors of the paper hope, therefore, that understanding the structural details of pili and the T4SS will help biochemists think of ways to thwart that sharing. But long before humans discovered antibiotics, bacteria were happily sharing genetic information and performing numerous beneficial roles for the biosphere (see here, here, and here). Scientists are also rapidly coming to the belief that “Horizontal Gene Transfer Happens More Often Than Anyone Thought,” as The Scientist reports.

A Machine Route from Free-Living to Parasite with T4SS

Are bad things we see the T4SS doing possibly the result of devolution? Phys.org reports on research by a team at Waginengin University in the Netherlands that might shed light on the origin of pathogenic bacteria. They speculate that pathogens emerged from free-living species when they took on a parasitic role in other microbes. If true, that would not be a case of progressive evolution, but rather of degeneration, like freeloaders taking the easy route of living off others.

The scientists examined numerous genomes of marine bacteria and found that pathogens in the Rickettsia family share many genes with marine microbes that are free-living in the ocean. Here’s where the T4SS makes a surprise appearance:

By comparing the genomes of the newly discovered species with those of previously known Rickettsiales, the team of researchers managed to reconstruct the evolution of host association and pathogenicity in the Rickettsiales. “We suggest that the free-living ancestor of Rickettsiales repurposed its needle-like type 4 secretion system to interact with and manipulate host cells,” Ettema speculates.

“Subsequently, many metabolic genes and genes affiliated with free-living lifestyle were lost as the ancestral Rickettsiales became more dependent on its host for metabolites and energy. This was then mirrored by the acquisition of genes involved in host manipulation and energy parasitism,” he adds.

Maybe some of mankind’s worst plagues “devolved” from “responsible” microbes that were free-living and doing good for the community. After all, devolution is much easier (and therefore much more likely) than progressive evolution. If a microbe already had a T4SS, it would have been a relatively simple degenerative route for it to support a freeloading lifestyle. The pathogen didn’t invent new information. It tossed genes overboard in the process of surviving, like Michael Behe suggested in one of his analogies for his book Darwin Devolves. Indeed, the research team identified a fair number of genes that the pathogens had apparently lost.

Research along these lines might start a trend away from Richard Dawkins’s world of selfish genes, where everything is only concerned about its own survival. If Michael Denton’s picture of prior fitness for complex life is followed, as he describes it most recently in The Miracle of Man, then researchers can see how some good mechanisms might have been short-circuited. Whether by entropy or accident, a few typos don’t always render a message unreadable. The message of design remains loud and clear.

On the Masoretes

 Masoretes

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article is about groups of scholars who compiled a system of pronunciation and grammatical guides of Jewish texts. For a discussion of the work of the Masoretes, see Masoretic Text. For the Israeli term for "Tradition Keeper" or "Traditionalist" non-Orthodox observance, see Shomer Masoret.

The Masoretes (Hebrew: בעלי המסורה, romanized: Ba'alei ha-Masora) were groups of Jewish scribe-scholars who worked from around the end of the 5th through 10th centuries CE,[1][2] based primarily in medieval Palestine (Jund Filastin) in the cities of Tiberias and Jerusalem, as well as in Iraq (Babylonia). Each group compiled a system of pronunciation and grammatical guides in the form of diacritical notes (niqqud) on the external form of the biblical text in an attempt to standardize the pronunciation, paragraph and verse divisions, and cantillation of the Hebrew Bible (the Tanakh) for the worldwide Jewish community.

The ben Asher family of Masoretes was largely responsible for the preservation and production of the Masoretic Text, although there existed an alternative Masoretic text of the ben Naphtali Masoretes, which has around 875 differences from the ben Asher text.[3] The halakhic authority Maimonides endorsed the ben Asher as superior, although the Egyptian Jewish scholar, Saadya Gaon al-Fayyumi, had preferred the ben Naphtali system. It has been suggested that the ben Asher family and the majority of the Masoretes were Karaites.[4] However, Geoffrey Khan believes that the ben Asher family was probably not Karaite,[5] and Aron Dotan avers that there are "decisive proofs that M. Ben-Asher was not a Karaite."[6]

The Masoretes devised the vowel notation system for Hebrew that is still widely used, as well as the trope symbols used for cantillation.

References

 Wegner, Paul (1999). The Journey From Texts to Translations. Baker Academic. p. 172. ISBN 978-0801027994.

 Swenson, Kristin (2021). A Most Peculiar Book: The Inherent Strangeness of the Bible. Oxford University Press. p. 29. ISBN 978-0-19-065173-2.

 Louis Ginzberg, Caspar Levias, Ben Naphtali, Jewish Encyclopedia

 Jewish Virtual Library: Aaron ben Moses ben Asher

 Khan, Geoffrey (2000). Early Karaite grammatical texts. Society of Biblical Literature. p. 52 ISBN 978-1589830004.

cf. Khan, Geoffrey (1990). Karaite Bible Manuscripts from the Cairo Genizah. CUP Archive. p. 20 ISBN 978-0521392273.

 Berenbaum, Michael; Skolnik, Fred, eds. (2007). "Masorah". Encyclopaedia Judaica. Vol. 3 (2nd ed.). Detroit: Macmillan Reference. p. 321. ISBN 978-0-02-866097-4. Archived from the original on 27 July 2016.

Further reading

In the Beginning: A Short History of the Hebrew Language, Chapter 5. ISBN 0-8147-3654-8

The Text of the Old Testament. ISBN 0-8028-0788-7

Introduction to the Tiberian Masorah. ISBN 0-89130-374-X

Wikisource-logo.svg Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, §2, §3

External links

"Masorah" in The Jewish Encyclopedia

The Role of the Masoretes (PDF)

"Masorah" in the Encyclopaedia Judaica

1st century Jerusalem's great tribulation.

 <iframe width="1019" height="573" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/y741QbT1YEo" title="The Siege of Jerusalem (70 AD) - The Great Jewish Revolt [FULL DOCUMENTARY]" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>

Speaking of simian language.

 Human Brain Has Many More Language Connections than Chimp Brain

Evolution News @DiscoveryCSC

In a study of brain scans from 50 humans and 29 chimpanzees, researchers discovered an interesting difference: The connections between language areas in the human brain are much larger than previously thought and quite different from those of the chimpanzee brain. That’s, of course, consistent with the relative complexity of human thought and language but the question had not really been examined before with a focus on one specific area.

The researchers were interested in a nerve tract that connects the frontal and temporal lobes of the brain, the arcuate fasciculus.

Chimpanzee brain connectivity seems to involve mainly the temporal lobe but in humans there is a connection towards the frontal and parietal lobes via the arcuate fasciculus.

“Our findings are purely anatomical, so it is hard to say anything about brain function in this context,” says [co-author Vitoria] Piai. “But the fact that this pattern of connections is so unique for us humans suggests that it may be a crucial aspect of brain organization enabling our distinctive language abilities.”

RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN, “CONNECTIVITY OF LANGUAGE AREAS UNIQUE IN THE HUMAN BRAIN” AT SCIENCE DAILY; THE PAPER REQUIRES A FEE OR SUBSCRIPTION.

As the researchers put it in the paper, “In the anterior temporal lobe, connections shared between both species and uniquely human expansions are present. Changes to human language streams extend beyond the arcuate fasciculus, including a suite of expansions to connectivity within the temporal lobes.”

In recent years, researchers have discovered a number of other unique features of the human brain.

Read the rest at Mind Matters News, published by Discovery Institute’s Bradley Center for Natural and Artificial Intelligence.

Also out of Africa II

 <iframe width="1019" height="573" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/GIwPxoUuEsU" title="Forgotten Wars - The Nubian Invasion of Egypt (720 BC)" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>

Also out of Africa.

 <iframe width="1019" height="573" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/qvO3_kYRRw8" title="Units of History - Nubian Archers - Longbowmen of Africa DOCUMENTARY" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>

I.D and false positives.

 Applying the Design Filter to Hexagons

David Coppedge

Hexagons (at least macroscopic ones) are relatively rare in nature. The most common place we see them is in beehives. It could be argued that if bees are intelligently designed, for which there is ample independent evidence, then the structures they create are also intelligently designed. We might argue that hexagons are the most efficient packing spaces for the least amount of material. We might point out that the design also provides more robust protection against stress than square-shaped cells. We can see that the structural design performs a function.

Our propensity to infer design, though, has to face up to other examples of hexagons in the non-living world. Some have been difficult to explain by natural law.

Columnar Basalt

When lava cools, it often forms polygonal-shaped columns, and hexagons are the most common shape. Many physicists have tried to understand how this occurs. There have been partial solutions, but nothing fully satisfying. A paper in Physical Review Letters reproduces the hexagonal columns with a mathematical model. The basic idea is summarized in a news release at APS Physics, along with a stunning photo of a pyramid of hexagonal basalt columns at the Giant’s Causeway in Ireland. It sure looks designed. How do we make a proper inference?

The surface of cooling lava contracts more quickly than the still-warm liquid underneath, creating a stress that is relieved by the formation of cracks. Martin Hofmann from the Dresden University of Technology, Germany, and colleagues considered a uniform lava layer and calculated the energy released from different crack patterns. They found that, in the initial stages of cooling, when the cracks start to appear at random places on the surface, the energy release is greatest if the cracks intersect at 90-degree angles. Butas the lava continues to cool and shrink, and the cracks collectively start to penetrate into the bulk, more energy is released per crack if they intersect at 120-degree angles. This transition from individual to collective growth of the cracks drives the pattern from rectangular to hexagonal. The hexagonal pattern is then maintained as the lava cools further, eventually leading to an array of hexagonal columns, similar to those seen in nature. [Emphasis added.]

One can find columnar basalt in many locations: in the Grand Canyon, in Yellowstone Canyon, in Utah’s Zion National Park, in the Rocky Mountains, at Devil’s Postpile in the Sierra Nevada, and of course at the Giant’s Causeway, along with other places around the world. The uniformity of the columns can be impressive, but they are rarely perfect. Many times other polygons are mixed in with the hexagons. 

Saturn’s North Pole Hexagon

A giant hexagon made up of clouds has persisted for decades on Saturn’s north pole. This formation has baffled scientists since it was first discovered by the Voyager spacecraft in 1981. It appears to be unique in the Solar System, and it’s huge: 20,000 miles across and 60 miles deep. Saturn’s south pole also has a giant vortex, but not this polygonal shape. Space.com describes attempts to explain the feature:

Scientists have bandied about a number of explanations for the hexagon’s origin. For instance, water swirling inside a bucket can generate whirlpools possessing holes with geometric shapes. However, there is of course no giant bucket on Saturn holding this gargantuan hexagon.

Voyager and Cassini did identify many features of this strange hexagon that could help explain how it formed. For example, the points of the hexagon rotate around its center at almost exactly the same rate Saturn rotates on its axis. Moreover, a jet stream air current, much like the ones seen on Earth, flows eastward at up to about 220 mph (360 km/h) on Saturn, on a path that appears to follow the hexagon’s outline.

We know that standing waves can maintain nodes that are stationary with respect to their reference frame. Something like that appears to be at work in Saturn’s polar winds. The article says that the “bizarre giant hexagon on Saturn may finally be explained.” A model by a planetary scientist from New Mexico reproduces many of the observed properties of the hexagon.

The scientists ran computer simulations of an eastward jet flowing in a curving path near Saturn’s north pole. Small perturbations in the jet — the kind one might expect from jostling with other air currents — made it meander into a hexagonal shape. Moreover, this simulated hexagon spun around its center at speeds close to that of the real one.

The scenario that best fits Saturn’s hexagon involves shallow jets at the cloud level, study team members said. Winds below the cloud level apparently help keep the shape of the hexagon sharp and control the rate at which the hexagon drifts.

This hexagon may not be permanent, since it is subject to perturbations by processes that have no particular reason to maintain it. A simpler case is seen in Jupiter’s Great Red Spot that appears to be shrinking after three hundred years since it was first observed.

Tiny Non-Living Hexagons

Snowflakes are classic examples of orderly structures with a hexagonal shape. Other non-living hexagons include the ring structures of many organic molecules (at least the way they are diagrammed by chemists). Some minerals also display hexagonal packing. Most of us have seen soap bubbles form hexagonal interfaces when they are packed together. An occasional hexagon can be found in mud cracks on a dry creek bed.

Life-Produced Hexagons

Bees are not the only hexagon-makers in the living world. We find hexagons on tortoise shells and in the ommatidia of insects’ compound eyes. Some diatom species form free-standing hexagons in addition to the more common circles, triangles, squares, and pentagons. We humans, of course, are great hexagon-makers. Understanding their ideal packing geometry, we make them in telescope mirrors, geodesic domes, and soccer ball covers. Sometimes we create them just for their artistic value.

Proper Inferences

If humans create hexagons by intelligent design, is that true for other living things that make them? And how should we distinguish the design inference in life from the natural hexagons on Saturn or in columnar basalt? These questions provide an opportunity to understand William Dembski’s Design Filter.

It’s not enough that something be orderly. Casey Luskin has discussed columnar basalt, answering ID critics’ accusations that the Design Filter would generate a false positive. We’ve also explained why snowflakes do not pass the design filter, despite their elegance and beauty. It’s not enough, further, that something be rare or unique, like the Saturn hexagon. The Design Filter prefers a natural-law explanation if one can be found, or if the probability of the phenomenon’s occurrence by chance is sufficiently high.

But do we wait forever for a natural explanation? Planetary scientists struggled for 35 years to explain Saturn’s hexagon. Shouldn’t we wait to explain beehives and compound eyes without reference to intelligent design? Isn’t natural selection a natural law? (Actually, it’s more like magic than a law of nature, but we’ll entertain the question for the sake of argument.) 

Intelligent design is not a gaps argument. It’s a positive argument based on uniform experience. We have experience watching melting lava or drying mud forming geometric patterns. We have no other experience with hexagons forming on gas giants like Saturn, though. What do we do?

The Information Enigma

The short answer involves information. The hexagon on Saturn performs no function. Columnar basalt doesn’t say anything. Snowflakes don’t carry a message. They are mere emergent phenomena that are not that improbable, given laws of nature with which we are familiar. The Design Filter works properly by rejecting a design inference for these on the basis of probability and natural law. 

All the living examples of hexagons, by contrast, are produced by codes. Beeswax will not form into hexagon cells on its own, nor will silica arrange itself into the geometric shells of diatoms. A digital code made of DNA dictates the placement of ommatidia in the insect eye and patterns in the turtle shell. Each of these structures performs a function and is the outcome of processes directed by a code. 

The coded information makes use of natural laws, to be sure, but it arranges the parts into hexagons for a functional purpose. In our uniform experience, we know of one cause that can generate codes or instructions that lead to functional geometries — intelligence.

There is one sense, though, in which we could make a design inference for the nonliving hexagons like snowflakes, basalt columns, and planetary atmospheres. Certain features of the universe are so finely tuned that without them, water, atoms, stars, and planets would not exist. It takes a higher-order design to have a universe at all. 

You might even say that the elegant mathematics that allows us to describe hexagons is conceptual, not material, as are the aesthetic values that allow us to appreciate them. So even if the Design Filter rejects a design inference for some of the hexagons at one level, the mere existence of atoms, natural laws, and beauty warrants a design inference in a broader context for all of them. Without minds, we wouldn’t even be debating these questions.

This article was originally published in 2015.

Lamarck: Darwinism can't live with him, can't live without him.

 Darwin and the Ghost of Lamarck

Neil Thomas

Despite his amply documented religious ambivalences there are clear signs that Charles Darwin was never finally able to “close his account” with God. As late as 1870 he wrote to Joseph Hooker that he felt his theology was “in a muddle.” He found it difficult to conceive of the universe as having arisen by blind chance yet could perceive no evidence of consistently beneficent design. Three years later in a letter to a Dutch correspondent he wrote of the design/God issue as being “beyond the scope of man’s intellect” and just four years before his death proclaimed the problem “insoluble.”1

Religion and Biology in Conflict

Darwin’s spiritual life and biological work were so interdependent that — as he saw matters — if his theory of natural selection were once proved incontrovertible, this would entirely rule out the theory of any tutelary deity having overseen the development of life on earth.2 All would be the sole result of chance mutations and natural selection. He steadfastly refused the harmonizing, bridge-building entreaties offered him by Charles Lyell, Charles Kingsley, and others of his circle to the effect that natural selection could simply be understood as the operational modality which God had chosen to create His creatures.

His work and beliefs being so indissolubly linked, it is inevitable that the residue of religious faith that Darwin retained from his early years caused him serious pause when he began to assess the epistemological status of his biological work. For if life had really arisen by providential guidance, what price his strictly secular version of life’s evolution?  This was a circle it was clearly not easy to square and his fretting over the uncompromising binary could sometimes make him appear as a latter-day avatar of the ancient Greek philosopher Pyrrho (who doubted whether mankind had adequate grounds for claiming any knowledge with absolute certainty). Darwin certainly evidenced an ultra-pyrrhonist streak when he questioned whether his own reasoning, which in his opinion had descended from lowly and unreliable baboon ancestry, could be a dependable guide to truth at all. 

Given his inability to resolve fundamental conflicts it was perhaps inevitable that Darwin in his later decades even began to harbor doubts about the efficacy of his pièce de resistance, natural selection, with its (claimed) capacity to create the whole spectrum of the world’s life forms autonomously. Could such a positive and creative process, he asked himself, have been set in train by such a negative phenomenon as natural selection, an entity which Darwin, at the behest of many well-intentioned friends, eventually consented to revise downward to reconceptualize more clearly and in more modest and realistic terms as “natural preservation”?  The trouble in the latter case of course was that notions of naturalistic evolution would now seem to be less logically defensible since mere preservation, by definition, cannot at the same time be creative. 

Ascending Mount Improbable

Hence, following first publication of the Origin in November 1859, Darwin began casting around for supplementary theories to that of natural selection, even reverting to once firmly rejected evolutionary ideas.3 For now he was even prepared to reconsider the Lamarckian/Erasmian idea of the relative use/disuse of organs as a co-determinant of biological development. This is exemplified when in his Descent of Man (1871) he found himself caught up in the challenging position of trying to explain how an ape might have “transitioned” into a human being. For the intuitively obvious morphological link between ape and (wo)man becomes on closer inspection considerably less straightforward than it might superficially appear — something shown up very clearly in the different language competences of apes and humans.

How was Darwin’s particular “Mount Improbable” to be ascended and the decidedly “uphill” transition from ape to human explained? To establish a convincing evolution of ape to human it would first be necessary to establish that simians could over time have increased their communicative vocabularies so as to transform relatively inarticulate emotional cries into specific vocal symbols. But this in turn brings up the related problem of how to explain the rapid mental processing on which articulate speech depends. Without the simultaneous co-adaptation of the simian brain how could the facility of speech, which depends on the interdependent agency of the brain in tandem with the specialized organs of vocal articulation, have developed by the largely unguided processes of natural selection?  In other words, how could chance allied to natural selection have acquired the uncanny capacity to synchronize operations? There are clear signs that Darwin at length found this problem to be so intractable that he was forced back on what he had once denounced as the Lamarckian heresy in order to put together a tolerably coherent explanation.

In order to definitively prove the ape/(wo)man connection it would be necessary to point simultaneously to a precise morphological and neurological pathway of development. By contrast, the explanation Darwin advanced in The Descent of Man was, it must be noted, excessively speculative and ill-focused. It is particularly telling that he felt it necessary to appeal here to Lamarckian ideas in order to put together his rather flimsy conjecture. He writes in Descent,

The mental powers of some earlier progenitor of man must have been more highly developed than in any existing ape, before even the most imperfect form of speech could have come into use; but we may confidently believe that the continued use and advancement of this power would have reacted on the mind itself, by enabling and encouraging it to carry on long trains of thought.4 [Emphasis added.]

Passing quickly over the suspicious overuse of the conditional tense (compare the number of conditional “must haves” and “could haves” in the cited words) and that rather nervous, whistling-in-the-dark phrase “we may confidently believe,” it is his dependence on the supposedly discredited Lamarckian idea of the use/disuse of organs which is most conspicuous here since such a conception is not consistent with his original theory of natural selection. It appears that Darwin at this point was coming perilously close to that “apostasy from his own theory” for which Wallace was arraigned in the mid 1860s. At the very least, we sense that Darwin’s trumpet was giving forth a less certain sound in 1871 when we contrast it with the more confident but less thought-through development of his ideas in the period 1838-1859. His loss of confidence in his prior convictions may in turn have contributed to the fact that some later scientists too found it difficult to lay the ghost of Lamarck to rest, and this despite the fact that 20th-century advances in knowledge of Mendelian genetics appeared to rule out a Lamarckian evolutionary pathway.5

Re-enter Lamarck

The lure of Lamarck was exemplified most strikingly in the case of early 20th-century Viennese biologist Paul Kammerer and the unhappy affair of the “midwife toad.” The highly regarded Kammerer made the following astounding claim, which I cite here in the words of his modern biographer:

Kammerer took a type of toad that is one of the few amphibian species that mates on land and forced them to breed in water. As a result the males developed nuptial pads [= adhesive calluses] which are regularly found on other male toad species. These nuptial pads help the male toad grasp the slippery female when they copulate in water. Kammerer asserted that not only was he successful in inducing the development of nuptial pads but also that they were passed on to the next generation.6

Unfortunately, it was later revealed that the mating pads had been faked by the use of dark ink stains and a short time after this discovery Kammerer was moved to take his own life.

There is no doubting the attractiveness of the Lamarckian theory of acquired characteristics and their supposed heritability. It promotes the comforting notion that parents can pass down not only their wealth and property to their progeny but also the benign results of their own physical efforts at self-improvement.7 It is without doubt a more inspiring philosophy than is Darwinism; but such sentimental considerations were an extraneous issue to Kammerer who simply found himself unable to accept the postulation that “natural selection” possessed the efficacy claimed for it by its originator. Hence, exactly like the later Darwin himself, Kammerer was driven — apparently at whatever cost — to seek a Lamarckian supplement to prop up what he deemed the inadequate Darwinian theory. 

 A similar scenario arose in the case of  the late polymath Arthur Koestler who was also moved to flirt with Lamarckian ideas out of a dissatisfaction with Darwinism as a defensible evolutionary pathway.8 Koestler felt that Darwinian mechanisms could be at best only part of the picture, claiming that “there must be other principles and forces at work on the vast canvas of evolutionary phenomena.”9 He cited the veteran Ludwig von Bertalanffy on this point, Bertalanffy having been one of the distinguished contributors to the interdisciplinary conference of internationally renowned scientists and scholars organized by Koestler in Alpbach in 1969 entitled Beyond Reductionism:10

If differential reproduction and selective advantage are the only directive factors of evolution, it is hard to see why evolution has ever progressed beyond the rabbit, the herring or even the bacterium which are unsurpassed in their reproductive capacities.11

In light of this much-reported deficiency in the explanatory power of Darwinian theory, Lamarckism was the idea to which Koestler was drawn as at least one possible stratagem for plugging the Darwinian gap.

Theology and Biology

The Darwin who had once described his theological position as muddled became no less bewildered towards the end of his life, a fact which is illustrated by two letters he wrote in the final decade of his life. In a famous letter to his botanist friend Joseph Hooker of February 1, 1871 he wrote, 

It is often said that all the conditions for the first production of a living organism are now present, which could ever [= always] have been present — But if (and Oh! What a big if?) we could conceive in some warm little pond with all sorts and ammonia and phosphoric salts, — light, heat, electricity etc., present, that a protein compound was chemically formed, ready to undergo still more complex changes, at the present day such matter would be instantly devoured, or absorbed, which would not have been the case before living creatures were formed.12

Yet the same Darwin who to all appearances set so much store by his theory of naturalistic evolution — enthusing unguardedly about an origin of life from spontaneous generation — was nevertheless capable of writing in his 1876 Autobiography of 

the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting, I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist. 

It is clearly not possible to postulate at one and the same time that sentient beings are the result of divine creation and of a random chemical reaction, and this contradiction underscores Darwin’s abiding ambivalence on the subject of creation and evolution. These theological ambivalences also had a correlative in his work as a naturalist where his position remained essentially interrogative as he shifted in his mind between one theoretical possibility and another.

“To Be or Not to Be…”

It should be stressed that Darwin’s hesitancies and diffidences as a biologist were real and not the product of false modesty, as is evidenced in the no fewer than five amended editions of the Origin which followed in quick succession in the decade following the first edition of 1859. In the later, revised editions, he did his honest best to integrate criticisms made by others (to which he always remained acutely sensitive). There was in him little of the blinkered zealot which we tend to associate with some modern proponents of his theory. Darwin had always conceded that he was advancing his present theory until such time as a better one might present itself.  It seems that what at first blush might be mistaken for mere gentlemanly humility was in fact meant in earnest.

It is therefore likely that Darwin would have positively welcomed many modern findings as a means of complementing and enriching his own work, and the last few decades have in fact provided an intriguing addendum to the whole Darwin/Lamarck saga. The idea of heritability “beyond genes” is now regularly studied under the umbrella rubric of epigenetics;13 and although some results of this recent research have proved resistant to definitive interpretation, modern scientific advances have at the very least amply confirmed the worries of Darwin and the suspicions of Kammerer and Koestler that Darwinian explanations could not possibly represent the whole story. (See, for example, the conspectus of diverging modern views covered at length recently by Stephen Buranyi in the UK newspaper The Guardian, asking “Do We Need a New Theory of Evolution?”)

This is surely a factor with an important bearing on the interpretation of the Origin. Many of Darwin’s peers did not conceive of his work as a univocal tract but as a more nuanced discussion document to which some such as Kingsley, Lyell, and even Huxley (who was never able to assent to the proposition of natural selection) had no hesitation about producing their own “minority reports.” In my view it is in such a “dialogic” way that the Origin might most appropriately be read in our own day too — as a commendable effort to penetrate impenetrable mysteries but whose author might best be listened to, in Coleridge’s phrase, “with no presumption of inerrancy.”

Notes

See Nick Spencer, Darwin and God (London: SPCK), pp. 96-9.

Darwin wrote defiantly to Charles Lyell on this subject, “I would give absolutely nothing for theory of nat. selection, if it require miraculous additions at any one stage of descent.” (Charles Darwin to Charles Lyell, October 11, 1859, Darwin Correspondence Project, Letter no. 253, University of Cambridge, https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-2503.xml.)

In later life he appeared touchingly open to incorporating responses to a variety of criticisms leveled at him by other scientists, with the result that, over a decade, the Origin went into no less than five revised editions, its sixth, heavily emended version being markedly different in many respects from the 1859 original. 

The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, edited by James Moore and Adrian Desmond (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 110.

A giraffe for instance cannot elongate its neck (and hence the necks of its progeny) by repeatedly craning towards the higher branches of trees, 

Kaus Taschwer, The Case of Paul Kammerer: The Most Controversial Biologist of His Time (Montreal: Bunim and Bannigan, 2019), p. 9.

See on this point Arthur Koestler, The Case of the Midwife Toad (London: Hutchinson, 1971), pp. 27-30.

Koestler cited with approval the view of the mid 20th-century scientist C. H. Waddington that chance mutation was like throwing bricks together in heaps in the hope that they would arrange themselves into an inhabitable house.

Koestler, Midwife Toad, p. 129.

Beyond Reductionism: The Alpbach Symposium, edited by Koestler and J. R. Smythies (London: Hutchinson, 1969). Cf. in that volume Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s “Chance or Law,” pp. 56-84, and for a balanced assessment of Koestler’s intellectual achievements and weaknesses Michael Scammell, Koestler: The Indispensable Intellectual (London; Faber and Faber, 2011). 

Koestler, Midwife Toad, p.129.

Darwin Correspondence Project, Letter no. 7471: https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-7471.xml

See John and Mary Gribbin, On the Origin of Evolution: Tracing Darwin’s Dangerous Idea from Aristotle to DNA (London: Collins, 2020), pp. 230-252 (chapter titled “The New Lamarckism”), Paul Davies’s recent chapter entitled “Darwinism 2.0” in his The Demon in the Machine: How Hidden Webs of Information Are Solving the Mystery of Life (London: Penguin, 2020), pp. 109-143, and Nessa Carey’s The Epigenetics Revolution: How Modern Biology is Rewriting our Understanding of Genetics, Disease and Inheritance (London: Icon, 2011).

yet more on why biology resembles technology.

 Irreducible Complexity in Ant Behavior Triggers a Recognition of Intelligent Design

David Klinghoffer

Here’s a very interesting episode of ID the Future, with host Eric Anderson and Animal Algorithms author Eric Cassell. The topic of conversation is the algorithm-driven foraging behavior of harvester ants. The design argument here is not from the algorithm alone but from the irreducibly complex combination of that with physical signs (cuticular hydrocarbons) exchanged by the ants and the sensors they use to interpret the signs. These must all work in concert, or the ants are out of luck. How did an unguided evolutionary process give each capacity to these social animals, each highly complex in itself but of no use unless present together? The evident foresight that guided the devising of this behavior is what triggers the recognition of intelligent design.

Cassell discusses recent research published in the Journal of the Royal Society Interface, “A feedback control principle common to several biological and engineered systems,” which draws an unapologetic parallel between human engineering and biological systems. As the authors write, “We hypothesize that theoretical frameworks from distributed computing may offer new ways to analyse adaptation behaviour of biology systems, and in return, biological strategies may inspire new algorithms for discrete-event feedback control in engineering.” In other words, biology and engineering can be mutually informative to each other. Cassell has written about this research, too, at Evolution News, and about similarly remarkable behaviors in Animal Algorithms. Download the podcast or listen to it here.

No free lunch re:information.

 Conservation of Information — The Theorems

William A. Dembski

I am reviewing Jason Rosenhouse’s new book, The Failures of Mathematical Anti-Evolutionism (Cambridge University Press), serially. For the full series so far, go here.

Until about 2007, conservation of information functioned more like a forensic tool for discovering and analyzing surreptitious insertions of information: So and so says they got information for nothing. Let’s see what they actually did. Oh yeah, here’s where they snuck in the information. Around 2007, however, a fundamental shift occurred in my work on conservation of information. Bob Marks and I began to collaborate in earnest, and then two very bright students of his also came on board. Initially we were analyzing some of the artificial life simulations that Jason Rosenhouse mentions in his book, as well as some other simulations (such as Thomas Schneider’s ev). As noted, we found that the information emerging from these systems was always more than adequately accounted for in terms of the information initially inputted. 

Yet around 2007, we started proving theorems that precisely tracked the information in these systems, laying out their information costs, in exact quantitative terms, and showing that the information problem always became quantitatively no better, and often worse, the further one backtracked causally to explain it. Conservation of information therefore doesn’t so much say that information is conserved as that at best it could be conserved and that the amount of information to be accounted for, when causally backtracked, may actually increase. This is in stark contrast to Darwinism, which attempts to explain complexity from simplicity rather than from equal or greater complexity. Essentially, then, conservation of information theorems argue for an information regress. This regress could then be interpreted in one of two ways: (1) the information was always there, front-loaded from the beginning; or (2) the information was put in, exogenously, by an intelligence. 

An Article of Faith

Rosenhouse feels the force of the first option. True, he dismisses conservation of information theorems as in the end “merely asking why the universe is as it is.” (p. 217) But when discussing artificial life, he admits, in line with the conservation of information theorems, that crucial information is not just in the algorithm but also in the environment. (p. 214) Yet if the crucial information for biological evolution (as opposed to artificial life evolution) is built into the environment, where exactly is it and how exactly is it structured? It does no good to say, as Rosenhouse does, that “natural selection serves as a conduit for transmitting environmental information into the genomes of organisms.” (p. 215) That’s simply an article of faith. Templeton Prize winner Holmes Rolston, who is not an ID guy, rejects this view outright. Writing on the genesis of information in his book Genes, Genesis, and God (pp. 352–353), he responded to the view that the information was always there:

The information (in DNA) is interlocked with an information producer-processor (the organism) that can transcribe, incarnate, metabolize, and reproduce it. All such information once upon a time did not exist but came into place; this is the locus of creativity. Nevertheless, on Earth, there is this result during evolutionary history. The result involves significant achievements in cybernetic creativity, essentially incremental gains in information that have been conserved and elaborated over evolutionary history. The know-how, so to speak, to make salt is already in the sodium and chlorine, but the know-how to make hemoglobin molecules and lemurs is not secretly coded in the carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen…. 

So no, the information was not always there. And no, Darwinian evolution cannot, according to the conservation of information theorems, create information from scratch. The way out of this predicament for Darwinists (and I’ve seen this move repeatedly from them) is to say that conservation of information may characterize computer simulations of evolution, but that real-life evolution has some features not captured by the simulations. But if so, how can real-life evolution be subject to scientific theory if it resists all attempts to model it as a search? Conservation of information theorems are perfectly general, covering all search. 

Push Comes to Shove

Yet ironically, Rosenhouse is in no position to take this way out because, as noted in my last post in this series, he sees these computer programs as “not so much simulations of evolution [but as] instances of it.” (p. 209) Nonetheless, when push comes to shove, Rosenhouse has no choice, even at the cost of inconsistency, but to double down on natural selection as the key to creating biological information. The conservation of information theorems, however, show that natural selection, if it’s going to have any scientific basis, merely siphons from existing sources of information, and thus cannot ultimately explain it. 

As with specified complexity, in proving conservation of information theorems, we have taken a largely pre-theoretic notion and turned it into a full-fledged theoretic notion. In the idiom of Rosenhouse, we have moved the concept from track 1 to track 2. A reasonably extensive technical literature on conservation of information theorems now exists. Here are three seminal peer-reviewed articles addressing these theorems on which I’ve collaborated (for more, go here):

William A. Dembski and Robert J. Marks II “Conservation of Information in Search: Measuring the Cost of Success,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics A, Systems & Humans, vol.5, #5, September 2009, pp.1051-1061

William A. Dembski and Robert J. Marks II, “The Search for a Search: Measuring the Information Cost of Higher Level Search,” Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics, Vol.14, No.5, 2010, pp. 475-486.

William A. Dembski, Winston Ewert and Robert J. Marks II, “A General Theory of Information Cost Incurred by Successful Search,” Biological Information (Singapore: World Scientific, 2013), pp. 26-63.

A Conspiracy of Silence

Rosenhouse cites none of this literature. In this regard, he follows Wikipedia, whose subentry on conservation of information likewise fails to cite any of this literature. The most recent reference in that Wikipedia subentry is to a 2002 essay by Erik Tellgren, in which he claims that my work on conservation of information is “mathematically unsubstantiated.” That was well before any of the above theorems were ever proved. That’s like writing in the 1940s, when DNA’s role in heredity was unclear, that its role in heredity was “biologically unsubstantiated,” and leaving that statement in place even after the structure of DNA (by 1953) and the genetic code (by 1961) had been elucidated. It’s been two decades since Tellgren made this statement, and it remains in Wikipedia as the authoritative smackdown of conservation of information. 

At least it can be said of Rosenhouse’s criticism of conservation of information that it is more up to date than Wikipedia’s account of it. But Rosenhouse leaves the key literature in this area uncited and unexplained (and if he did cite it, I expect he would misexplain it). Proponents of intelligent design have grown accustomed to this conspiracy of silence, where anything that rigorously undermines Darwinism is firmly ignored (much like our contemporary media is selective in its reporting, focusing exclusively on the party line and sidestepping anything that doesn’t fit the desired narrative). Indeed, I challenge readers of this review to try to get the three above references inserted into this Wikipedia subentry. Good luck getting past the biased editors who control all Wikipedia entries related to intelligent design.

So, what is a conservation of information theorem? Readers of Rosenhouse’s book learn that such theorems exist. But Rosenhouse neither states nor summarizes these theorems. The only relevant theorems he recaps are the no free lunch theorems, which show that no algorithm outperforms any other algorithm when suitably averaged across various types of fitness landscapes. But conservation of information theorems are not no free lunch theorems. Conservation of information picks up where no free lunch leaves off. No free lunch says there’s no universally superior search algorithm. Thus, to the degree a search does well at some tasks, it does poorly at others. No free lunch in effect states that every search involves a zero-sum tradeoff. Conservation of information, by contrast, starts by admitting that for particular searches, some do better than others, and then asks what allows one search to do better than another. It answers that question in terms of active information. Conservation of information theorems characterize active information. 

A Bogus Notion?

To read Rosenhouse, you would think that active information is a bogus notion. But in fact, active information is a useful concept that all of us understand intuitively, even if we haven’t put a name to it. It arises in search. Search is a very general concept, and it encompasses evolution (Rosenhouse, recall, even characterized evolution in terms of “searching protein space”). Most interesting searches are needle-in-the-haystack problems. What this means is that there’s a baseline search that could in principle find the needle (e.g., exhaustive search or uniform random sampling), but that would be highly unlikely to find the needle in any realistic amount of time. What you need, then, is a better search, one that can find the needle with a higher probability so that it is likely, with the time and resources on hand, to actually find the needle. 

We all recognize active information. You’re on a large field. You know an easter egg is hidden somewhere in it. Your baseline search is hopeless — you stand no realistic chance of finding the Easter egg. But now someone tells you warm, cold, warm, warmer, hot, you’re burning up. That’s a better search, and it’s better because you are being given better information. Active information measures the amount of information that needs to be expended to improve on a baseline search to make it a better search. In this example, note that there are many possible directions that Easter egg hunters might receive in order to try to find the egg. Most such directions will not lead to finding the egg. Accordingly, if finding the egg is finding a needle in a haystack, so is finding the right directions among the different possible directions. Active information measures the information cost of finding the right directions.

Treasure Island

In the same vein, consider a search for treasure on an island. If the island is large and the treasure is well hidden, the baseline search may be hopeless — way too improbable to stand a reasonable chance of finding the treasure. But suppose you now get a treasure map where X marks the spot of the treasure. You’ve now got a better search. What was the informational cost of procuring that better search? Well, it involved sorting through all possible maps of the island and finding one that would identify the treasure location. But for every map where X marks the right spot, there are many where X marks the wrong spot. According to conservation of information, finding the right map faces an improbability no less, and possibly greater, than finding the treasure via the baseline search. Active information measures the relevant (im)probability

We’ve seen active information before in the Dawkins Weasel example. The baseline search for METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL stands no hope of success. It requires a completely random set of keystrokes typing all the right letters and spaces of this phrase without error in one fell swoop. But given a fitness function that assigns higher fitness to phrases where letters match the target phrase METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL, we’ve now got a better search, one that will converge to the target phrase quickly and with high probability. Most fitness functions, however, don’t take you anywhere near this target phrase. So how did Dawkins find the right fitness function to evolve to the target phrase? For that, he needed active information.

My colleagues and I have proved several conservation of information theorems, which come in different forms depending on the type and structure of information needed to render a search successful. Here’s the most important conservation of information theorem proved to date. It appears in the third article cited above (i.e., “A General Theory of Information Cost Incurred by Successful Search”):

Wrapping Up the Discussion

Even though the statement of this theorem is notation-heavy and will appear opaque to most readers, I give it nonetheless because, as unreadable as it may seem, it exhibits certain features that can be widely appreciated, thereby helping to wrap up this discussion of conservation of information, especially as it relates to Rosenhouse’s critique of the concept. Consider therefore the following three points:

The first thing to see in this theorem is that it is an actual mathematical theorem. It rises to Rosenhouse’s track 2. A peer-reviewed literature now surrounds the work. The theorem depends on advanced probability theory, measure theory, and functional analysis. The proof requires vector-valued integration. This is graduate-level real analysis. Rosenhouse does algebraic graph theory, so this is not his field, and he gives no indication of actually understanding these theorems. For him to forgo providing even the merest sketch of the mathematics underlying this work because “it would not further our agenda to do so” (p. 212–213) and for him to dismiss these theorems as “trivial musings” (p. 269) betrays an inability to grapple with the math and understand its implications, as much as it betrays his agenda to deep-six conservation of information irrespective of its merits.

The Greek letter mu denotes a null search and the Greek letter nu an alternative search. These are respectively the baseline search and the better search described earlier. Active information here, measured as log(r/q), measures the information required in a successful search for a search (usually abbreviated S4S), which is the information to find nu to replace mu. Searches can themselves be subject to search, and it’s these higher level searches that are at the heart of the conservation of information theorems. Another thing to note about mu and nu is that they don’t prejudice the types of searches or the probabilities that represent them. Mu and nu are represented as probability measures. But they can be any probability measures that assign at least as much probability to the target T as uniform probability (the assumption being that any search can at least match the performance of a uniform probability search — this seems totally reasonable). What this means is that conservation of information is not tied to uniform probability or equiprobability. Rosenhouse, by contrast, claims that all mathematical intelligent design arguments follow what he calls the Basic Argument from Improbability, which he abbreviates BAI (p. 126). BAI attributes to design proponents the most simple-minded assignment of probabilities (namely uniform probability or equiprobability). Conservation of information, like specified complexity, by contrast, attempts to come to terms with the probabilities as they actually are. This theorem, in its very statement, shows that it does not fall under Rosenhouse’s BAI. 

The search space Omega (Ω) in this example is finite. Its finiteness, however, in no way undercuts the generality of this theorem. All scientific work, insofar as it measures and gauges physical reality, will use finite numbers and finite spaces. The mathematical models used may involve infinities, but these can in practice always be approximated finitely. This means that these models belong to combinatorics. Rosenhouse, throughout his book, makes off that combinatorics is a dirty word, and that intelligent design, insofar as it looks to combinatorics, is focused on simplistic finite models and limits itself to uniform or equiprobabilities. But this is nonsense. Any object, mathematical or physical, consisting of finitely many parts related to each other in finitely many ways is a combinatorial object. Moreover, combinatorial objects don’t care what probability distributions are placed on them. Protein machines are combinatorial objects. Computer programs (and these include the artificial life simulations with which Rosenhouse is infatuated) are combinatorial objects. The bottom line is that it is no criticism at all of intelligent design to say that it makes extensive use of combinatorics. 

Next, “Closing Thoughts on Jason Rosenhouse.”

Editor’s note: This review is cross-posted with permission of the author from BillDembski.com.

What they think they know that Just ain't so?

 Darwinists’ Delusion: Closing Thoughts on Jason Rosenhouse

William A. Dembski

I have been reviewing Jason Rosenhouse’s new book, The Failures of Mathematical Anti-Evolutionism (Cambridge University Press), serially. This is the final post in the review. For the full series, go here.

Would the world be better off if Jason Rosenhouse had never written The Failures of Mathematical Anti-Evolutionism? I, for one, am happy he did write it. It shows what the current state of thinking is by Darwinists on the mathematical ideas that my colleagues and I in the intelligent design movement have developed over the years. In particular, it shows how little progress they’ve made in understanding and engaging with these ideas. It also alerted me to the resurgence of artificial life simulations. Not that artificial life ever went away. But Rosenhouse cites what is essentially a manifesto by 53 authors (including ID critics Christoph Adami, Robert Pennock, and Richard Lenski) that all is well with artificial life: “The Surprising Creativity of Digital Evolution.” (2020) In fact, conservation of information shows that artificial life is a hopeless enterprise. But as my colleague Jonathan Wells underscored in his book Zombie Science, some disreputable ideas are just too pleasing and comforting for Darwinists to disown, and artificial life is one of them. So it was helpful to learn from Rosenhouse about the coming zombie apocalypse.

Selective Criticism

As indicated at the start of this review, I’ve been selective in my criticisms of Rosenhouse’s book, focusing especially on where he addressed my work and on where it impinged on that of some of my close colleagues in the intelligent design movement. I could easily have found more to criticize, but this review is already long. Leaving aside his treatment of young-earth creationists and the Second Law of Thermodynamics, he reflexively repeats Darwinian chestnuts, such as that gene duplication increases information, as though a mere increase in storage capacity can explain biologically useful information (“We’ve doubled the size of your hard drive and you now have twice the information!”). And wherever possible, he tries to paint my colleagues as rubes and ignoramuses. Thus he portrays Stephen Meyer as assuming a simplistic probabilistic model of genetic change when in the original source (Darwin’s Doubt) he is clearly citing an older understanding (by the Wistar mathematicians back in the 1960s) and then makes clear that a newer, more powerful understanding is available today. Disinformation is a word in vogue these days, and it characterizes much of Rosenhouse’s book.

In closing, I want to consider an example that appears near the start of The Failures of Mathematical Anti-Evolutionism (p. 32) and reappears at the very end in the “Coda” (pp. 273–274). It’s typical, when driving on a major street, to have cross streets where one side of the cross street is directly across from the other, and so the traffic on the cross street across the major street is direct. Yet it can happen, more often on country roads, that the cross street involves what seem to be two T-intersections that are close together, and so crossing the major street to stay on the cross street requires a jog in the traffic pattern. 

Rosenhouse is offering a metaphor here, with the first option representing intelligent design, the second Darwinism. According to him, the straight path across the major street represents “a sensible arrangement of roads of the sort a civil engineer would devise” whereas the joggy path represents “an absurd and potentially dangerous arrangement that only makes sense when you understand the historical events leading up to it.” (p. 32) Historical contingencies unguided by intelligence, in which roads are built without coordination, thus explain the second arrangement, and by implication explain biological adaptation.

Rosenhouse grew up near some roads that followed the second arrangement. Recently he learned that in place of two close-by T-intersections, the cross street now goes straight across. He writes:

Apparently, in the years since I left home, that intersection has been completely redesigned. The power that be got tired of cleaning up after the numerous crashes and human misery resulting from the poor design of the roads. So they shut it all down for several months and completely redid the whole thing. Now the arrangement of roads makes perfect sense, and the number of crashes there has declined dramatically. The anti-evolutionists are right about one thing: we really can distinguish systems that were designed from those that evolved gradually. Unfortunately for them, the anatomy of organisms points overwhelmingly toward evolution and just as overwhelmingly from design. (p. 273–274)

A Failed Metaphor

The blindness on display in this passage is staggering, putting on full display the delusional world of Darwinists and contrasting it with the real world that is chock-full of design. Does it really need to be pointed out that roads are designed? That where they go is designed? And that even badly laid out roads are nonetheless laid out by design? But as my colleague Winston Ewert pointed out to me, Rosenhouse’s story doesn’t add up even if we ignore the design that’s everywhere. On page 32, he explains that the highway was built first and then later towns arose on either side of the highway, eventually connecting the crossroads to the highway. But isn’t it obvious, upon the merest reflection, that whoever connected the second road to the highway could have built it opposite to the first road that was already there. So why didn’t they do it? The historical timing of the construction of the roads doesn’t explain it. Something else must be going on.

There are in fact numerous such intersections in the US. Typically they are caused by grid corrections due to the earth’s curvature. In other words, they are a consequence of fitting a square grid onto a spherical earth. Further, such intersections can actually be safer, as a report on staggered junctions by the European Road Safety Decision Support System makes clear. So yes, this example is a metaphor, but not for the power of historical contingency to undercut intelligent design, but for the delusive power of Darwinism to look to historical contingency for explanations that support Darwinism but that under even the barest scrutiny fall apart. 

Enough said. Stay tuned for the second edition of The Design Inference!

Editor’s note: This review is cross-posted with permission of the author from BillDembski.com.

Trouble comes in pairs for Darwinism?

 Günter Bechly: Species Pairs Wreck Darwinism

Evolution News @DiscoveryCSC

On a new episode of ID the Future, distinguished German paleontologist Günter Bechly continues a discussion of his new argument against modern evolutionary theory. According to Bechly, contemporary species pairs diverge hardly at all over millions of years, even when isolated from each other, and yet we’re supposed to believe that the evolutionary process built dramatically distinct body plans in similar time frames at various other times in the history of life. Why believe that? He suggests this pattern of relative stasis among species pairs strikes a significant and damaging blow to Darwinian theory.

In this Part 2 episode, Bechly and host Casey Luskin discuss mice/rat pairs, cattle and bison, horses and donkeys, Asian and African elephants, the Asian black bear and the South American spectacled bear, river hippos and West African pygmy hippos, the common dolphin and the bottle-nosed dolphin, and the one outlier in this pattern, chimpanzees and humans. If chimps and humans really did evolve from a common ancestor, why do they appear to be the lone exception to this pattern of modern species pairs differing in only trivial ways? Bechly notes that whatever one’s explanation, there appears to be clear evidence here of human exceptionalism. He and Luskin go on to cast doubt on the idea that mindless evolutionary processes could have engineered the suite of changes necessary to convert an ape ancestor into upright walking, talking, technology-fashioning human beings.

What about Hawaiian silversword plants? They seem to have evolved into dramatically different body plans in the past few million years. Are these an exception to Bechly’s claimed pattern of species pair stasis? After all, the differences among silverswords can be quite dramatic, with differences far more extensive than what we find between, say, Asian and African elephants or horse and donkey. Drawing on a second article on the topic, he notes that some extant species of plants possess considerable phenotypic plasticity. They have the capacity to change quite dramatically and still breed with other very different varieties. This appears to be the case with silverswords. There is more to his argument. Tune in to hear Dr. Bechly respond to additional objections that Dr. Luskin raises.  Download the podcast or listen to it here. Part 1 of their conversation is here.